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VIVARIUM is devoted in particular to the profane side of mediaeval philosophy
and the intellectual life of the Middle Ages and Renaissance.

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Dream Bodies and Dream Pains in Augustine's
*"De Natura et Origine Animae"**

MARY SIRRIDGE

"St. Perpetua, for example, seemed to herself in dreams to be wrestling with a certain Egyptian after being turned into a man."
Augustine, *De Natura et Origine Animae*¹

ABSTRACT

In his *De Natura et Origine Animae*, an answer to a work by Vincentius Victor, Augustine was drawn into attempting to answer some questions about what kind of reality dream-bodies, dream-worlds and dream-pains have. In this paper I concentrate on Augustine's attempts to show that none of Victor's arguments for the corporeality of the soul are any good, and that Victor's inflated claims about the extent of the soul's self-knowledge are the result of mistaking self-awareness for self-knowledge. Augustine takes the position that the feelings we have in dreams and the feelings of the dead, although they are real feelings, are not always the feelings they seem to be. This position is consistent with Augustine's later works, though it departs from his understanding of these issues in his earliest works.

In *De Natura et Origine Animae*, written around 419 A.D., Augustine was drawn into attempting to answer some questions about what kind of reality dream-bodies, dream-worlds, and dream-pains have. Did St. Perpetua really feel that she was struggling, or did she merely dream that she felt that way? Was she really struggling? Was she really wrestling? Was she

* I thank Marcia Colish and Fr. Roland Teske, who heard or read earlier versions of this paper and made important suggestions.

¹ Augustine, *De Natura et Origine Animae*, IV. 16. 26. 405, ed. C.F. Urba & J. Zycha, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (hereafter CSEL) 60, Vienna 1913, 301-419 (hereafter DNOA). Also titled *De Anima et eius Origine*, *Patrologia Cursus Completus Patrum Latinorum* (hereafter PL) 44, 475-548 (I have consulted the English translation, *The Nature and Origin of the Soul*, in: *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, Vol. 23.1, ed. and transl. R. Teske, S.J., Hyde Park, NY 1997, 466-561.

really a male while wrestling with the Egyptian? And what about the Egyptian?

Augustine got entangled in a discussion of these questions in the course of responding to a treatise on the soul by one Vincentius Victor. In this treatise, which has excited effusive enthusiasm among Augustine's own friends and associates,² Victor argues that the human soul is corporeal. In support of this position, he has cited the Bible narrative about Lazarus and Dives. Moreover, Victor considers it obvious that each soul is infused directly by God. Given the soul's complete knowledge of its "properties and nature" (*sua qualitate naturaque*), Victor argues, simply by reflecting upon his own soul Augustine should have arrived quickly at the realization that the soul is corporeal, and that each man's soul, then his spirit, are created *de novo* from and by the breath of God. From this position on the origin of the soul, Victor argues for an assortment of theses, some of which are typically Pelagian,³ e.g., that there is no way for the soul to inherit original sin, and that unbaptized infants can be saved by the prayers of the faithful.

In this paper I will not deal directly with Augustine's attack on Victor's brand of Pelagian theological views. I will concentrate instead on his attempts to show that Victor's claims about the extent and value of the soul's self-knowledge are wildly exaggerated, and that none of Victor's arguments for the corporeality of the soul are any good. It is in the course of giving his own explanation of the story of Lazarus and Dives that Augustine is drawn into a discussion of dreaming. With respect to their actions, bodies and feelings, the dead resemble dreamers, he says; but it is a good deal easier to think about dream experience than about after-death experience. As an example of dream experience, Augustine pro-

² Victor's work is lost, and we are left with Augustine's reconstruction, including a fair number of passages which purport to be direct quotations. The quotations of Book IV, which takes the form of a letter directed to Vincentius Victor himself, are presumably accurate in the main, since they match those in Books I and II, which were originally addressed to recipients who were familiar with Vincentius Victor's treatise.

³ In DNOA III. iii. 3-xiii. 19, Augustine lists the various errors of Victor's work: that the soul was made by God out of himself; that God will continuously create souls forever; that the soul lost some merit by being conjoined with flesh; that the soul regains merit from being conjoined with flesh; that the soul deserved to become sinful; that unbaptized infants are saved; that some who are predestined to be saved may not be saved; that some of the mansions in the Father's house are outside the kingdom of God; that Christian sacrifice should be offered for those who die unbaptized; that those who die without baptism may be saved at the Last Judgment.

poses the dream visions of St. Perpetua described in the popular narrative of the martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas.⁴ He comes to a surprising set of conclusions: In our dreams it is with dream-bodies that we have dream-adventures in dream-worlds; nonetheless we are really ourselves in our dreams, and the feelings we have in dreams are real.

One interesting implication of Augustine's position on dream-experience is that the feelings we have in dreams and the feelings of the dead, although they are real feelings, are not always exactly the feelings they seem to be. Augustine is aware of this implication, which is in fact in keeping with his understanding of self-awareness, self-knowledge, and body and soul in his later works, although it constitutes a departure from the understanding of these issues expressed in his earliest works.

Self-Awareness and Self-Knowledge

In the course of his argument, Victor has attacked Augustine for holding that the soul is not corporeal, but spiritual. Furthermore Victor has criticized Augustine for having been either too cautious or too obtuse to make a definite decision about whether the soul is generated (*ex propagine*) or derived (*ex traduce*) from the parent's soul as bodies are generated from bodies, or whether, like the soul of Adam, each soul is created *de novo* by God by being directly breathed into its body (*insufflata*).⁵ According to

⁴ *Passio Sanctorum Perpetuae et Felicitatis*, ed. C.J.M.J. van Beek, Noviomagi 1936 (hereafter *Passio*). Considerable controversy has surrounded the *Passio Sanctorum Perpetuae et Felicitatis*. There have been doubts, first expressed by Augustine in DNOA (DNOA I. x. 12), about whether Perpetua actually wrote the sections describing her imprisonment; Perpetua's authorship is not, however, questioned in Augustine's Sermon 281 for the Feast of the Martyrs Perpetua and Felicitas (Sermo CCLXXXI, PL 38, 1284-5). The authorship of the narrative is discussed by Thomas Heffernan, *Philology and Authorship in the "Passio Sanctorum Perpetuae et Felicitatis"*, in: *Traditio* 50 (1995), 315-25. Emanuela Prinzivalli, *Perpetua the Martyr* in: Augusto Frascchetti (ed.), *Roman Women*, Chicago & London 1994, 118-40, argues for Perpetua's authorship of the *Passio* and summarizes the scholarly debate about whether the extant Greek version of the text is the original, whether Tertullian was the author of the *Passio* as a whole, and the extent to which the *Passio* is a Montanist work.

⁵ DNOA IV. v. 6. 386: "Et absurdum existimas atque incongruum rationi ut nesciat anima utrumnam divinitus insufflata sit, an de parentibus tracta." Cf. also DNOA I. xiv. 20. "Ita quaerendum est adhuc unde det, utrum ex propagine, sicut ipse quidem dat, sed tamen ex propagine dat corporis membra; an uero nouum neque propagatum singulis insufflando distribuatur." For a description of these views of the origin of the human soul and Augustine's approach to the problem in his later works, cf. R.J. O'Connell, S.J., *The Origin of the Soul in St. Augustine's Later Works*, New York 1987, esp. 251-6.

Victor, Augustine's reluctance to take a position on the origin of the soul is well nigh indecent:

But I assure you that it appears to me completely absurd and unreasonable that a man should be a stranger to himself, that he who is held to have acquired the knowledge of all things should be supposed to be ignorant of his very self. For what difference is there between a man and a beast if he does not know how to delve into and discuss his nature or what he is like (*sua qualitate natura*que), so that these words of Scripture are justly applied to him, "*Man, although he was in honor, did not understand; he has become as one of the beasts, and is likened unto them*" (Ps xlix, 13). For since the good God established nothing without its reason, and created man a rational animal, capable of understanding, endowed with reason, and alive with the power of sense so as to entrust all things devoid of reason to his prudent governance, what can be more unfitting than to say that that he cheated man of knowledge only of himself? The wisdom of the world, which reaches towards the knowledge of truth with an inquiry which is pointless because it cannot know Him through whom it is possible to learn true things, nonetheless has made the attempt to discover some things about the nature of the soul that are near to the truth, indeed practically akin to it. How unbecoming, and indeed shameful, it is, then, for any religiously minded man to know nothing about this very subject, or completely forbid himself to know anything about it!⁶

The comparison with beasts rankles. In book IV, addressed to Victor personally, Augustine returns to the insult again and again with fugue-like obsessiveness. "To what extent," he asks at one point, "will you allow that we can be ignorant of our nature *and still keep a safe distance from those beasts of the field?*"⁷ In addition, it is no doubt of some concern to Augustine

⁶ DNOA IV. ii. 2. 381: "Sed mihi, crede, satis superque uidetur absurdum atque incongruum rationi, ut homo ipse expertus sui sit aut is, qui rerum omnium creditur adeptus esse notitiam, sibi ipsi habeatur ignotus. quid autem differt homo pecore, si nescit de sua qualitate natura que disquirere atque disserere, ut merito in illum conueniat quod scriptum est: *homo cum esset in honore, non intellexit; assimilatus est iumentis et comparatus est eis?* nam cum deus bonus nihil non ratione condiderit ipsumque hominem animal rationale, intellectus capacem, rationis compotem sensuque uiuacem, qui omnia rationis expertia prudenti ordinatione distribuat, procreauerit, quid tam inconuenienter dici potest quam ut eum sola sui notatione fraudarit? et cum sapientia mundi, quae sese usque ad ueri cognitionem superuacua quidem inuestigatione protendit, quia scire nequit per quem licet quae sunt uera cognosci, aliqua tamen uicina, immo affinia ueritati temptauerit super animae natura dispicere, quam indecens atque pudendum est religiosum quemquam de hoc ipse aut nihil sapere aut penitus sibi interdixisse ne sapiat!"

⁷ DNOA IV. 2. 3. 382-3: "Dic ergo quatenus nobis naturam nostram nescire concedas, ut a pecoribus salva sit nostra distantia." Also IV. x. 14; IV. xi. 15; IV. viii. 8; V. vii. 11. Augustine is also obsessively irritated by the silliness of Victor's psychological theory, most particularly by Victor's comparison of God's insufflation of the soul to our blowing up of bags. If Victor supposes that we pour our breath into the bag, but without any lessening of ourselves or of our breath, Augustine suggests, let Victor blow into a bag and hold his nose and mouth, and see just how long he continues to think that he has lost none of his breath! (DNOA III. iv. 4 ff) How can we consider learning about the origin

that Victor's work provides an accessible, pseudo-scientific rationale for some Pelagian theses. But the principal irritant for Augustine in dealing with Victor's work is that he is faced with disarming a position which is neither very cogently framed nor well argued, though it has focussed popular interest upon questions that are very important and central to his own thought, viz., the nature of the soul, its transparency to itself and its connection with the body.

Augustine starts his refutation of Victor by reading "*sua qualitate naturae*" in such a way as to attribute to Victor a ridiculously strong claim:

And so you seem to have taken the position that man ought to be able to discover and discuss the entirety of his nature and attributes in such a way that nothing about himself is hidden from him.⁸

This may well be a stronger claim, than Victor meant to make; but it allows Augustine to force him onto a slippery slope. If we can be allowed ignorance of the number of hairs on our heads, he asks, then precisely what sorts of things fall under "*qualitate atque natura*"? Just exactly what kind of self-knowledge follows immediately upon being human? If there is anything about ourselves of which we can be ignorant, couldn't we just as well also be ignorant of the answer to the very question we are examining? The way is open for Augustine to subject Victor's confident claims about self knowledge to critical scrutiny.

One of Victor's half-developed arguments is that it would be strange for man to be able to have knowledge of all sorts of things other than himself, and yet not to know what he himself is and is like. He offers no further explicit defense of this claim; but tangled up in Victor's messy juxtaposition of "the wisdom of the world," which attempts to investigate the soul, and "the religiously-minded man," who refuses the attempt, is a relevant point of comparison. Worldly wisdom falls short of the truth when it looks to things outside the soul, because it is ignorant of something that is required in order to come to know truth.⁹ By contrast, even

of the soul, he asks, from someone who does not even know how he goes about blowing up a bag? (DNOA I. iv. 4; IV. iv. 5; IV iv. 3).

⁸ DNOA IV. ii. 3. 382: "quod sensisse ita uideris, tamquam de uniuersa sua qualitate atque natura sic homo disquirere atque disserere debeat, ut nihil enim sui lateat."

⁹ DNOA IV. ii. 2. 381. The force of "per quem" (n. 6 above) is unclear. Victor may mean that they lack knowledge of normal epistemological intermediaries like the senses and memory, or knowledge of how to draw inferences from prior and better known premises. If so, the intended contrast is between mediated and unmediated knowledge; this contrast would affect believer and unbeliever alike. More probably, though, 'quem' indicates

this worldly wisdom comes very close to the truth when it turns its attention to the the soul itself. Victor's point, presumably, is that between the soul and itself there is no intermediary that must first be known if the the soul is to know itself (though Victor again does not make his point explicit); rather the soul's self-knowledge is a direct and immediate consequence of its presence to itself, thus requiring no prior knowledge, no method of investigation or inferences, and no divine illumination. In any event, this is the strategy that Augustine seems to attribute to Victor, for he undertakes to argue that the soul's immediate access to itself is of extremely limited cognitive value.

In arguing against Victor, Augustine needs to differentiate carefully between his own views on self-knowledge and Victor's extravagant claims. In this very work, Augustine himself asserts that understanding is essential to human nature;¹⁰ that as beings with understanding we are present to ourselves and aware of ourselves in a unique and immediate way;¹¹ and that while we live, we know with immediate certainty that we live, and that we remember, understand and will.¹² In the arguments against Victor, he is concerned to point out that immediate self-awareness and our natural level of self-knowledge do not amount to complete knowledge of the soul's nature and operations, let alone to knowledge about its origin.

We do not know, Augustine argues, how it is that food sustains life (DNOA IV. iv. 5). Nor do we know:

that someone, not something, is lacking; the worldly lack divine illumination or knowledge of God. It is not clear who Victor's "worldly wise" are, though Tertullian, from whom Victor takes a fair amount of his theory about the soul, describes the Stoic theory of soul with approval. Cf. Tertullian, *De Anima* V, ed. J.H. Waszink, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* (hereafter CC) 2, Turnholt 1954, 781-869, esp. 786-7 (hereafter DA). Victor would surely consider the material theory of soul attributed to the Stoics by Tertullian to be a clear step in the right direction in theorizing about the soul.

¹⁰ DNOA IV. xi. 15. 394: "nam si intellegentia tibi placet in natura hominis, quoniam reuera si eam non haberet, nihil quantum ad animas pertinet, pecoribus distaremus, intellege quid non intelligas."

¹¹ DNOA IV. xix. 30. 409-410: "Sic enim et nos ipsos certius quam ceteros nouimus, quia nobis conscientia nostra nota est et uoluntas, quam plane uidemus, et in ea tamen aliquam corporis similitudinem non uidemus, hanc in alio quamuis praesente non ceruimus."

¹² DNOA IV. vii. 9. 389: "Ecce modo, modo dum sumus, dum uiuimus, dum nos uiuere scimus, dum meminisse nos et intellegere et uelle certissimi sumus, qui nos naturae nostrae magnos cognitores esse iactamus..." Cf. Also Augustine, *Soliloquia* II.1-5, ed. W. Hörmann, CSEL 89, Vienna 1986, 1-98; Augustine, *Enchiridion* 20, ed. E. Evans, CC LXVI, Turnholt 1979, 49-114.

... when human seed is converted into blood, when into solid flesh; when the bones begin to harden and to fill with marrow; how many kinds of veins and nerves there are; by what channels and circuits the former serve to irrigate, and the latter to connect the entire body, whether skin is properly thought of as nerve, or teeth as bone... or again, what purpose is served by those veins in which air circulates instead of blood, those they call the arteries (DNOA IV. v. 6).

Augustine allows that Victor perhaps misspoke, that he meant to say only that the soul had complete knowledge of *its own* "nature and quality," and not anything about its body (DNOA IV. ii. 3). The weaker claim fares little better than the stronger one, however, for it is the soul itself that directs the development and functions of its body. And if we do not know whether or how the soul sets the veins in motion to animate the body, and the nerves to make it move, then the soul is ignorant of its own operations, even though the body is below it metaphysically, "more able to give life to the body than to know about it"¹³—such knowledge as there is of these things is a matter of art and possessed by very few.¹⁴ We also do not know from what part of the body thinking and willing originate or how we go about simple actions like moving a finger (DNOA IV. vi. 7). The central region of the body that initiates life activity and actions (*hegemonikon*) remains a mystery to us. The conclusion of Augustine's elaborate discussion of the inscrutability of the soul's operations is simple: If we are ignorant of the soul's own present operations—precisely because we are ignorant of the body it governs—, then how should we expect to have comprehensive knowledge of its history, indeed, of an event in its history that is further back than birth. And even if the soul were to have been aware of its startup, is there any reason to suppose that it would know how it got started? (DNOA IV. v. 6)

Another of Victor's arguments is that it would be absurd for man to have been given reason and understanding, then left unaware of these abilities and activities. Surely Victor is to some extent right; it would be extremely strange for a rational soul to be able, for example, to understand number theory and make wise decisions without being at all aware of these abilities and activities—if the supposition makes any sense at all.

¹³ DNOA IV. v. 6. 386: "et cum uiscera intrinsecus nostra non possint sine anima uiuere, facilius ea potuit anima uiuificare quam nosse."

¹⁴ Our ignorance is due at least in part to ignorance of the workings of the body, which remain incompletely known, even to scientists who spend their lives studying them (DNOA IV. ii. 3. 382-383). These scientists do *not*, Augustine adds, go around calling non-scientists "cattle" because they have not acquired this knowledge.

But here, too, Augustine argues, Victor's confidence in the extent of the soul's self-knowledge is unwarranted. Even if the soul must be immediately aware that it remembers, understands and wills, Augustine argues, it does not follow even that it knows *what* it remembers or understands or *how strongly* it wills; he cites the case of one Simplicius, who did not know that he knew all the books of Virgil from memory, until he had performed such feats as reciting aloud the last line but one from every book (DNOA IV. vii. 9). Indeed we cannot even fathom how memory works; Augustine offers one of his memory conundrums in evidence. Suppose there is something I once knew, then could not remember, but now do remember:

We often presume that we will keep something in memory, and thinking this, we do not write it down. Then afterwards it does not come to mind when we want it to, and we are sorry that we believed it would come back to us and did not write it down so as to prevent it from getting away. Then, although we are not searching after it, it suddenly comes back to us. And so were we not ourselves when we knew it <at the start>? And then again, are we not who we used to be <then>, now that we are not able to call it to mind? How is it, then, that we are somehow taken away from and alienated from ourselves, and then again somehow brought back to and restored to ourselves—as if we were someone else and somewhere else and we ourselves were unable to get to ourselves because of having somehow been put somewhere else when we seek and do not find what we have placed in our memory, and as if we then came back to ourselves when we find it. After all, where do we search, if not within ourselves? And what are we searching for, if not for ourselves—as if we were not within ourselves, but had withdrawn to some place apart from ourselves? Do you not notice and tremble before such vastness? And what is this but our nature, not as it was, but as it is now?¹⁵

As for knowing what we know, Augustine says that he himself has often been in error about whether he knew the answer to a question or not, thinking he knew the answer when he did not, and vice versa. And Peter, he reminds his reader, knew that he was willing to die for his Lord, but

¹⁵ DNOA IV. vii. 10. 389-90: "Saepe nos praesumimus aliquid memoria retenturos et cum id putamus, non scribimus nec nobis postea cum uolumus uenit in mentem nosque paenitet credidisse uenturum nec litteris inligasse ne fugeret; et subito rursus, cum id non quaeramus, occurrit: numquid nos non eramus, quando id cogitabamus? nec tamen hoc sumus quod fuimus, quando id cogitare non possumus. quid est ergo, quod nescio quomodo subtrahimur negamurque nobis itemque nescio quomodo proferimur ad nos redimurque nobis, quasi alii simus et alibi simus, quando quaerimus nec inuenimus quod in memoria nostra posuimus, neque nos ipsi ad nos ipsos ueluti alibi positos peruenire possumus et tunc perueniamus quando inuenimus? ubi enim quaerimus nisi apud nos? et quid quaerimus nisi nos, quasi non simus in nobis et aliquo recesserimus a nobis? nonne adtendis et exhorrescis tantam profunditatem? et quod est hoc aliud quam nostra natura, non qualis fuit, sed qualis nunc est?"

was unaware of how weakly he willed to do so (DNOA IV. vii. 11). Thus the fact that the soul has immediate self-awareness does not add up to the kind of self-knowledge Victor would need to sustain his claim that the rational soul knows even its own rational operations with full clarity and certainty.

Augustine's commitment to the idea that self-awareness does not lead to very much self-knowledge should not come as much of a surprise. Throughout his career, Augustine consistently tends to identify the self with the soul; but by the time of *De Natura et Origine Animae*, Augustine has come also to emphasize the fact that the soul is the soul of its body, a body that it animates and directs in ways that lie outside its self-awareness. In his discussion of the creation of man in *De Civitate Dei* XIII, he says that man is not body alone, nor a soul alone, but is "both body and soul joined together."¹⁶ In *De Genesi ad Litteram* he appeals tentatively to the soul's "natural appetite for managing the body"¹⁷ to explain the resurrection of bodies after the last judgment. But although the soul's animation and direction of the body is a genuine part of its own operation, knowledge of such operations of the soul is not available from the immediate data of introspection and reflection. The soul's ignorance of how it animates and directs the body marks a limit to its self-awareness that Augustine considers significant; his extended argument against Victor is not a matter of setting fire to a straw man. Failure to understand the soul's complex interaction with the body is the first of several ways in which Victor's theory disasterously oversimplifies the soul's "properties and nature," and *a fortiori* the extent of the soul's self-knowledge.

Furthermore, the mind's cognition of its own operations, like remembering, thinking and willing, is neither complete nor infallible. As Augustine has argued in *De Natura et Origine Animae*, the mind can be ignorant of

¹⁶ Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XIII, 24. 409, ed. B. Dombert & A. Kalb, CC 48, Turnholt 1955. (Hereafter *De Civ. Dei*).

¹⁷ Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* XII. xxxv. 68, 485. PL 34, 245-468. (hereafter *De Gen. ad litt.*): "Sed si quem mouet, quid opus sit spiritibus defunctorum corpora sua in resurrectione recipere . . . siue alia latentiore causa, siue ideo quia inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi; quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in illud summum coelum, quamdiu non subest corpus, cuius administratione appetitus ille conquiescat." Augustine comes very close here to saying "somewhat in the fashion of Aquinas, that the mind is not really a complete thing without the body," Gareth Matthews, *Augustine and Descartes on Minds and Bodies* in: G. Matthews (ed.), *The Augustinian Tradition*, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1999, 230. Matthews thinks that Augustine does not take this position, though it would be open to him to do so.

the data of its own internal life, e.g., of what it wills or how strongly and unambiguously it wills something. Already in *Confessiones* we find a dramatic picture of the mind's propensity for obscuring its mixed motives and imperfectly realized commitments. And although awareness of our minds' operations is indeed the basis for our knowledge of the structure and nature of the mind, it is a repeated theme in Augustine's later work that the mind's self-awareness, such as it is, does not amount to knowledge of how it works. The mind can be ignorant of how it carries out some purely mental operation, for instance of whether the will is prompted to remember by images of experience stored in memory, or is in fact itself the cause of remembering (*De trin.* XI. 7. 12).¹⁸ We have difficulty grasping what memory is at all, and only a lengthy process of reasoning brings us to an understanding of such facts about memory as that the mind is present to itself by way of something like a present-memory (*De trin.* XIV. 11. 14).

Finally, it is obvious that self-awareness does not lead the soul to the most basic and important fact about its nature, *viz.*, the incorporeality of mind. The mind does have an immediate sense of what it is, Augustine says, i.e., of its living, remembering, understanding and willing; in this sense it knows its own substance. "What is so present to knowledge as what is present to mind?" he asks; "And what is so present to mind as the mind itself?" (*De trin.* X. 7. 10). People who suppose that the mind is corporeal,

... overlook the fact that the mind knows itself, even when it seeks itself, as we have already shown. But we can in no way rightly say that anything is known while its substance is unknown. Wherefore, since the mind knows itself, it knows its own substance (*De trin.* X. 10. 16).

From this immediate awareness, a knowledge of its incorporeality is *available* to the mind. Still, for all its powers of introspection and reflection, the mind can make a fundamental mistake about its own nature and take itself to be corporeal because it easily confuses its own substance with its objects. Self knowledge properly so-called requires that the mind strip

¹⁸ Augustine, *De Trinitate* XI. 7.12, ed. W.J. Mountain & Fr. Glorie, CC 50, 50A, Turnholt, 1968 (hereafter *De trin.*). Cf. Also *De trin.* XI. 8.13, where a lengthy argument is required to establish that what is stored in the memory is not the same as the resultant expression of it in the thought of the person who remembers (*quod inde in cogitatione recordantis exprimitur*) precisely because introspection and reflection are not sufficient to decide the question.

away what it is not from its view of itself and concentrate on what it itself is.¹⁹

... Let the mind then not go seeking for a look at itself as if it were absent, but rather take pains to discern itself, given that it is present. Let it not try to come to know as if it did not know itself, but rather to separate itself out from what it knows to be other (*De trin* X. 9. 12).

Thus in more sophisticated works like *De Trinitate* and *De Genesi ad Litteram*, and even in the earlier *Confessiones*, we find a smooth fit with the view of self-awareness and self-knowledge in *De Natura et Origine Animae*.

The Dead and Dreaming: Real Feelings in Unreal Bodies

In addition to his argument for the soul's knowledge of its own origin based on the soul's immediate awareness of itself and its operations, Victor has also given an account of how each soul is directly created by God. Victor's own theory seems to have been that the soul or "inner man" is formed within a body when the breath of God whirling about in it causes a substance to congeal (*gelante substantia*) which is so molded that inside the body another body, the "inner man," comes to be enclosed as if in the shape of its corporeal sheath (*ueluti in forma uaginae corporalis inclusum*),²⁰ to the extent that in its shape it resembles the outer man.²¹ By a similar process a third corporeal entity, constituted by sense and intellect, takes shape within the soul, so that "the whole man consists of three elements: the outer, the inner and the innermost" (DNOA IV. xiv. 20). On

¹⁹ Thus Gareth Matthews' claim (Matthews 1999, n. 17 above), at 225, that Augustine holds that "the mind of each of us knows what a mind is simply and solely by knowing itself," needs to be understood either as very severely restricted to a kind of non-thematized sense of self, which the soul indeed always has of itself, or as the claim that this non-thematized self-awareness is the necessary condition and source both of the soul's particular knowledge of its own states and acts and of its genuine knowledge of its nature.

²⁰ DNOA IV. xiv. 20, 399-400. "De hac enim [*scil.* anima] loquebaris, cum diceres: 'Et gelante substantia quae comprehendere non poterat, efficeret corpus aliud intra corpus naturae suae ui et spiramine conglobatum, exindeque inciperet homo interior apparere, quem ueluti in forma uaginae corporalis inclusum, ad similitudinem sui delineauit exterioris hominis habitudo.'"

²¹ This account of the formation of the soul is essentially the one given by Tertullian in DA IX, 7-9, 793-794. For Tertullian, who holds that souls are generated from souls (*ex traduce*), only the first soul results from the direct inspiration of God; in subsequent souls, the divine breath of God is poured out as a kind of vapor with the seminal fluid. Cf. DA XXVII, 5-9, 823-4. Tertullian draws the conclusion that original sin is transmitted in the propagation of souls.

this account, souls, each created separately by God's breath, are entirely corporeal.

Augustine has criticisms of this account of the genesis of the soul,²² but he is far more concerned to attack the scriptural arguments Victor adduces for the corporeality of the soul. Victor has cited the case of the dead Rich Man of Luke 16:24, who looks up and recognizes the (also dead) Lazarus in the bosom of the (equally dead) Abraham and begs that Lazarus come down to bring him water to relieve his tormenting thirst. Victor has then gone on to make the explicit claim that being able to recognize anything and impose a name upon it implies its corporeality:

You say, "Names cease to be given when form is not distinguished; and where there is no designating of persons, there is no giving of names," . . . You say, "Someone whose help is implored must, assuredly have a bodily form and be seen bodily."²³

So, according to Victor, if it is the soul that survives death, and after death the soul is still being recognized and called by name, and is raising up its eyes and suffering thirst and having this or that in its bosom, then clearly the soul is a kind of body, which has limbs to move and senses and the ability to feel pleasure, pain and emotions. According to Victor, "bodily members are here ascribed to the soul as if it were really a body."²⁴

Augustine makes fairly short work here of the reference to the bosom of Abraham; like many references to bodies and bodily parts in Scripture, it must be taken metaphorically, to refer to "that remote and separate abode of rest and peace in which Abraham now is."²⁵ With respect to how Dives recognizes Lazarus and Abraham, Augustine argues that Victor is making an assumption that is demonstrably false, i.e., that what lacks bodily reality is *ipso facto* formless and therefore cannot be recognized and

²² He argues, for example, that it is hard to see how something corporeal can ever be constituted in the image of God, who is incorporeal, but also hard to see how Victor can avoid being committed to the soul's being of the substance of God (DNOA IV. 14. 20).

²³ DNOA IV. xv. 22. 402: "Dicis etiam 'cessare illic nomina, ubi non distinguitur forma, et nihil illic agere appellationem nominum, ubi nulla est designatio personarum' . . . 'cuius auxilium inploratum est,' inquis, 'corporeus utique usus est atque formatus.'"

²⁴ DNOA IV. xvi. 23. 402: "'Denique,' inquis, 'membra illic animae describuntur ut uere sit corpus.'"

²⁵ DNOA IV. xvi. 24. 403-4. Augustine here gives the same sort of account found in Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses*, and in Tertullian's DA, ch. 7 and 55. Cf. L.J. van der Lof, *Abraham's Bosom in the Writings of Irenaeus, Tertullian and Augustine*, in: *Augustinian Studies*, 26 (1955), 109-23. Cf. also *De gen. ad litt.* XII. xxxiii.

named; does Victor need to look at his face in a mirror in order to recognize who he is, he asks?²⁶ Is it not instead true that we know ourselves better than we know others precisely because we can directly recognize ourselves by our own will and consciousness (*conscientia et voluntas*)? And even in the case of others, we do not know them, properly speaking, by perceiving their bodies; we most properly recognize even others not by their bodies, but by their life and will (*vitam et voluntatem*), even if that spiritual recognition is mediated by bodies in this life.²⁷

But Augustine has still got to explain how Dives can lift up his eyes, suffer thirst, and beg Lazarus to dip his finger in water to cool his tongue if Dives has no body. Augustine follows Irenaeus and Tertullian in taking the story of Lazarus and Dives as a real narrative, and not just as a parable of some sort. And if the story is taken literally, then the souls of the dead speak, look up and occupy space. Apparently Dives can see Lazarus and Abraham above him—otherwise why would he make the effort to lift up his eyes? And apparently he is tormented by thirst—otherwise why would he beg for water? Dives, Lazarus and Abraham are all dead, existing only as their souls. It appears, then, that the souls of the dead are corporeal.

Augustine is convinced that by looking to dream experience we can in principle find a way of resolving such questions about bodily phenomena connected with the dead without admitting that these “bodies” actually are physical bodies. The bodily likenesses in dreams, says Augustine, are of the same kind (*ex eo genere*) as bodily likenesses of the dead, but they are more accessible to our understanding.²⁸ Victor has himself made reference to St. Perpetua’s dream visions about her dead brother and has

²⁶ DNOA IV. xv. 21. 401: “‘Sed,’ inquis, ‘si anima caret corpore, quid est quod apud inferos diues ille cognoscit?’ . . . haec dicens si agnitionem hominis provenire non putas sine corporis forma, ut noueris te ipsum, credo quod assidue speculum adtendis, ne, si fueris oblitus faciem tuam, non te possis agnoscere.”

²⁷ DNOA IV. xviii. 30. 409-10: “quis autem recte dicat se aliquem hominem cognouisse, nisi in quantum potuit eius uitam uoluntatemque cognoscere, quae utique moles non habet nec colores? sic enim et nos ipsos certius quam ceteros nouimus, quia nobis conscientia nostra nota est et uoluntas. quam plane uidemus et in ea tamen aliquam corporis similitudinem non uidemus, hanc in alio quamuis presente non cernimus, etiam cuius absentis faciem nouimus, recolimus, cogitamus. nostram uero faciem eo modo nosse, recolere, cogitare non possumus et tamen nos ipsos nobis magis quam illum cognitum uerissime dicimus. ita clarum est ubi sit potior hominis ueriorque notitia.”

²⁸ DNOA IV. xviii. 28. 408: “quamuis enim et ea quae similia corporibus cogitamus, ex eo genere sint; tamen quod ad mortuos adinet, aptior coniectura de dormientibus ducitur.”

argued that if the saint dreamed she saw her brother Dinocrates miserable and tormented by thirst and by the cancer from which he died, and then later saw him free of thirst and pain as a result of her prayers and tears, then her dream visions prove that the unbaptized can be saved by the prayers of the living. In addition to her dreams about her dead brother, Augustine says, that same St. Perpetua also dreamed that she was wrestling with an Egyptian, having been turned into a man.²⁹

The introduction of St. Perpetua's visions at this point is some indication that Augustine has more at stake in this discussion than besting a fairly silly theory put forward by an inconsequential opponent. Victor's appeal to the story of St. Perpetua had to do with the possibility of saving the souls of the unbaptized and was not directly connected with the issue of the corporeality of the soul. But Tertullian in his *De Anima* had cited St. Perpetua's dream visions as support for his view that the souls of the dead are in some real place, which is part of his argument for the corporeality of the soul.³⁰ Like Victor, Tertullian had also used the story of Abraham, Lazarus and Dives as scriptural support for his view that souls are corporeal. But unlike Victor, Tertullian had situated his examples in a framework of more general philosophical arguments against mind-body dualism; he is thus a far more formidable opponent than Victor. The soul cannot impart movement to the body or be moved by external things, Tertullian had argued, unless it is itself corporeal.³¹ Moreover, soul and body exhibit a "communion of corporeal passions" (*corporaliū passionum communiō*); the soul suffers together (*compati*) with the body and shares its pains, and the body is afflicted along with (*condolescit/coaegrescit*) the soul in passions like anxiety, distress and love, and in

²⁹ DNOA IV. xviii. 26. 405: "nempe sancta Perpetua uisa sibi est in somnis cum quodam Aegypto in uirum conuersa luctari."

³⁰ Tertullian explicitly names Perpetua only in DA LV, 4, where he appeals to her vision of the place in which the holy martyrs repose as a basis for his argument that only the souls of martyrs are now already in paradise; but the spatial reality of Hades and Paradise are part of his argument for the corporeality of the soul in DA VII.

³¹ DA VI, 3. 788: "Dehinc si corporis est moueri extrinsecus ab aliquo, ostendimus autem supra moueri animam et ab alio, cum uaticinatur, cum furit, utique extrinsecus, cum ab alio, merito quod mouebitur extrinsecus ab alio secundum exempli propositionem corpus agnoscam. Enimuero si ab alio moueri corporis est, quanto magis mouere aliud? Anima autem mouet corpus, et conatus eius extrinsecus foris parent. Ab illa est enim impingi et pedes in incessum et manus in contactum et oculos in conspectum et linguam in effatum, uelut sigillario motu superficiem intus agitante. Unde haec uis incorporalis animae?"

fear and shame, as shown by its weakness, blushing and pallor.³² By the time of *De Natura et Origine Animae*, Augustine was familiar with Tertullian's arguments,³³ which he had previously discussed in *De Genesi ad Litteram*, although not particularly successfully.³⁴ He was aware, then, that he had to give an account of the mode of existence and experiences of the dead and dreaming that allowed him to separate actions, passions and the recognition of others from having some sort of body; to do so he needed to give a convincing response to Tertullian's anti-dualistic arguments by showing that the experiences and actions of the dead described in the scriptural passage are in principle independent of embodiment.

In dreams, Augustine says, we remain, to be sure, ourselves. By contrast, "the earth, the sea, the sun, the moon, the stars, and the rivers, mountains, trees or animals" that we see in our dreams are not bodily in nature, but only very like bodies.³⁵ St. Perpetua was herself in her dream, then; but her opponent was a dream-Egyptian.

What about St. Perpetua's male body? If we suppose ourselves to have corporeal bodies in our dreams, Augustine argues, then we would have to concede that the mountains and rivers of our dreams are corporeal, for how could a corporeal body ascend a dream-mountain? But, as we have seen, the mountains and rivers in our dreams are not corporeal. Thus St. Perpetua's body is only a dream-body, a likeness (*similitudo*) of a corporeal body (DNOA IV. 17. 25). In the case of St. Perpetua, Augustine

³² DA V, 5. 787: "Item, corporalium et incorporalium passiones inter se non communicare; porro et animam compati corpori, cui laeso ictibus uulneribus ulceribus condolecscit, et corpus animae, cui afflictæ cura angore amore coaegrescit per detrimentum socii uigoris, cuius pudorem et pauorem rubore atque pallore testetur. Igitur anima corpus ex corporalium passionum communione."

³³ DNOA II. 5. 9. Here Augustine correctly attributes to Tertullian the view that both God and the soul are corporeal.

³⁴ Although Augustine's *De Genesi ad Litteram* was probably composed in stages, making a definitive dating of the work very difficult, Book X. 24-26 of that work, in which Augustine explicitly discusses Tertullian's *De Anima*, was surely written before Augustine's answer to Vincentius Victor; cf. O'Connell 1987 (n. 5 above), esp. 201-45. In *De Genesi ad Litteram* Augustine objects vigorously to Tertullian's materialism, but he has not got much of an argument against it; he is able to show only that Tertullian's claim that the corporeal soul takes on the shape of the body, but never increases in size, is fairly silly.

³⁵ DNOA IV. xvii. 25. 404: "nam et in somnis quando aliqua dura et molesta peripetitur, nos utique sumus et, nisi euigilantibus nobis illa praetereant, poenas grauissimas pendimus; sed corpora esse credere, quibus hac atque illac quasi ferimur et uolitamur in somnis, hominis est, qui parum uigilanter de rebus talibus cogitauit. de his quippe uisorum imaginibus maxime anima probatur non esse corporea, nisi uelis et illa corpora dicere, quae praeter nos ipsos tam multa uidemus in somnis: caelum, terram, mare, solem, lunam, stellas, fluuios, montes, arbores, animalia. haec qui corpora esse credit incredibiliter desipit."

offers a further argument against the real corporeality of her dream body. Who could doubt, he asks, that St. Perpetua's soul was "the likeness of a male body," and not a true male body—since her own body, from which she was not yet sundered by death, was lying on her bed, female as ever. If the male dream-body was a physical body, Augustine asks,

why did it not still have the shape of its female sexual organ (*cur non servabat vaginae suae formam*)? After all, it had found no male genitals in the flesh of this woman, from which it could take shape by compressing itself—or, as you say—congealing.³⁶

Augustine here forces an application of Victor's own account of the formation of the soul to the formation of dream bodies; the body of the sleeping St. Perpetua must serve as a kind of "sheath" which lends its shape to the bodily parts of the corporeal soul formed within it. But as St. Perpetua's own body remains female, there is nothing in her sleeping body where there would have to be something to lend shape to male genitals. Thus her male dream-body must perforce have been some mere likeness of a body.

Dream bodies are produced, Augustine says, in the same way as the likenesses of rivers and mountains in dreams: the appearances (*species*) of bodies are formed while we are awake and stored in memory; then in some mysterious way in our dreams we recollect them, and they come before us as if we were seeing them.³⁷ The process is none too predictable.

³⁶ DNOA IV. xviii. 26. 405: "quis autem dubitet, in illa similitudine corporis animam eius fuisse, non corpus, quod utique in suo femineo sexu manens, sopitis sensibus iacebat in stratis, quando anima eius in illa uirilil corporis similitudine luctabatur? quid hic dicis? uerumne erat corpus illa uiri similitudo an non erat corpus, quamuis haberet similitudinem corporis? elige quod uelis. *si corpus erat, cur non seruabat uaginae suae formam?* neque enim in illius feminae carne uirilia repererat genitalia, unde ita posset sese coarctando, et, ut tu loqueris, 'gelando formari'" (italics mine). Possibly following Tertullian, *De Resurrectione Mortuorum* VII, 8. 930, ed. J.B. Ph. Borleffs, CC 2.2, Turnholt 1954, 921-1012. Victor had used '*uagina*' to describe the body as a sort of sheath in which the soul inheres—apparently in the manner of a sword in a scabbard. The usage is classical; '*uagina*' used as a term for a scabbard is also found in Tertullian, *De Resurrectione Mortuorum* IX, 2, 932. Augustine's naughty rhetorical question thus also has an innocent reading: if <her soul> was a body, then why did it not preserve the shape of its <bodily> sheath? Cf. the translation of R. Teske (Teske 1997, n. 1 above): "If it was a body, why did it not retain the form of its covering?"

³⁷ DNOA IV. xvii. 25. 404-405: "procul dubio tamen spiritalis est, non corporalis. namque huiusmodi species uelut corporum, non tamen corpora et uigilantium cogitatione formantur et profunditate memorie continentur et ex eius abditissimis sinibus nescio quo mirabili et ineffabili modo cum recordamur prodeunt et quasi ante oculos prolata versantur . . . quid ergo mirum, si et ipsa sibi in sui corporis similitudine apparet et quando sine corpore apparet? neque enim cum suo corpore sibi apparet in somnis et tamen in ea

The dream bodies of those who have lost limbs sometimes appear with fullgrown versions of the limbs they lost, though they never seem to appear with the tiny arms they once had (*integros*); and sometimes the appear without them (*ex quacunque parte truncatos*). On Victor's account, it is impossible to explain this kind of variability, let alone how Samuel's soul appeared wearing its customary garments—did his soul and soul-clothing somehow take shape in his living, clothed body so that at death his soul left his body wearing soul-clothing?³⁸

What about St. Perpetua's wrestling? Augustine says explicitly that if our bodies in dreams are likenesses of bodies, we only "seem to climb" dream-mountains and "seem to enter" dream-houses;³⁹ and so St. Perpetua is only dream-wrestling against the dream-Egyptian. Still, Augustine says, even if she had no body, there was nonetheless a "certain likeness of a body" (*similitudo quaedam*) in which she felt true struggling or strain (*verus labor*) and true joy (*vera laetitia*).⁴⁰

Applying his results to the question of the alleged corporeal souls of the dead, Augustine proposes that the souls of the dead are not corporeal; after death and before the final judgment, there are only the likenesses of bodies, like the dream-bodies of dreamers. Just like the souls of dreamers, however, the souls of the dead feel real sadness and real joy and real pain, not just the likeness of such feelings:

What if this same sort of thing happens in hell, and the dead recognize each other not by their bodies, but by likenesses of bodies? For when we suffer sadness (*tristitia patimur*), even if only in our dreams, although it is only the likeness of bodily limbs which acts, and not bodily limbs themselves, still there is not just a likeness of suffering, but real suffering; joy is felt in the same way.⁴¹

ipsa similitudine corporis sui quasi per loca ignota et nota discurrit et laeta sentit multa uel tristia."

³⁸ DNOA IV. xix. 29. 409: "cur 'Samuhel sanctus post mortem', ut ipse quoque commemorasti, 'solito indumento vestitus apparuit?' . . . numquid iste de corpore uestitus exierat?"

³⁹ DNOA IV. xvii. 25. 405: "sed puto, quod nec tu audeas dicere figuram illam corporis atque membrorum, quam sibi habere uidetur in somnis, uerum corpus esse. nam isto modo erit uerus mons, quem sibi uidetur ascendere, et corporea domus, quam sibi uidetur intrare, et arbor uero lignumque uerum corpus habens, sub qua sibi uidetur iacere, et aqua uera, quam sibi uidetur haurire, et omnia in quibus quasi corporibus uersatur corpora erunt, si et ipsa corpus est, quae simili imagine inter cuncta illa uersatur."

⁴⁰ DNOA IV. xviii. 26. 406: "si autem non erat corpus, et tamen erat aliquid simile corporis, in quo sane uerus labor aut uera laetitia sentiretur . . ."

⁴¹ DNOA IV. xiii. 27. 406: "Quid si tale aliquid apud inferos geritur et in eis se non corporibus, sed corporum similitudinibus animae agnoscunt? cum enim tristitia patimur quamuvis in somnis, etsi membrorum corporeorum sit illa similitudo, non membra corporea, non est tamen poenae similitudo, sed poena; sic etiam ubi laeta sentiuntur." This is essen-

Augustine cites the example of Dinocrates, St. Perpetua's brother who appeared to her after his death. Surely, he says, it must have been in the likeness of a body, not a physical body, that his soul came to her, with its suffering (*miseria*) revealed in its "face."

It appeared as if afflicted in just the way the body had been afflicted because, though not a body, in being the likeness of the body it had the likeness of its affliction as well. But still, in its unreal body the soul felt real distress, which was signified by the appearance of the body's affliction, and from which his holy sister's prayers earned his deliverance.⁴²

The deliberate antithesis between "unreal body" and "real distress" in this passage calls attention to the metaphysical peculiarity of Augustine's position. Dinocrates' suffering is real, not a likeness of suffering, though it is in a likeness of a body, not a real body, that his soul undergoes that real suffering.

Augustine thus manages to explain the story of Dives and the dream-visions of St. Perpetua without conceding that the soul is corporeal, but at the price of significant metaphysical awkwardness. The awkwardness seems unnecessary. Why allow that the feelings of the dead and dreaming are genuine? Why not just concede that they are only similitudes of feelings, just as their bodies, surroundings and adventures are merely similitudes, i.e., dream-realities?

Augustine's solution is all the more striking for standing at the intersection of philosophical traditions which strongly connect having emotions, pleasures and pains with having a body. Even Neoplatonists like Plotinus, who deny that the soul can be affected by the body, hold that many emotions, pleasures and pains are activities of soul which respond to its observation of bodily conditions.⁴³ Even more relevant is a strain

tially the same account Augustine gives in *De Genesi ad Litteram* XII. 32-4, though he is there much more concerned to argue that Hell is spiritual, not really some place.

⁴² DNOA IV. xviii. 27. 407: "et quasi uulnerata uisa est, sicut corpus fuerat uulneratum, quoniam corpus non erat, sed habebat in similitudine corporis etiam similitudinem uulneris. porro autem in non uero corpore uera miseria fuit animae, quae significabatur adumbrato corporis uulnere, de qua sororis sanctae orationibus meruit liberari."

⁴³ For relevant texts from the Aristotelian commentators and important Neoplatonic authors, cf. *Emotion*, in: Richard Sorabji, *Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 A.D.: A Sourcebook*, London/Ithaca forthcoming. Cf. also S. Knuuttila, *Medieval Theories and the Passions of the Soul*, in: S. Knuuttila (ed.), *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford 2004; S. Knuuttila and J. Sihvola, *How the Philosophical Analysis of Emotions Was Introduced*, in: J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen (eds.), *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy*, Dordrecht/Boston 1998, 1-19; E.K. Emilsson, *Plotinus on the Emotions*, *ibid.*, 339-63.

of thought which can be traced to Plato himself, and especially to the *Philebus*, in which physical pleasure and pain are explained as a sort of intentional surface of needs or lacks and their fulfillment.⁴⁴ In addition, Augustine had access to the Stoic theory that the emotions necessarily involve and arise in consciousness out of a bodily first phase or “first movement”.⁴⁵ Thus Augustine would have gotten from several sources the idea that where there are genuine emotions and feelings of pleasure and pain, there is real embodiment in some sense. Indeed in *Confessiones*, Augustine himself seems to be adopting a Stoic approach in his discussion of the pleasures and pains of sensing that follow so inevitably from bodily states as to be unavoidable and thus not subject to moral assessment.⁴⁶

In the light of this background, it seems that Augustine’s proposal that the real misery, joy, pain and struggles of the dead and dreamers are felt in unreal bodies is decidedly odd. Given the theory of “intentional surfaces” or “first movements” that Augustine appears to accept in *Confessiones*, it is surely a fair question about the joys and sorrows of dreamers and of the dead how they *can* be fully real if there are no real or really appropriate bodies for them to arise out of and be felt in. The problem is even more acute with feelings of struggle, fatigue and pain—how can the feeling of struggle or fatigue or physical pain be real or “true,” if there is no real body to wrestle or tire or suffer from a lethal cancerous sore? Augustine ought to concede, it seems, that the pains and passions of dreamers and of the dead are no more real than their bodies.

It is tempting to suppose that Augustine has forgotten the larger context of his response to Victor, which requires him to argue for the non-transparency of the soul to itself, and has slipped into assuming uncritically, as Descartes does in *Meditation II*, and as Victor urges, that the mind’s operations (like judging and willing) and internal states (like pain and seeming to see the light) being wholly within the mind, are necessarily just what they seem to be, because the mind’s own states and operations

⁴⁴ Plato, *Philebus* 33d-e, 43 a-c, *Platonis Opera* II, Oxford 1901. Cf. Knuuttila 2004 (n. 43 above) for a sketch of the Platonic and post-Platonic development of theories of feeling and emotion.

⁴⁵ Cf. R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, Oxford 2000, esp. 355-6, 372-84, for an account of Augustine’s Stoic sources and his appropriation of them. Cf. also M. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* II, Leiden 1985, esp. 207-13; G. O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind*, London 1987, esp. 38-60.

⁴⁶ Augustine, *Confessiones* X. 33. 49-34. 51, 181-182, ed. L. Verheijen, *CC* 27, Turnholt 1981 (hereafter *Conf.*).

are, so to speak, transparent to its gaze. Even if he is dreaming, says Descartes, it is as certain that he doubts and wills and seems to see the light as that he exists, for none of these things are “distinct from his thought,” or “separate from him”:

For example, I now see the light, hear the noise, and feel the heat. These things are unreal, since I am dreaming. But it is still certain that I seem to see, to hear and to feel the heat (*Meditations*, II).⁴⁷

There is some evidence for this proto-Cartesian interpretation of Augustine. As we have seen, Augustine does hold that the soul knows some things about itself on the basis of immediate awareness and simple reflection; we know immediately and certainly, for example, that we are, that we live, and that we understand, will and remember. Sometimes, in a manner that anticipates Descartes’ strategy, he cites this knowledge as evidence against the sceptical position that we can know nothing.⁴⁸ In addition, he says explicitly that we know (*novimus*) ourselves more certainly than we do others precisely because we know ourselves directly by way of our consciousness and will (DNOA IV. xix. 30). If Augustine thinks that joy (*gaudium*), gladness (*laetitia*), sorrow (*tristitia*), pleasure (*delectatio*), suffering (*poena*), distress (*miseria*), disgust (*offensio*) are real even if the person who feels them is dreaming or dead, this must be, it seems, because, he thinks that like understanding and willing, feelings, emotions, pleasures and pains have to be whatever they seem to be, even if their purported external points of reference are merely figments.

With respect to passions like joy and fear, it is indeed Augustine’s position that such emotions are wholly in the soul; and in a passage from *The City of God* Augustine explains why. Augustine is arguing against the “view of the Platonists” that the emotions as such invariably have their origin in the body. The argument itself is an odd one, invoking the authority of Virgil as a spokesman for the Platonists; but it concludes:

Thus even on their own admission, it is not only by the body that the soul is affected, so that it desires, fears, rejoices and grieves; it can also be stirred up by these emotions <arising> out of the soul itself. What is important is what the will of a man is

⁴⁷ René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, transl. Roger Ariew, Indianapolis 2000, 110.

⁴⁸ Cf. *De trin.* XV. 12. 21-2. Other evidence for Augustine as a proto-Cartesian is his view that mathematical definitions and their immediate consequences would be certain, even if I were dreaming or mad; cf. *Soliloquies* I. 9-10, *CSEL* LXXXIX; *Enchiridion* VII. 20, ed. E. Evans, *CC* 46, Turnholt 1958, 23-114.

like . . . When we consent to our appetite for what we will, there is desire; but when we consent to enjoying what we will, that is called joy. Similarly, when we dissent from what we do not want to happen, this willing is fear; but when we dissent from what happens, though we will it not to, such willing is sorrow. And thus for the whole variety of things to which we are drawn by appetite or from which we flee, as the will of a man is attracted or repelled, it is changed or turned into this or that emotion.⁴⁹

Whatever their source, then, the emotions themselves are thus intentional expressions of the attachments of the will; the will's positive and negative attachments as they are present in and to consciousness are emotions.

Thus, even if some feelings do arise first in the body, bodily states are not indispensable to emotions. For one thing, not all desires, pleasures, pains and emotions are corporeal.⁵⁰ In the case of demons, for example, it is their very minds which are tossed about on a sea of ungovernable passions (*De Civ. Dei* IX. 6); their "airy bodies" hardly come into the picture at all. And the devil, who has no body at all, is nonetheless subject to emotions like envy (*De Civ. Dei* XIV. 6), which is an emotion of the soul. Angels aside, although Augustine tends to use expressions '*appetitus*' and '*libido*' in connection with the desires and pleasures of sense and sex, in *Confessiones* he refers to "a lust for the knowledge to be gained from the senses" (*appetitus noscendi*) (*Conf.* X. 35. 54) and "the lust for revenge" (*libido vindicandi me*); we get pleasure (*libeat nos*) and feel joy (*gaudium*), he says, from being feared and loved by others (*Conf.* X. 36. 58-59). And even with respect to those emotions that do start with bodily states and responses, it is the will that is the direct source of the emotions and passions, which are themselves wholly in the higher part of the soul, wholly in the realm of consciousness.⁵¹ And so the fact that St. Perpetua is dreaming is no reason for supposing that her joy at her dream victory over the

⁴⁹ *De Civ. Dei* XIV. 5-6. 421. "Vnde etiam illis fatentibus non ex carne tantum afficitur anima, ut cupiat, metuat, laetetur, aegrescat, uerum etiam ex ipsa his potent motibus agitari. Interest autem qualis sit uoluntas hominis . . . Sed cum consentimus appetendo ea quae uolumus, cupiditas; cum autem consentimus fruendo his quae uolumus, laetitia uocatur. Itemque cum dissentimus ab eo quod accidere nolumus, talis uoluntas metus est; cum autem dissentimus ab eo quod nolentibus accidit, talis uoluntas tristitia est. Et omnino pro uarietate rerum, quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur uel offenditur uoluntas hominis, ita in hos uel illos affectus mutatur et uertitur."

⁵⁰ Cf. G.I. Bonner, "*Libido*" and "*Concupiscentia*" in *St. Augustine*, in: *Studia Patristica* VI (1962), 304-14, where Augustine's broad and variable use of this terminology is discussed.

⁵¹ Augustine's account of emotions strongly resembles Plotinus's account of the passions, though Augustine does not hold that the soul is not affected by the passions, or even that it should be unaffected by passions. Cf. E.K. Emilsson 1998 (n. 43 above), esp. 339-63;

dream Egyptian is not real joy. She could also feel genuine extreme fear, even if her real body were lying peacefully on the bed without a hint of the pallor and trembling which with which fear usually starts.

Still, even if Augustine can convincingly show that having emotions does not require a body, it is hard to see how he can give the same sort of "internalist" account of feelings like Perpetua's sense of fatigue and struggle, Dinocrates' suffering from his wound, and Dives' tormenting thirst, for these are the sort of feelings which normally arise from the body and have a somatic component. It seems extremely problematic philosophically to claim that pleasures, pains, thirst, and feelings of struggle and exhaustion are real, even when the soul is not appropriately embodied—or not embodied at all, like souls of the dead.

Tertullian had in fact reasoned from the reality of the torments of the damned and from the principle that whatever can suffer has to be corporeal, that souls must be corporeal (DA. VII. 4). Augustine is, of course, not interested in denying that the sufferings and joys of the dead are real; he agrees with Tertullian that the souls of those who are not saved are really in torment. He does not, however, agree with Tertullian that everything that can be affected in any way whatsoever must be corporeal. Initially, however, it is hard to see how this helps much in explaining what is going on with the dead Dinocrates and Dives; even if not every sort of suffering involves having a body, still, if the dead can suffer genuine thirst and genuine pain from a cancerous sore, they must, it seems, have some sort of bodies.

Augustine's solution to the problem of the pains of the dead is that the souls of those who are not saved, like Dinocrates and Dives, are really in torment, though they have no bodies; but they are not really suffering the pains they think they are suffering or the pains that onlookers like Perpetua think they are suffering. The soul of Dinocrates that comes to Perpetua is suffering, and Dives is in torment. But in an important sense Dives is not feeling what he thinks he is feeling, for he identifies the torment he is really feeling as a bodily sensation that he is not really feeling, however much he may appear to himself to be feeling it. Dives is said to seek to repair the (real) "ruins of his soul," in which "there is

J.M. Dillon, "Metriopatheia" and "Apatheia": Some Reflections on a Controversy in Later Greek Ethics, in: J. Anton, and A. Preus (eds), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy* I-II, Albany, NY 1983, 508-17.

true suffering" which "torments his soul";⁵² he has no real body, however, and therefore no real thirst. If he is asking for water, then he is mistaken about *what kind of* torment he is feeling. The same goes for Dinocrates. His soul feels real torment; but it is not the bodily pain he thinks he is feeling. It must be, Augustine says, that the souls of the dead associate with themselves "similitudes" of bodies, as dreamers do. Here, as elsewhere, Augustine has very little to say about how such similitudes or likenesses of bodies are produced. But presumably they arise out of the soul's own habitual association with its body and its habitual association of pleasure, pain and the passions with certain bodily states.⁵³ Thus Dinocrates experiences his genuine spiritual torment as pain from the imagined cancerous sore in his "shadow of a body," and his genuine spiritual frustration is experienced as frustration at being unable to reach the golden cup above him and drink from it.

When the dead take each other to be embodied, possibly they just perceive whatever bodily likenesses other dead souls project for themselves. But it is more likely that they really perceive each other by the kind of "interior sense" by which we perceive ourselves in life, though in life we do not have this same kind of immediate access to the "minds and wills" of others. They then construe this unaccustomed form of recognizing others as bodily recognition:

But who would have the ability to investigate what power of cognition even souls that are not good will receive after death, once freed from their corruptible bodies, so that they are able to perceive and recognize others as bad as they are—and even the good—by their interior senses? Will they recognize them not by real bodies, but in the similitudes of bodies? Or by the good or evil movements of their minds in which there is nothing like the shape of bodily members (so that even though

⁵² DNOA IV. xix. 29. 409: "cur ergo aquae stillam desideravit apud inferos diues? . . . sed in illo uera erat molestia, qua cruciabatur anima, non tamen uerum corpus cui quaereret alimenta."

⁵³ In *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Augustine says that the mechanisms by way of which images come before the mind, whether they are dreams or visions, are mysterious, though the origin of all such images is experience. Cf. *De Gen. ad litt.* XII. 18. 39-40. About the likeness of the body that the soul has after death, he says only that it is no more peculiar than the bodily likenesses the dreaming associate with themselves (*De Gen. ad litt.* XII. 32. 60-61). The source, however, may be the soul's "natural aptitude for managing the body," which is so strong as to prevent it from attaining perfect fulfillment until it is reunited with the body, "so that it has the perfect measure of its being, obeying and commanding, vivified and vivifying with such wonderful ease that what was once its burden will be its glory" (*De Gen. ad litt.* XII. 35. 68).

Abraham's bodily form had not been known to him, Dives, in torment, recognized Father Abraham, whose soul had managed to hold on to a similitude of its body, albeit an incorporeal one)? But in fact, can any of us ever say that we have known anybody except insofar we were able to know that person's life and will, which assuredly have no weight or color?⁵⁴

Probably, then, the Rich Man recognizes Abraham's "consciousness and will" directly, though he thinks he is seeing Abraham; and so it does not matter that he could not recognize Abraham by sight. However the process works in detail, the dead project their real recognition of each other onto an imagined recognition of bodies—presumably because human souls become so accustomed to recognizing others by recognizing their bodies. Augustine gives no detailed analysis of Perpetua's visions; her situation is somewhat different, he notes, since she is not herself dead when she is allowed to perceive the sorry state of her dead brother's soul. Still, since Dinocrates' soul has got no real body, it must be that she misidentifies her "interior sense" of his soul as seeing him bodily; his spiritual torment with physical suffering from his sore, his thirst, and his frustration at being unable to reach the rim of the cup; and his salvation with his release from pain and thirst. Possibly this is because he sees himself in this way; but perhaps it is only that Perpetua is accustomed to seeing her brother's body whenever she recognizes him, and is unaccustomed to directly perceiving the pain and pleasures of another person's soul.

Thus Augustine is not a simple proto-Cartesian. This is because according to Augustine in some cases, at least, the soul can make mistakes about what it is feeling, because it can make mistakes about the mode of its embodiment. St. Perpetua in her wrestling dream and the dead Dinocrates and Dives are really feeling something when they sense fatigue, struggle and pain, and their feelings are really theirs and really of the general kind they appear to be; but they are not really exactly the feelings they appear to be, since they are not really the surfaces of bodily states and

⁵⁴ DNOA IV. xix. 30. 409: "Post mortem uero quam uim cognitionis corruptibilibus exoneratae corporibus animae accipiant etiam non bonae, ut uel pariter malas uel etiam bonas ualeant interioribus sensibus intueri et agnoscere siue in ipsis non corporibus, sed similitudinibus corporum sive in bonis aut malis affectionibus mentis, in quibus nulla sunt quasi liniamenta membrorum, quis ualeat indagare? unde est et illud, quod patrem Abraham diues ille, cum in tormentis esset, agnouit, cui figura corporis eius non erat nota, cuius corporis similitudinem quamuis incorpoream potuit anima retinere. quis autem recte dicat se aliquem hominem cognouisse, nisi in quantum potuit eius uitam uoluntatemque cognoscere, quae utique moles non habet uel colores?"

operations.⁵⁵ In the end, I think that we must read Augustine's reference to Perpetua's "*verus labor*" in her dream as referring to a real *sense of struggle* or fatigue or real *effort*—projected in this case onto a dream body which participates in dream adventures. Even if Augustine does at one point say that her soul wrestled (*luctabatur*), elsewhere he says only that she "appeared to herself in a dream to wrestle" (*visa sibi est in somnis luctari*).⁵⁶

It would be open to Augustine to abandon proto-Cartesian transparency, even with respect to the emotions that arise within the mind itself. His account of emotions gives us no compelling reason to think that our emotions are invariably the ones they appear to be. We can be mistaken about what we will, and about how strongly and unambiguously we will something. Even if the genuineness of an emotion is not undercut just by the unreality or inappropriateness of its object and circumstances, still if we can make mistakes about other states of consciousness, and emotions are just conscious expressions of states of will, there is in principle no reason to suppose that we cannot misidentify our feelings. But Augustine seems not much inclined to doubt that in the normal run of things the mind is pretty much transparent to itself with respect to its feelings and emotions.

The Delights of Dreamers and Sinning in One's Sleep

It would not be surprising if Augustine's treatment of dreams and dreamers in *De Natura et Origine Animae* context proved to be at variance with what he says elsewhere. Dream reality is not Augustine's main interest in this work; and his discussion of dream reality is clearly shaped by its intended use, i.e., to serve as a model for understanding apparent bodily phenomena among the dead. *De Natura et Origine Animae* itself is topical and polemical, written in rapid response to a particular work, which

⁵⁵ In his first sermon for the Feast of St. Perpetua and St. Felicitas (*Sermo CCLXXX*, v. 5, *PL* 38, 1283) Augustine discusses the repose of martyrs and the torments of the one "who thirsts for a drop from the finger of the beggar," and says that there is the same sort of difference between the repose and torments of these souls before the Day of Judgment and after that day when they regain their bodies as between the joys and sufferings of the dreaming and the waking, "not because these souls are necessarily making a mistake like the souls of dreamers," (*necesse sit falli*) but because it is one thing to have repose without any body and another to have happiness with a glorified body.

⁵⁶ 'Uisa est' must, it seems, mark the wrestling as only dream-wrestling, not real wrestling, for there is no reason to suppose St. Perpetua might have been mistaken about what sort of dream-action her dream body was engaged in—that she might instead have been dream-treading dream-water.

was, to all appearances, not very good philosophically or theologically. It is aimed obliquely at both Pelagius and Tertullian.

There are two important passages that suggest that Augustine did indeed change his mind about dream-reality and related issues. In *Confessiones* X Augustine seems to claim that we are not morally responsible for our dream-pleasures; but it is hard to see how he can hold that we are not responsible for such pleasures if he also holds, as he does in *De Natura et Origine Animae*, that we are ourselves in our dreams and that our dream pleasures are real and really ours. And in the very early *Contra Academicos*, Augustine seems to answer the sceptic who doubts that we can know anything by arguing that we can know with certainty what pleasures we are having—because even if we should be asleep, pleasures have to be the ones they appear to be; this is exactly what he seems committed to denying in *De Natura et Origine Animae*.

In *Confessiones* X. 30 Augustine discusses the occurrence in dreams of sexual activities and pleasures that would be illicit in waking life. The lustful images encountered in sleep, Augustine says, move us more powerfully than waking experience of the realities themselves. He then proceeds to worry about whether the dreamer has moral responsibility for experiencing the pleasure:

But in my memory, about which many things have been said, there still live images of the sorts of things to which I once clung by habit. When I encounter them waking, they have no power, but in dreams they lead not only to pleasure, but even to something very like consent and deed (*usque ad consensionem factumque simillimum*). . . . Am I not then I, my Lord God? And yet in that moment in which I go from here into sleep or come back from sleep there is such a difference between myself and myself. Where is that reason by which a person awake resists such suggestions, and remains unmoved, even should the realities themselves be forced upon him? Does it close with the eyes? Does it sleep with the senses of the body? And how does it happen that often we put up resistance, and are mindful of our purpose, and remaining most chastely faithful to it, give no consent to such temptations? And yet the difference is so great that when things turn out otherwise, we return to peace of conscience upon awaking and on account of the great distance between the two states we discover that we did not do what was somehow done in us, to our sorrow.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ *Conf.* X. 30. 41, 176-177: "Sed adhuc uiuunt in memoria mea, de qua multa locutus sum, talium rerum imagines, quas ibi consuetudo mea fixit, et occursantur mihi uigilanti quidem carentes uiribus, in somnis autem non solum usque ad delectationem sed etiam usque ad consensionem factumque simillimum . . . numquid tunc *ego non sum*, domine deus *meus*? et tamen tantum interest *inter me ipsum et me ipsum* intra momentum quo hinc ad soporem *transeo* uel huc inde *retranseo*! Vbi est tunc ratio qua talibus suggestionibus resistit *uigilans* et, si res ipsae ingerantur *inconcussus*? numquid *clauditur* cum oculis? numquid *sopitur* cum sensibus corporis? et unde saepe *resistimus* *nostrique* propositi memores atque in

Augustine's considered view is clearly that we are not responsible for the sexual pleasures in our dreams. He does not fault the "peace of consciousness" to which he returns upon awaking. There is, he says, enough distance between our sleeping and waking selves that "we discover (*reperiamus*) that we did not do" whatever regrettable actions and indulgences "were done in us" in sleep. Intuitively appealing though this view is, it is initially hard to see how Augustine is entitled to it. He does not doubt that the pleasures involved are genuine or that they are ours or that they are the ones they seem to be. And so, it seems he should be held morally accountable for them.⁵⁸ The only way for Augustine to avoid drawing this conclusion, it would seem, is to cast doubt on whether we are ourselves in our dreams.

The *Confessiones* passage does indeed look to be far more ambivalent about whether we are ourselves in our dreams than the account of Perpetua's dream-visions. The question of first-person dream identity is explicitly raised here, after all. Perhaps more significantly, Augustine never uses a first-person singular verb to refer to his sleeping self. Matters are blurred further by the repeated reference to "so great a difference" between waking self and dream-self and still further by the forceful and final reference to our regret for "what was somehow done in us." Still, Augustine is not ultimately prepared to doubt that he is himself in his troublesome dreams. The question: "Am I not I?" with which he begins the discussion clearly expects a positive answer. The first person plural forms "*resistimus nostrique*" and "*adhibemus*" used to describe our sleeping selves tilt the passage towards the unquestioned view of *De Natura et Origine Animae* that we are ourselves in our dreams; and the second "*me ipsum*" of the paradoxical "*interest inter me ipsum et me ipsum*" more or less settles the matter of self-identity: we are ourselves in our dreams. But we now face a further question: If Augustine ultimately has no doubt about whether he is himself in his dreams, then why is self-identity treated in such an ambivalent

eo castissime permanentes nullum talibus inlecebris *adhibemus* adsensum? et tamen tantum interest ut, cum aliter accidit euigilantes ad conscientiae requiem *redeamus* ipsaque distantia *reperiamus* nos *non fecisse* quod tamen in nobis quoquo modo *factum esse* doleamus."

⁵⁸ In *On Being Immoral in a Dream* in: *Philosophy* 56 (1981), 47-54, Gareth Matthews argues that Augustine can avoid responsibility only by holding (1) that he is not his dream self; or (2) that dream suggestion, consent and pleasure are not real; or (3) that he cannot do otherwise than he does in his dreams. Since Augustine does not accept (1) or (2), and considers (3) irrelevant morally, says Matthews, Augustine has not got a very good reason for denying that we are responsible for what we do and feel in our dreams.

way, and why does the passage have such an ambivalent and aporetic tone overall with respect to responsibility?

The nature of Augustine's ambivalence in *Confessiones* X becomes clearer if we compare this discussion with his much more unambiguous and resolute treatment of the "consents of dreamers" (*consensiones somniantium*) in *De Genesi ad Litteram*, where he is discussing someone who is dreaming about having illicit sexual intercourse (*De Gen. ad litt.* XII. 15. 31). Such dream images, says Augustine, come from our waking life. Suppose the source of the images in question to be free of consent to pleasure (*placitum consensionis*)—the images come, let us suppose, from thinking about sexual activity while composing this very chapter:

Then if the images of the corporeal things that I have been forced to think about in order to say this should appear as vividly in a dream as bodies appear to the waking, something happens that could not be done without sin by someone who was awake. For who can avoid thinking about what he is discussing, when he is speaking and finds himself constrained by the subject matter to say something about sexual intercourse he has had? Then if this image that arises in the mind of the speaker comes so vividly into the vision of the sleeper that it is impossible to distinguish between it and real sexual intercourse, it immediately moves the flesh, and there follows what naturally follows upon this movement. Still, this happens without sin, to the same extent as we say a waking man is without sin who undoubtedly has to think about such a thing in order to talk about it.⁵⁹

In this passage, the dreamer's actions are not real ones, only dream actions. This passage is not ambivalent; the dreamer does not sin. The reason is fairly clear: everything that happens to the dreamer is presented to us as being something over which he has no control. The speaker has entertained the image of engaging in sexual intercourse; that same image, now vivid as life, is forced upon him in his dream. The occurrence of such dream images is no more significant morally than the images that accompany speaking about sexual activity in dreams that are forced upon the speaker by the need to speak meaningfully. And if the dreamer's flesh then responds of its own accord to images that would hardly perturb him

⁵⁹ *De Gen. ad litt.* XII. 15. 31: "porro imagines rerum corporalium, quas necessario cogitavi ut haec dicerem, si tanta expressione praesentarentur in somnis, quanta praesentantur corpora vigilantibus, fieret illud quod sine peccato fieri a vigilante non posset. Quis enim vel cum loquitur, et postulante necessitate sermonis de suo concubitu aliquid dicit, possit non cogitare quod dicit? Porro ipsa phantasia, quae fit in cogitatione sermocinantis, cum ita expressa fuerit in visione somniantis, ut inter illam et veram commixtionem corporum non discernatur, continuo movetur caro, et sequitur quod eum motu sequi solet, cum hoc tam sine peccato fiat, quam sine peccato a vigilante dicitur, quod ut diceretur sine dubio cogitatum est."

at all if he were awake, and the inevitable ensues, this is a mere "natural consequence," and thus not a matter of responsibility and guilt. Generally speaking, then, no one gets any credit or any blame for dream actions, or for other images that arise in dreams, or for the resulting physical responses. It would be no more appropriate to blame Augustine for what he does and experiences in his dreams, than to clap the now-awake Perpetua on the back and congratulate her for her plucky stand against the Egyptian or for feeling exhilarated at her victory.⁶⁰

De Genesi ad Litteram XII offers a far more nuanced examination of visions and images, both natural and divinely and demonically produced, than *Confessiones*. But in addition, there are significant differences between the dreamer of *Confessiones* X and the dreamer of the *Genesis* commentary which explain how Augustine can say that the *Genesis* dreamer is innocent pure and simple, while remaining ambivalent about the moral responsibility and guilt of his dreaming self in *Confessiones* X.

In *De Genesi ad Litteram* Augustine has deliberately simplified his case morally. First, though sexual pleasure is mentioned here as it is in *Confessiones* X, it does not assume much importance in the tale of virtuous rhetoric, dream images and "inevitable results." Second, our virtuous dreamer is in no way currently morally responsible for *having* the images he has to start with. Perhaps most importantly, Augustine is supposing that the "consent of the dreamers," which is the subject he started out to discuss, is only dream-consent. For suppose that I have thought about having indulged in all manner of illicit activities in the course of piously condemning them, and that as a result these images now come vivid as life before my sleeping eyes, so that I seem to myself to be doing just what I talked about. "The flesh responds," says Augustine, "and the inevitable results." But surely if I am to be dreaming about acting (and despite the misleading parallel with memory images of the doings of my past self, this is the case Augustine has in mind, and not my dreaming about someone very like myself acting while I look on), then in my dream, there has got to be some element of intention, consent or involvement. Who is it, then, that consents to hopping into bed with Sean Connery, etc.? According to Augustine, my dream self is myself; if anyone consents, then, it must be I who consent. To be entitled to the claim that dream pleasure

⁶⁰ In the case of the very good, Augustine admits that the soul's merits are sometimes manifested in its dream choices and actions; even in his dream, the wise Solomon asked God for wisdom (*De Gen. ad litt.* XII. 15. 31), and God was pleased.

has no moral significance here, Augustine has got to hold out that there is no real consent involved in my dream-response to the images, but only dream-consent, just as the images themselves occur without "consent to pleasure." The passive and impersonal constructions of the passage show that this is just what he is assuming. No real consent, then. And so unambiguously no moral responsibility.

All of these simplifications are lacking in the situation described in *Confessiones* X. First, pleasure is explicitly involved, and Augustine unambiguously takes dream pleasure to be real pleasure. Secondly, Augustine seems here to have in mind liminal states in which one is drifting back and forth between dream and waking, and therefore more or less tenuously tied to one's own sleeping body and waking life; it is therefore not clear that the consent involved is dream-consent plain and simple. Most importantly, perhaps, in this case the dream images are not introduced into Augustine's inner life by the melancholy necessity of speaking about illicit sexual activity, and they are not images which exercise no attraction for him. They come from memories of what once attracted him strongly; this attraction, he fears, is still present as a secret inclination that is resisted when he is awake and on guard against it (*vigilans*), but not when his orientation to his main moral purpose is dulled and disoriented by half-sleep. This is why Augustine wavers in *Confessiones* X. In this case, the dreamer's consent may indeed be a genuine movement of the will, and to that extent a cause for moral concern, even though the dreamer's will is so weakened and caught so completely off guard that its movements do not count as consent in a morally significant sense.⁶¹

There is more similarity between treatments of dreamers and their experiences in *De Natura et Origine Animae* and *Confessiones* than there ini-

⁶¹ This ambivalence about dream consent is neatly mirrored by the deliberate ambiguity of "consensionem factumque simillimum," which can mean "consent and something very like the deed," but also "something very like consent and something very like the deed." Thus Matthews 1981 (n. 58 above), who says that Augustine does not draw the distinction between dream consent and real consent because of his "tendency to view the mind and its acts as directly and immediately known to itself" at 51, underestimates Augustine on both points. Already in *Contra Academicos* III, xii, 28, ed. W.M. Green, CC 29, Turnholt 1970 (hereafter cited as CA), Augustine takes a similar position on dream-assent. At issue there is the wise man's dream-refusal to choose the highest good. Even in our sleep, Augustine says, we would not dream of denying that someone is wise when he is asleep because in his dreams he assents to falsehoods in place of truths—then allowing that he is wise again as soon as he wakes up.

tially appears to be. The two works agree completely that our dream-pleasures and dream-pains are real and are really ours. They agree that dream images come in the main from the experiences and habits of our waking life; in *De Natura et Origine Animae*, as in the Genesis commentary, this account is extended to explain the “somatic” experiences of the dead. The two works agree completely that we are ourselves in our dreams. The ambivalence of the *Confessiones* X passage does not come from doubt on Augustine’s part about whether he is himself in his dreams. His ambivalence has to do instead with the suspicion, all too often confirmed, that there is a part of his soul which is not wholly converted to his decision, and remains alien to himself and his moral purpose, a subversive inclination to lower goods that is always present, but ordinarily resisted. In the chapters of *Confessiones* X which follow, Augustine repeatedly expresses his anxiety about the remnants of misdirected desire, both physical and the intellectual, which remain in his soul and cause it to slide indiscernibly from pleasures that are natural and unavoidable into some measure of the guilty pleasures associated with self-love and immoral concupiscence.⁶² It is significant that Augustine concludes the discussion of *Confessiones* X with an appeal to God to free him from such dreams and responses to them, and thereby to cause *his own soul*, freed from the snares of concupiscence, to follow him to God.⁶³

⁶² Ishtiyaque Haji, *On Being Morally Responsible in a Dream* in: Matthews 1999 (n. 17 above), 222-232, is surely on the right track in his guess that Augustine is thinking that a dreamer can be to some extent morally responsible for entertaining a certain thought while asleep, if the thought arises from the desires of waking life, even if it the waking thought was “veiled from her consciousness by rationalization,” at 180. In the subsequent discussion, *Conf.* X. 33. 49-X. 34. 51, Augustine describes the difficulty of distinguishing between illegitimate “*libido*” and the legitimate and inevitable “*uoluptates aurium*” and “*uoluptates oculorum*” which attend hearing and seeing; Cf. also *Contra Julianum Pelagianum* IV. 14, PL 44, 641-874, where he distinguishes between the legitimate “*commoditatis provisio*,” which leads us to avoid what is unpleasant and painful, and which does not yet amount to illegitimate “*libido*”. Cf. also *De trin.* III, 3, where Augustine says that beasts are moved by some “*naturali appetitu suae uoluptatis et deuotione molestiae*”; with our mortal bodies, we are moved unavoidably in the same way.

⁶³ *Conf.* X. 30. 42. 177: “Numquid non potens est manus tua, deus omnipotens, sanare omnes languores animae meae atque abundantiore gratia tua lasciuos motus etiam mei soporis extinguere? Augebis, domine, magis magisque in me munera tua, ut anima mea sequatur me ad te concupiscentiae uisco expedita, ut non sit rebellis sibi, atque ut in somnis etiam non solum non perpetret istas corruptelarum turpitudines per imagines animales usque ad carnis fluxum, sed ne consentiat quidem.” At his age, he adds, it is surely no great thing for God to prevent him, even in his dreams, from doing shameful things “*usque ad fluxum carnis*,” and indeed to prevent even the slightest hint of consent to them.

The differences between Augustine's account of Perpetua's dream and his assessment of his own dream activities and experiences in *Confessiones* X have to do with the peculiarities of the two cases. In *Confessiones*, Augustine does not, it is true, raise the possibility that the sexual pleasures felt in dreams are not the pleasures they appear to be. This may be because he had not yet thought of this possibility in 399-401 A.D., when the *Confessiones* passage was written. More probably it is because he thinks there is no reason for uncertainty about what kind of pleasures these are, given the body's obvious involvement in a liminal dream state. And in *De Natura et Origine Animae* Augustine spends no time worrying about the status of the sleeping Perpetua's "consent." This is because the images in Perpetua's dreams are not just tossed up by her memory and imagination, but divinely sent to prefigure her passion and martyrdom. Perpetua herself introduces the account of her first two dream-visions with "*Mihi ostensum est*" (*Passio* VII. 3; VIII. 1); and in describing her visions Augustine uses the well-known formula for apparitions, "*in somnis visa est*," to describe Perpetua's dreams.⁶⁴ At the end of her description of her third dream, Perpetua herself provides the interpretation:

I awoke. And I understood that I would fight, not against beasts, but against the devil; but I knew that victory would be mine. I have completed this a short time before the exhibition; as to what takes place at the exhibition, let whoever wishes write it down.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ 'Ostensio/ostensum est' has an established post classical use, found in both Tertullian and Apuleius, having to do with visions. The formula Augustine uses to describe Perpetua's dream visions is one that often describes just such portents. Virgil uses "*in somnis . . . visus est adesse mihi*" to introduce Hektor's dream appearance to Aeneas, "bearing the wounds (*vulnera gerens*) that he received in his final battle and afterwards" (*Aeneid*, II. 270). The appearance of "the form of Mercury" to Aeneas to tell him to make haste to flee Carthage is introduced by "*in somnis rursusque ita visa monere est*" (*Aeneid* IV. 554). Cicero, *De Divinatione* I. iv. 49, introduces the vision of Hannibal with, "*visum est in somnis a Iove in deorum concilio vocari*"; and Socrates is said to have begun his report of his own vision of the woman of great beauty who foretold his death, "*vidisse enim se in somnis*" (*ibid.*, xxiv. 52). In the second of his Sermons for the Feast of St. Perpetua and St. Felicitas, Augustine describes Perpetua: "It delights the pious mind to behold a vision (*spectaculum*) like the vision of herself St. Perpetua said she had been shown (*revelatum esse*), that having been turned into a man (*virum se factam*) she fought with the devil", *Sermo* CCLXXXI. ii. 2 (n. 4 above) at 1284.

⁶⁵ *Passio* X. 14-15: "Et experrecta sum. Et intellexi me non ad bestias, sed contra diabolum esse pugnaturum; sed sciebam mihi esse victoriam. Hoc usque in pridie muneris ego; ipsius autem muneris actum, si quis voluerit, scribat."

Clearly St. Perpetua's feelings and dream experiences prefigure her martyrdom precisely by reflecting the disposition of her will. Perpetua's decisions and feelings in her dream are more in character than those of the sleeping Augustine; they are in line with her main moral purpose. Something of her real commitment to her passion and martyrdom "shines through" in her dream-consent to fight the Egyptian in the dream that prefigures her passion. In the passion narrative itself, this close connection between dream and life is reflected strikingly by the tone of St. Perpetua's autobiographical narrative, in which she describes her imprisonment and trial and her three visions, and even by its grammar.⁶⁶

Contra Academicos III. xi. 26 seems to present us with a different sort of inconsistency. In this early work, Augustine includes pleasure and pain among the self-presenting states; we can be sure that we are experiencing pleasure, and certain about what kind of pleasure it is:

This I say, that when a man tastes something, he can swear in good faith that he knows it is sweet to his palate or that it is not. Nor can any trickery of the Greeks dispossess him of this knowledge. For who would be so outrageous as to say to me while I am licking away with delight, "Perhaps you are not tasting it, and this is only a dream"? Am I contesting this? But even in a dream it would delight me.⁶⁷

There is some slippage in this passage. It seems to start with the claim that I am warranted in saying that I know with certainty *whether something tastes bitter or sweet to me or not*, even if I am only dreaming that I am tasting it; but it seems to end with the weaker claim that I know with certainty *that I am having the pleasure*, even if I am not tasting anything, or not tasting anything sweet. Even the weaker claim that I can know certainty that I am feeling sensory delight if I feel that I am, even if I am dreaming, is not really consistent with Augustine's approach in

⁶⁶ *Passio* X. 7, 26. Gender in Perpetua's third dream-vision, in which she "became a man" and vanquished the Egyptian in a wrestling match is grammatically unambiguously feminine; she was transformed into a man, "*facta sum masculus*" (*Passio* X. 7, 26); she was lifted into the air, "*sublata sum*" (*Passio* X. 11, 26); the arbiter hails her as victor with "*Filia, pax tecum*" (*Passio*, X. 13, 26); and she describes her awakening from the dream vision, "*Et expectata sum*" (*Passio*, X. 14, 26).

⁶⁷ *CA* III. xi. 26. 50: "Illud dico, posse hominem, cum aliquid gustat, bona fide iurare se scire palato suo illud suaue esse vel contra nec ulla calumnia Graeca ab ista scientia posse deduci. Quis enim tam inpudens sit, qui mihi cum delectatione ligurrienti dicat: fortasse non gustas, sed hoc somnium est? numquidnam resisto? Sed mihi tamen in somnis etiam delectaret." For "*numquidnam resisto?*" John O'Meara (transl.), *St. Augustine: Against the Academics*, New York NY 1951, at 129, reads "Do I stop my savoring?", which makes for a slightly different train of thought, but the same sort of conclusion.

De Natura et Origine Animae, where he wants to say that the souls of the dead and dreaming can misconstrue their experience to the extent of making mistakes about what sorts of pleasures they are feeling. But in any event, the surrounding context makes it clear that Augustine means the stronger claim, for he has been belaboring the point that I can know that there appears to me to be a bent stick in water or that something looks white to me or that something tastes bitter to me at this moment, even if it does not still taste bitter to me later, or tastes sweet to a cow at this very moment (CA III, xi, 26, 50). Like instances of logical or mathematical truths (CA III, x, 23, 48), such claims are said to be in absolutely no danger of being undercut on the grounds that they are indistinguishable from very similar claims that are false (CA III, xi, 26, 50)—in this case, because no good faith claims about our own intentional states are ever false. The distinction between appearance and reality does not apply to intentional realities. The Academic can start us down the slippery slope towards assenting to nothing only if we ourselves slip over into claims about the extramental causes of our intentional states, by saying, e.g., “This ice cream tastes scrumptious.”

There is a degree of genuine disagreement between the *Contra Academicos* passage and the much later *De Natura et Origine Animae*. This is not surprising, given the increasing sophistication of Augustine’s philosophy of mind and the fact that the later works put stronger emphasis on man’s essential embodiment.⁶⁸ Equally important is the fact that the philosophical objectives of Augustine’s earliest works and his later works are very different. In *Contra Academicos* Augustine’s aim is to disarm epistemological skepticism. His strategy is to appeal to immediate perceptual contents and feelings of pleasure and pain; these, he says, can be known with certainty. Even if we are dreaming, Augustine argues, we can be sure about the “intentional surface” of our experience, where a distinction between appearance and reality makes no sense. A proto-Cartesian identification of knowledge with certainty and the idea that the immediate and complete presence of some given is sufficient for certainty is important to this agenda. *De Magistro*, from the same period, puts forward the actual pres-

⁶⁸ In stressing the connection between body and soul, Augustine may be reacting to Pelagian criticism of his views on embodiment and related issues; but he has also begun, perhaps from ca. 412 A.D., to work on the later sections of *De Genesi ad Litteram*, and so he cannot very well ignore the fact that embodiment is God given. Cf. O’Connell 1987 (n. 5 above).

ence of something to the mind as a necessary condition for learning anything about it. If I am asked about something sensible like the new moon, and if it is present to me I can answer truly about it:

But if the person who asks me does not see the moon, he acquires a belief about it (or, as often happens, he does not); but he does not learn anything about it unless he himself sees what is being talked about.⁶⁹

In his later works, by contrast, Augustine does not care as much about disarming scepticism. Indeed, given the increased prominence of will in his later philosophy of mind and epistemology, he cannot afford to care very much about it. Cognition for the later Augustine is markedly a process of selection, attention, thinking and speaking, which requires skill and strategy; and the measure of objectivity of such activity is its success. Despite Augustine's increased interest in the soul's multifarious opacity to its own introspective gaze, *Confessiones* still reflects to some extent the epistemology of presence of the earlier period. But by the final sections of *De Trinitate*, Augustine's views in epistemology have changed considerably, in large part because they are now shaped by his interest in showing how the human mind and its operations furnish an image of the divine Trinity. The Academics achieved their paltry success, he says, by casting doubt in obvious ways on our perceptual knowledge of the world based on the data of the senses. Anyone who wants to read more against the Academics is welcome to consult his youthful work, he adds. But in fact the Academics never succeeded in casting any doubt on a much more significant kind of knowledge such as that we live, and think and will. Furthermore, he concludes:

Far be it from us to doubt that the things we learn through the bodily senses are true, for by them we have learned about heaven and earth and all the things in them which are known to us, so far as He who created both us and them willed that we come to know them. And far be it from us to deny that we know what we have learned from the testimony of others. Otherwise we would not know that the

⁶⁹ Augustine, *De Magistro* XII, 39, ed. K.-D. Daur, CC 29, Turnholt 1970, 157-203, at 197, says: "Namque omnia quae percipimus, aut sensu corporis aut mente percipimus. Illa sensibilia, haec intelligibilia siue, ut more nostrorum loquar, illa carnalia, haec spiritalia nominamus. De illis cum interrogamur, respondemus, si praesto sunt ea, quae sentimus, uelut cum a nobis quaeritur intuentibus lunam nouam, qualis aut ubi sit. Hic ille, qui interrogat, si non uidet, credit uerbis et saepe non credit, discit autem nullo modo, nisi et ipse quod dicitur uideat, ubi iam non uerbis, sed rebus ipsis et sensibus discit." Pretty clearly Augustine means to allow that I, who see the moon, thereby come to know something about it when it is present; he has thus moved away from the rearguard epistemological campaign against the Academic in *Contra Academicos*.

ocean exists, and the lands and cities we know about from copious reports. We would not know that there were people and deeds that we learn about from reading history. We would not know the things that are reported daily from all over, and are confirmed by consistent and consonant evidence. Finally, we would not know where and of what parents we were born. <We would not know these things> because these are all things we believe on the testimony of others. And if it is completely absurd to say this [*sc.* that we do not know such things], then it has to be admitted that not only our own bodily senses, but those of others have added enormously to our knowledge (*De trin.* XV. xii. 21).

In this complex process of knowing and willing of things and events, we dimly resemble God; for all these things, whether we come to know them by our own experience or by the testimony of others, we have a word within. We resemble God only dimly, because for his part He knows things in a single Word and does not know things because they are; rather they are because He knows them (*De trin.* XV. xii. 22).

Conclusion

Augustine hardly ever pursued epistemology, ontology or philosophy of mind for their own sakes; on any topic, what we find in his thought is a consistent philosophical core, with the actual working out of the position shaped decisively by Augustine's particular orientation and developing agenda, by his current enthusiasms, and by the opponent of the moment. Like the other later works, *De Natura et Origine Animae* adheres to a consistent core of thought. From *De Libero Arbitrio* onwards Augustine consistently declines to give a definite answer to the question of the soul's origin, of how God creates souls. He never deviates from his discovery that the soul is immaterial and immortal, or from the assumption that first person experiences are constitutive of personal identity and have a special and immediate givenness to the self. He in fact holds consistently that dream-assent and dream-consent in normal cases are not morally or epistemologically significant.

De Natura et Origine Animae also fits into a general progression from a naïve, proto-Cartesian philosophy of mind to an interest in the dynamics of embodiment and the conviction that self-knowledge demands an ongoing labor of psychological and moral archaeology and rigorous philosophical reflection. The simple view of self-presenting states that Augustine exploits in *Contra Academicos* has given way to the position, already clearly present in *Confessiones*, and articulated powerfully in *De Trinitate* that the self is not just the sum of its first-person experiences, but also the locus

of reflection upon its own experiences, and that self-awareness merely supplies essential data for self-knowledge. As a result, Augustine is increasingly open to the suggestion that in various ways our first-person experiences may not be the experiences they appear to be. Augustine's response to Vincentius Victor, cranky, topical and polemical though it is, is nevertheless firmly fixed in the landscape of Augustine's later works.

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Emotions and Cognitions
Fourteenth-Century Discussions on the Passions of the Soul

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ABSTRACT

Medieval philosophers clearly recognized that emotions are not simply “raw feelings” but complex mental states that include cognitive components. They analyzed these components both on the sensory and on the intellectual level, paying particular attention to the different types of cognition that are involved. This paper focuses on William Ockham and Adam Wodeham, two fourteenth-century authors who presented a detailed account of “sensory passions” and “volitional passions”. It intends to show that these two philosophers provided both a structural and a functional analysis of emotions, i.e., they explained the various elements constituting emotions and delineated the causal relations between these elements. Ockham as well as Wodeham emphasized that “sensory passions” are not only based upon cognitions but include a cognitive component and are therefore intentional. In addition, they pointed out that “volitional passions” are based upon a conceptualization and an evaluation of given objects. This cognitivist approach to emotions enabled them to explain the complex phenomenon of emotional conflict, a phenomenon that has its origin in the co-presence of various emotions that involve conflicting evaluations.

I

Suppose that, during your childhood, you had a best friend who was very close, with whom you shared not only most of your time, but also most of your secrets. The two of you were inseparable at school and went through all the stormy stages of adolescence together. But then, one day, your friend suddenly disappeared without any explanation. You heard rumors that she had gone to Australia, but you received no message from her—no phone call, no postcard, nothing. It took you years to come to terms with this strange behavior. Yet one morning, when you were about to leave your apartment, all of a sudden she was standing at your door, smiling at you as if nothing had happened. How would you react? You

would be in a complex emotional state, I assume, and you would go through various stages. First, you might feel sheer pleasure at seeing her, a pleasure that would immediately trigger bodily actions like running toward her and embracing her. But then you might also feel anger. Why did she leave so abruptly? And why did she show up after so many years without warning you? Finally, you might also feel a bit guilty. After all, you could have done something to learn about her whereabouts. You neglected to keep in touch as much as she did.

It is quite easy to imagine such a situation and to give a detailed description of the complex emotional state a person is likely to be confronted with. However, it is far from easy to provide a philosophical analysis of this state. In such an analysis, we need to do at least two things. First, we ought to give a *structural* explanation of the emotional state, i.e., we need to indicate what kind of components or elements are to be taken into account and how these elements are interrelated. Thus, it is necessary to delineate what we need to consider when we describe a person as feeling pleasure, anger, and guilt. Does such a person have mere feelings, comparable to sensations like feeling hungry and thirsty, or does she have mental states with a cognitive content? And how can we characterize this content? Second, it is also necessary to provide a *functional* explanation of the complex emotional state, spelling out what causes the various components and what they cause in turn. Should we say, for instance, that seeing an old friend causes pleasure? And should we assume that pleasure, in turn, causes an action like embracing? Or should a different causal role be assigned to pleasure?

Philosophers in the later Middle Ages tried to answer all of these questions by providing both a structural and a functional analysis of emotions or, more precisely, of “passions of the soul” (*passiones animae*), as they used to call the mental phenomena a person experiences or “undergoes” when she is in an affective state.¹ Since most fourteenth-century authors worked with an Aristotelian theory of the soul, they examined two levels when analyzing passions.² First, they turned to the sensory soul, which

¹ For the technical use of the term “*passio*”, rooted in Aristotelian metaphysics, see V. Hirvonen, *Passions in William Ockham's Philosophical Psychology*, Dordrecht 2004, 47-73.

² Ockham stresses that these two levels are really and not simply conceptually distinct; see *Quodl.* II, q. 10 (OTh IX, 156-161). All references to Ockham's works apply to the *Opera Philosophica* (= OPh) and *Opera Theologica* (= OTh), ed. by G. Gál et al., St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967-1988. On the metaphysical framework of his psychology, see M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, Notre Dame 1987, 654-64, and G. J. Etzkorn, *Ockham's View of*

was divided into two parts: “cognitive” and “appetitive”. They investigated the passions we find on this level and the causal role they play in our actions. Second, they examined the level of the intellectual soul, which they also divided into a “cognitive” and an “appetitive” part, asking again what kind of passions are to be found there and how they differ from sensory passions. In their view, we are utterly unable to understand passions unless we analyze the relationship between cognitive and appetitive parts on each level as well as the interaction between the two levels. Only then do we get a clear picture of all the structural elements, and only then can we explain the causal role of all the relevant elements.

In light of this architecture of the soul, I intend to examine how two prominent fourteenth-century philosophers, William Ockham and his pupil Adam Wodeham, analyzed passions on both levels. It goes without saying that I will not be able to take into account all the dimensions of their complex explanatory model. I will discuss neither moral aspects (e.g., the importance attached to higher-level passions for the development of virtues) nor theological ones (e.g., the role passions play in the theory of beatific vision).³ Since I am primarily interested in structural and causal aspects, especially in the way later medieval philosophers related elements in the cognitive part of the soul to those in the appetitive part, I will focus on the interplay between these parts and on the impact it has for an explanation of human actions.

To avoid misunderstandings, I should point out that speaking about parts of the soul does not amount to introducing various homunculi or separate faculties. Ockham emphasizes that intellect and will are not different entities within the human soul. Ontologically speaking, they are one and the same substance that is capable of bringing about different states or acts. Thus, the intellect is nothing but the intellectual soul insofar as it produces cognitive acts, and the will is the very same soul insofar as it produces volitional acts.⁴ There is only a real distinction between intellectual and sensory soul, not between intellect and will. In giving such an ontologically parsimonious explanation, Ockham clearly uses his “cleaver” to cut away a multiplicity of entities and really distinct parts.⁵

the Human Passions in the Light of his Philosophical Anthropology, in: W. Vossenkuhl and R. Schönberger (eds.), *Die Gegenwart Ockhams*, Weinheim 1990, 265-87.

³ For a comprehensive account of both moral and theological aspects, see S. Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford 2004, ch. 4.

⁴ See *Reportatio* II, q. 20 (OTh V, 435-6).

⁵ On this methodological principle, see J. Boler, *Ockham's Cleaver*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 45 (1985), 119-44.

It is therefore hardly adequate to investigate the relationship between various parts understood as special entities, even if ones uses the expressions “intellect” and “will”, as Ockham (and following him Wodeham) himself does. The basic questions should rather be how intellectual and volitional *acts* are interrelated and how they are based upon acts brought about by the sensory soul.

II

If we want to understand the activities of the sensory soul, we need to look at the way Ockham explains sensory cognition (*notitia sensitiva*). In his view, this type of cognition provides information about particular, material things and can be either intuitive or abstractive, depending on the senses that are involved.⁶ If the external senses are activated, and if they grasp something present to them as present and existent, an intuitive cognition occurs. If, however, only the imagination as an internal sense is active and apprehends a thing without taking notice of its existence, there is mere abstractive cognition. This distinction can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose there is an apple in front of you and you see it as an existent apple. In that case, you have a sensory intuitive cognition. If there is no apple physically present to you, but you are terribly hungry and visualize an apple in your imagination, then you have nothing more than a sensory abstractive cognition. Normally, such an abstractive cognition presupposes an earlier intuitive one, for you cannot visualize an apple if you have not already seen one.

So far, the intellect has not been involved in the cognitive process. There is intellectual cognition (*notitia intellectiva*) only when the intellect starts forming mental terms, i.e., concepts, and when it apprehends the object by means of these terms.⁷ Here, Ockham again distinguishes between intuitive and abstractive cognition.⁸ Intuitive cognition occurs when the

⁶ See *Reportatio* II, q. 12-13 (OTh V, 256-61); *Reportatio* III, q. 3 (OTh VI, 114-25). The thesis that sensory intuitive cognition provides the basis for further cognition is already stated in *Ordinatio* I, prologus (OTh I, 25).

⁷ On Ockham's identification of concepts with mental terms, thoroughly discussed by recent commentators, see C. Panaccio, *Les mots, les concepts et les choses. La sémantique de Guillaume d'Occam et le nominalisme d'aujourd'hui*, Montréal-Paris 1991, and D. Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*, Frankfurt a. M. 2002, 361-85.

⁸ See *Ordinatio* I, prologus (OTh I, 30-3) and *Quodl.* V, q. 5 (OTh IX, 495-500). On this distinction, widely discussed in recent secondary literature, see the concise analysis provided by C. Michon, *Nominalisme. La théorie de la signification d'Occam*, Paris 1994, 108-26,

intellect apprehends a present and existent thing as an existent thing. More precisely, Ockham claims that by means of this cognition “one can know whether or not there is a thing such that, if there is a thing, the intellect immediately judges that it is and knows with evidence that it is.”⁹ Thus, an intuitive intellectual cognition is always followed by a judgment about the existence or non-existence of the cognitive object. Abstractive intellectual cognition, on the other hand, is not followed by such a judgment. In that case, the intellect “abstracts from the existence or non-existence and from other conditions which contingently apply to a thing or are predicated of a thing.”¹⁰ This means that if I simply conceive of an apple, I do not judge about the actual existence of an apple. I merely grasp a certain cognitive content.

This distinction between sensory and intellectual cognition is crucially important for an understanding of the passions, because Ockham emphasizes that it is sensory cognition, not the external object or intellectual cognition of this object, that immediately causes passions such as pleasure, desire, and sadness.¹¹ Thus, when I meet an old friend, it is not the friend herself or my thinking about her, but my seeing her that causes pleasure in me. Before I activate my intellect and, accordingly, before I form or use any concepts, my seeing immediately triggers a passion.¹² Of course, Ockham acknowledges that in most cases sense and intellect cooperate so that the intellect works upon the material provided by the senses and comes up with an intellectual cognition. But he insists on the fact that sensory cognition is not necessarily followed by, or transformed into, an intellectual one, as becomes clear when you consider infants who do

and E. Karger, *Ockham's Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition*, in: P. V. Spade (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, Cambridge-New York 1999, 204-26.

⁹ *Ordinatio* I, prologus (OTH I, 31): “. . . notitia intuitiva rei est talis notitia virtute cuius potest sciri utrum res sit vel non, ita quod si res sit, statim intellectus iudicat eam esse et evidenter cognoscit eam esse . . .”

¹⁰ *Ordinatio* I, prologus (OTH I, 31): “Aliter accipitur cognitio abstractiva secundum quod abstrahit ab existentia et non existentia et ab aliis condicionibus quae contingenter accidunt rei vel praedicantur de re.”

¹¹ See *Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, art. 9 (OTH VIII, 251); *Quodl.* III, q. 17 (OTH IX, 268-72); *Ordinatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (OTH I, 420).

¹² Ockham makes it clear that the external object cannot be more than a mediate cause. *Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, art. 9 (OTH VIII, 252): “Et per consequens obiectum apprehensum nullo modo est causa immediataistarum passionum. Sed solum si sit causa [. . .], est solum causa mediata respectu illius passionis et solum causa causae quatenus naturaliter causat cognitionem intuitivam in sensu et eam conservat, quae cognitio causat immediate passionem praedictam modo praedicto.”

not yet use concepts but nevertheless have sensory cognitions causing passions (e.g., seeing the mother or tasting milk causes pleasure).¹³ It is even more obvious in the case of brute animals. Ockham mentions the famous case of the sheep that flees when seeing a wolf.¹⁴ The mere act of seeing terrifies the sheep and makes it flee. Thus, there can be a sensory cognition causing a passion without the presence of any intellectual activity.

This claim inevitably raises the question of how we should understand this type of cognition. What exactly does it mean that we (as well as brute animals) can see something without making use of concepts? Unfortunately, Ockham does not give a detailed answer to this question. Modern readers may immediately raise the objection that it hardly makes sense to speak about pre-conceptual seeing.¹⁵ If seeing is more than the mere reception of sensory inputs, it always involves an explicit or implicit use of concepts: we always see something *as something* and thereby categorize the perceptual object. For instance, you see the red, round thing in front of you as an apple or simply as a red, round thing. That is why you make use of concepts in the very act of seeing and not in a later act of intellectual apprehension. So, Ockham's claim that there are pre-conceptual sensory acts of cognition causing passions before the intellect provides concepts looks questionable.

Although it is tempting to argue in this way, I do not think that Ockham's claim should be dismissed so easily. Let me try to explain this by probing the examples he discusses. The most illuminating cases are those of animals that have mere sensory cognition.¹⁶ When a sheep sees a wolf, it apprehends the so-called "external sensible qualities" of the wolf, i.e., its color, its shape, its size, etc., and it immediately cognizes that a thing having all these properties is dangerous. Ockham emphasizes that the sheep does not apprehend the concepts of color, shape, etc. It simply perceives some patches that happen to have a certain color, shape, etc. Nor does it grasp dangerousness or hostility as a special quality

¹³ Infants are mentioned in *Reportatio* IV, q. 14 (OTh VII, 314), and in *Quodl.* I, q. 15 (OTh IX, 84), where Ockham states: "puer videt sensibiliter et non intellectualiter . . .". He even assumes that they have some form of non-intellectual judgment. They judge that something is agreeable or disagreeable without using the concepts "agreeable" and "disagreeable".

¹⁴ See *Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, q. 2 (OTh II, 410-1).

¹⁵ In the current debate, J. McDowell, *Mind and World*, Cambridge, Mass., 1994, 46-65, takes this line in his critique of theories of pre-conceptual perception.

¹⁶ See *Reportatio* IV, q. 14 (OTh VII, 314-5), and *Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, q. 2 (OTh II, 410-1).

that would be added to the sensible qualities. Criticizing some of his predecessors, among them Thomas Aquinas, Ockham holds that there is no special *intentio*, as claimed by these authors,¹⁷ that could be grasped. Dangerousness is simply what results from a thing displaying certain qualities. That is why the sheep grasps the sensible qualities of the wolf and its property of being dangerous at the same time. In addition, the sheep is also capable of distinguishing the wolf from other things displaying other sensible qualities. Ockham even claims that the sheep is capable of making some kind of judgment, although he hastens to add that it does not form a full-fledged judgment that would involve the use of concepts. The sensory judgment is a mere act of recognizing and locating a certain pattern of sensible qualities. When performing this act, the sheep sees the wolf *as something*, in the sense that it sees it as a specific bundle of colors, and it is capable of discriminating this bundle from another one, say from the one it sees when looking at a fellow sheep. Yet it is utterly unable to see the wolf as a wolf, simply because it cannot apply an appropriate concept to what it sees.

In light of the specific capacity that an animal with mere sensory cognition has, we can conclude that this type of cognition is indeed pre-conceptual, but nevertheless more than the reception of an unstructured stream of sensory inputs. It has a distinct content that enables an animal to distinguish different things in the material world. This is important for an understanding of the genesis of sensory passions, for it is precisely the sensory cognition having a distinct content that causes them. Ockham says with respect to the fleeing sheep: "Then I ask: what could cause this act of desiring to flee? Not the hostility, for there is no such thing there, and what does not exist cannot be a cause of anything. Therefore, this act is caused by a cognition of the external sensible qualities . . ."¹⁸ So it is the act of seeing, not the thing itself or a mysterious entity called "hostility", that causes a passion. This occurs naturally, without any intellectual intervention. Ockham acknowledges that not only animals experience such passions. Human beings have them as well. That is why he claims that human pleasure and desire are often naturally caused by sensory

¹⁷ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. by P. Caramello, Turin-Rome 1952, pars I, q. 78, art. 4, corp.

¹⁸ *Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, q. 2 (OTh II, 411): "Tunc quaero: a quo causaretur ille actus appetitivus fugiendi? Non ab inimicitia, quia nulla est ibi, et non-ens nullius potest esse causa; igitur causatur a cognitione sensibilibus exteriorum . . ."

cognitions, without there being any use of concepts. To illustrate this point with a modern example, we may say: when I see and smell a bouquet of fresh flowers, it is not the use of the concepts “flowers” and “fresh” and, hence, not the conceptualization of the present situation that makes me feel pleasure. Rather, the simple fact that I experience enjoyable sensible qualities causes my pleasure.

This has a consequence for an explanation of how passions can be controlled or corrected. Do I have direct control over my pleasure when I see and smell fresh flowers? Hardly, Ockham would respond. The flowers *naturally* cause a certain type of sensory cognition in me, which in turn *naturally* causes pleasure. I cannot dictate to my senses not to provide a certain visual and olfactory cognition, and not to cause pleasure. Similarly, the sheep cannot decide not to be terrified when it sees the wolf. The passion arises naturally. However, this does not mean that we have no control whatsoever over our sensory passions. Ockham carefully points out that human beings, unlike brute animals, can exercise a certain control over them, because they are capable of bringing about acts of the will. But these acts cannot directly change or influence passions. They are only capable of producing a certain disposition that influences the way we see things. “Or,” Ockham continues, “perhaps the act of the will is a mediate cause with respect to these passions, because it is the cause of the cause. For it is the partial immediate cause of an apprehension that precedes such an act called ‘passion’.”¹⁹ This claim can easily be illustrated. Suppose that I decide to go to a flower shop where I will be exposed to exquisite scents and colors. In that case, my decision (an act of the will) is a *mediate* cause of pleasure, because it makes me go to a place where I will acquire a certain sensory cognition. This cognition will then cause pleasure. But the act of the will can by no means function as the *immediate* cause of pleasure. Were I exposed to rotten flowers, I could not command myself: feel pleasure! No matter how much I want a sensory passion, I cannot have it unless I have previously had the necessary sensory cognition.²⁰

The fact that acts of the will can be an indirect cause shows that there is an important difference between human beings and brute animals.

¹⁹ *Reportatio* III, q. 12 (OTh VI, 411): “Vel forte ipse actus voluntatis est causa mediata respectu illarum passionum, quia est causa causae. Est enim causa immediata partialis apprehensionis praecedentis talem actum qui vocatur passio.”

²⁰ Note that this cognition does not need to be directly caused by an external object.

When a sheep sees a wolf, it cannot want to avoid the passion of fear, simply because it lacks volitional acts. It cannot even want to be in a situation where it would not be scared. We human beings, on the other hand, can want to expose ourselves to situations where we have different sensory cognitions and, consequently, different passions. In addition, we can use our intellect in order to conceive of one and the same situation in different ways. Suppose you suffer from wolf-phobia just like a sheep, but you learn that there are nice, tame wolves in the circus. Then, you can want to go to the circus so that you will have a sensory cognition of a wolf that will be shaped by what you have learned. That is, you will no longer see the wolf as a mere bundle of sensible qualities that scares you. You will see it as a tamed animal. This may make you overcome your wolf-phobia. So, unlike the unfortunate sheep, you can do something to change your passions. This is an important point in Ockham's theory. While not being under the immediate control of acts of the will, passions are not out of control either. We can force ourselves to an *éducation sentimentale* (a) by exposing ourselves to situations in which we acquire certain sensory cognitions and (b) by conceptualizing these basic cognitions.

At this point someone might voice a fundamental objection against Ockham's claim that sensory cognitions cause passions. Why does he not admit that objects in the world play this causal role? Could he not appeal to his famous ontological razor or "cleaver" and claim that the wolf immediately causes fear when it is present to a person or to a sheep? No doubt, Ockham would reject this suggestion because it misses the crucial point that an object in itself simply triggers our senses—nothing more. In some passages, he presents an explicit argument endorsing the thesis that it is the sensory cognition, not the external object, that plays the causal role.²¹ If the object caused a passion, he says, the passion would disappear as soon as the object would be removed or destroyed. However, it is possible for a passion to persist after the removal or destruction of the object. (Suppose you see a wild wolf in the dark and are terribly scared. Then the wolf disappears. Yet you are still shaken by fear because you still have the strong impression of something big, dark, and threatening.

Since it can also be abstractive, i.e., an act of imagination, it can be caused by the sensory soul itself. For example, I can force myself to come up with an imagination of a delicious apple, which will cause pleasure.

²¹ See *Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, art. 9 (OTh VIII, 251-2); *Quodl.* III, q. 17 (OTh IX, 268-9).

It is the persisting content of your previous act of seeing that maintains your fear.) Ockham even adduces an argument *ex hypothesi* to corroborate this claim: "If God preserved the seeing of a pleasurable or saddening object and destroyed the object of that act of seeing, the pleasure or sadness in the appetite following the sense of sight could immediately be caused, as is clear from experience."²² Appealing to experience may be difficult in this case, but the crucial point is clear. A passion can be caused even without the presence of an external object; therefore, the external object cannot be the immediate cause of a passion. This is an important thesis that should not be neglected. In Ockham's view, passions should not be explained in a crude behaviorist way, because it is not simply the stimulus stemming from an external object that causes a passion as a reaction. Rather, our sensory cognition plays the decisive causal role. To put it in a nutshell, we may say that it is not the world itself, but our sensory cognitive attitude toward the world that causes passions. This is why passions are "cognitively penetrable", as modern psychologists and philosophers of mind would say.²³ Shifts in the way we cognize the world immediately affect our passions.

Now one may still wonder in what sense passions are "cognitively penetrable". Does that mean that we first need to have a sensory cognition so that we can acquire a passion that, taken in itself, is a mere sensation? Or does it mean that we need to have a sensory cognition so that we can acquire a passion that has in itself a cognitive content? This question arises because in his discussion of sensory passions, Ockham mentions not just pleasure and desire, but also pain.²⁴ Yet pain seems to be a state without a cognitive content. Using modern terminology, one could say that pain has a certain phenomenal quality (it feels a certain way to have, say, a headache), but not a cognitive content (a headache is not *about* something and does not represent a certain object or quality in the world).²⁵ If Ockham treats pain along with other sensory passions, it seems

²² *Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, art. 9 (OTh VIII, 251-2): "Si etiam Deus conservaret visionem alicuius obiecti delectabilis vel tristabilis et destrueret obiectum illius visionis, potest statim causari delectatio vel tristitia in appetitu sequente visum, sicut patet per experientiam."

²³ I borrow this expression from Z. Pylyshyn, *Computation and Cognition*, Cambridge, Mass. 1984.

²⁴ Pain is the passion he discusses most extensively in *Quodl.* III, q. 17 (OTh IX, 269-70).

²⁵ This is, of course, a controversial claim that would not be unanimously accepted in the contemporary debate. It is usually discussed as "the phenomenological theory", for

as if he were reducing all passions to mere sensations that lack a cognitive content.

Tempting as this interpretation may be, it would not be a correct account of Ockham's theory. In his explanation of various sensory passions, he makes it clear that most of them are *about* something, and therefore have a cognitive content. He states, for instance, that pleasure is about something present, whereas desire and avoidance are about something that is not present and not possessed.²⁶ This clearly shows that he takes these passions to be intentional states: they are directed toward present or non-present objects. Even pain is intentional in his view.²⁷ Or to be more precise, pain as a passionate attitude toward something bad that affects the body is intentional. Ockham carefully distinguishes pain, understood in this sense, from pain understood as a mere feeling.²⁸ Therefore, it would be erroneous to say that Ockham considers passions to be non-intentional sensations or moods. Most of them are fully cognitive: not only are they caused by sensory cognitions, they also have a cognitive content in themselves.

III

Sensory cognition is the starting point for every cognitive activity and the first cause of passions. Yet it is clear that human beings also have an intellectual soul, which, just like the sensory soul, can bring about cognitive acts (so-called "intellectual acts") and appetitive acts (so-called "volitional acts"). This is precisely what distinguishes human beings from brute animals, which are only endowed with a sensory soul. Since human beings can have higher-level acts, Ockham introduces "passions of the will" that play a decisive role in his theory of emotions.²⁹ His most extensive discussion

instance by P. Smith and O. R. Jones, *The Philosophy of Mind. An Introduction*, Cambridge-New York 1986, 193-206.

²⁶ *Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, art. 9 (OTh VIII, 256). Ibid. (OTh VIII, 252), he says that desire and avoidance are "respectu obiectorum absentium et non habitum".

²⁷ *Quodl.* III, q. 17 (OTh IX, 271): "... quando est delectatio vel dolor de aliquo obiecto, cessat actus desiderandi." Ockham explains the transition from one passion to another by referring to the object of the passion. If the object of desire, which has not been present, suddenly becomes present, desire ceases and is replaced by pleasure (if the object is good) or pain (if the object is bad). This explanation shows that passions are defined with respect to a certain object.

²⁸ See *Quodl.* III, q. 17 (OTh IX, 269).

²⁹ He explicitly speaks about passions, for instance in *Quodl.* II, q. 17 (OTh IX, 187):

of these passions can be found in a context that may look strange to modern readers, but was of great importance in the later Middle Ages, namely the debate about enjoyment (*fruitio*). According to traditional Christian doctrine, God is the highest and final object—the only object human beings enjoy for its own sake, not with regard to something else.³⁰ The most perfect enjoyment will be reached in the beatific vision, when human beings contemplate God in, and for, himself. This theological thesis immediately raises the philosophical question of what kind of emotional state enjoyment is. Given that the human soul, separated from the body, can have it, it is certainly not a sensory passion. And given that it is not implemented in the body, it does not bring about bodily actions. So, what is it, and how is it caused? These questions sparked a general discussion about the structure and the causes of non-sensory passions.

All philosophers and theologians involved in this debate agreed that enjoyment, unlike sensory pleasure, is a conceptualized form of passion. If someone enjoys God's presence, one loves him *as God*, categorizing him as the highest and most desirable being. Given this obvious fact, one may be tempted to say that enjoyment and other forms of higher-level passions are an intellectual affair. That is, the intellectual soul, by grasping an object and conceptualizing it, brings about all these passions in its cognitive activities.

"... dico primo quod passiones sunt in voluntate, quia amor et spes, timor et gaudium sunt in voluntate, quae tamen communiter ponuntur passiones. Similiter delectatio et tristitia sunt in voluntate, quae etiam sunt passiones; igitur etc." Ockham was by no means the first medieval author to speak about passions of the will. He followed Scotus, who already presented a detailed analysis of these passions, and shifted the focus from the sensory to the volitional level. This crucial shift is analyzed by S. Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (n. 3), 265-71, and O. Boulnois, *Duns Scot: Existe-t-il des passions de la volonté?*, in: B. Besnier, P.-F. Moreau and L. Renault (eds.), *Les passions antiques et médiévales*, Paris 2003, 281-95. On the rise of voluntarist psychology in general, see B. Kent, *Virtues of the Will. The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century*, Washington D.C. 1995.

³⁰ Peter Lombard states this thesis in the very first of his 48 distinctions, where he refers to the Augustinian distinction between enjoyment (*fruitio*) and use (*usus*): God is the only object enjoyed for its own sake, not used for something else. Given this classical distinction, all medieval theologians commenting on the *Sentences* dealt with the question of what kind of emotional state enjoyment is. On the theological background and its impact on philosophical debates, see A. S. McGrade, *Ockham on Enjoyment—Towards an Understanding of Fourteenth Century Philosophy and Psychology*, in: *The Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1981), 706-28.

Ockham firmly opposes such an intellectualist approach, holding instead that “enjoying is an act of the will alone.”³¹ He acknowledges that conceptualization plays a decisive role. But in his view, this does not amount to claiming that enjoyment is nothing but a special form of intellectual activity. Rather, it is the will that brings about an act of enjoyment when the intellect presents a certain object. Thus, when a person thinks about God, he or she performs an act of enjoyment that is a distinct volitional act. This separation of two acts seems to hint at a perfect analogy between “lower” and “higher” passions. As we have seen, on the sensory level, there needs to be a sensory cognition, which, however, is not in itself a passion. Rather, a sensory cognition *causes* a sensory passion. Similarly, one may say that on the higher level, there needs to be a conceptual cognition, which, taken in itself, is not yet a passion. Rather, a conceptual cognition *causes* a passion, i.e., a volitional act such as enjoyment.

Although it is tempting to construct such an analogy, it would not express Ockham’s opinion. He explicitly rejects the claim that the intellect causes passions of the will, claiming instead: “. . . when the intellect presents an enjoyable object to the intellect—in a clear or in an obscure way, in particular or in general—the will can actively produce an act of enjoyment with respect to that object, and this happens on natural grounds.”³² Quite obviously, Ockham emphasizes that there is no simple causal mechanism that makes the will come up with a certain passion whenever the intellect delivers a particular cognition.³³ The will *can* produce an act of enjoyment, but it need not.

Lurking in the background of this thesis is Ockham’s famous doctrine of the liberty of the will: the will can act in conformity with objects and judgments presented by the intellect, but it does not have to.³⁴ Even if

³¹ *Ordinatio* I, dist. 1, q. 2 (OTh I, 395): “. . . primo ostendum est quod frui est actus solius voluntatis.”

³² *Ordinatio* I, dist. 1, q. 2 (OTh I, 397): “. . . dico primo quod obiecto fruibili ostenso voluntati per intellectum sive clare sive obscure sive in particulari sive in universali, potest voluntas active elicere actum fruitionis, et hoc ex puris naturalibus, circa illud obiectum.”

³³ Ockham clearly rejects the thesis, defended by, among others, Aquinas (see his *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, ed. by P. Mandonnet, Paris 1929, dist. 1, q. 1., art. 1 ad 1), that the will always follows the intellect.

³⁴ *Ordinatio* I, dist. 1, q. 2 (OTh I, 399): “Sed voluntas respectu cuiuscumque obiecti libere et contingenter agit, igitur simpliciter de potentia sua absoluta potest cessare ab actu suo.” See also *ibid.*, q. 6 (OTh I, 503); *Reportatio* III, q. 11 (OTh VI, 355); *Reportatio* IV, q. 16 (OTh VII, 350). For a concise analysis of the so-called liberty of indifference, see M. McCord Adams, *Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality*, in: P. V. Spade (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham* (n. 8), 245–72.

the intellect conceives of an object as something good and desirable, the will is free *not* to accept it and, consequently, *not* to enjoy it. In fact, the will has three options: it can accept it, not accept it, or take a neutral stance. For that reason, enjoyment is not automatically caused by an intellectual apprehension. When such a passion arises, it requires its own cause: the will.³⁵

Now one might wonder how the structure of a volitional act of enjoyment is to be understood. Since Ockham often emphasizes that this act is distinct from an intellectual activity, it can hardly display the very same structure. Is it an act that has a mere phenomenal quality, comparable to a good feeling? Or is it an act that also comprises a cognitive component, even though it differs from an intellectual act? To answer these questions, we need to look at how Ockham explains the relationship between an act of enjoyment or a more mundane act of love (*dilectio*) and an act of pleasure (*delectatio*). Criticizing some of his contemporaries, among them Peter Auriol, he points out that there is a real distinction between these two acts. That is, a loving person who feels pleasure has two acts: (i) an intentional act of loving directed toward a certain person or state of affairs, and (ii) a non-intentional act of experiencing pleasure. The reason for this distinction is quite simple: there can be an act of love without there being an act of pleasure.³⁶ Ockham adduces a colorful example to illustrate this thesis. A devil can love to seduce a human being and make him sin, but he does not experience any pleasure in this despicable deed. He has, as it were, a cool-hearted love.³⁷ This example shows that an act of love is neither identical to, nor necessarily accompanied by, an act that has a certain phenomenal quality. It is not simply an act of “feeling good”. Rather, an act of love (or in the case of love of God: an act of enjoyment) is an act that is *about* something and can be identified through its content. This content may be characterized in various ways, both as being propositional and non-propositional. Thus, the devil’s act of love has the content *that the human being should sin*, whereas a human

³⁵ It should be noted that this appeal to a distinct cause does not involve an ontological commitment to a spooky entity called “the will”. As pointed out above (see n. 4), Ockham does not introduce the will as an entity or faculty that would be really distinct from the intellect. The expression “the will” is always to be understood as “the intellectual soul insofar as it produces volitional acts”. There is only an ontological commitment to various *acts*, not to various parts, of the soul.

³⁶ See *Ordinatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (OTh I, 407).

³⁷ See *Ordinatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (OTh I, 408).

being's act of enjoyment simply has the content *God*. No matter how the content is structured (in a "complex" or a "simple" way, as Ockham would say), an act of love always has a content, and is therefore to be understood as a cognitive act. An act of pleasure, on the other hand, is a mere feeling that may or may not go along with the cognitive act.

IV

So far, it has become clear that volitional passions such as enjoyment and love are not only based upon cognitive acts, but are themselves intentional acts with a cognitive content. But how then can we distinguish them from simple intellectual acts? What, for instance, is the difference between the mere act of thinking about God and loving God, if it is not just a phenomenal quality that necessarily goes along with the second act and characterizes it? It looks as if the cognitive approach Ockham takes to the volitional passions risks assimilating them completely to intellectual acts.

In light of this difficulty, it is not surprising that Ockham's contemporaries and successors animatedly discussed the question of how we should characterize the structure of a volitional passion. Adam Wodeham, Ockham's pupil and secretary, deals with this problem in a very detailed study.³⁸ Following his teacher, he subscribes to the thesis that enjoyment and love are acts of the will, which are not to be identified with or reduced to intellectual acts. He unmistakably rejects the intellectualist position, claiming that "the first cognition of an enjoyable object, be it an intuitive or an abstractive cognition, is really distinct from an enjoyment of that object, and vice versa, an enjoyment from this cognition."³⁹ Wodeham acknowledges, however, that intellectual acts are necessary for the genesis of passions. If someone had no idea whatsoever of God, they could clearly have no love of God. This fact shows that cognitions brought about by the intellect play the indispensable role of a *partial* cause. However, it by no means proves that they are the *total* or unique cause.⁴⁰ In addition,

³⁸ Wodeham was by no means the only author to discuss this problem. Walter Chatton, Richard Fitzralph, Gregory of Rimini, Peter Ailly and others also analyzed it in detail. For an overview, see A. S. McGrade, *Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham: Philosophy, Psychology, and the Love of God*, in: A. Hudson and M. Wilks (eds.), *From Ockham to Wyclif*, Oxford 1987, 63-88, and S. Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (n. 3), 275-82.

³⁹ *Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum*, ed. by R. Wood, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1990, dist. 1, q. 5, § 4 (vol. I, 277): "... prima notitia fruibilis, sive intuitiva sive abstractiva, realiter distinguitur a fruitione eiusdem, et econtra ista fruitio ab illa cognitione."

⁴⁰ Wodeham argues that it is even excluded that they are the total cause, because

Wodeham points out that “experience teaches that we frequently apprehend things which we neither hate nor love.”⁴¹ This simple fact shows that an intellectual cognition does not automatically cause a passion: we can simply cognize God, or a fellow human or a material thing, without being compelled to have any passion. Nor is an intellectual cognition in itself a passion. Otherwise every person cognizing a certain object would inevitably be in a passionate state. The wide diversity of human reactions toward one and the same object—some people feel love when cognizing a certain person, others do not—clearly shows that passions must not be identified with intellectual cognitions.

Now Wodeham faces a dilemma. On the one hand, he concedes that intellectual cognitions are the partial cause of passions, and that passions comprise a cognitive element because they are always about a certain object. On the other hand, he rejects an identification of passions with cognitions *tout court*. How are the two theses to be reconciled? Wodeham tries to find a solution by claiming that passions are indeed states with a cognitive content, but volitional states that are caused partially by cognitions of the intellect and partially by the will itself. That is why they are higher-level cognitions. In fact, Wodeham presents his second thesis as follows: “Second I say—not as the expression of an assertion but of an opinion—that every act of desiring and hating, and hence enjoyment, is some cognition and some apprehension, because every experience of an object is some cognition of that thing.”⁴² Obviously, Wodeham defends a strong cognitivist position. Not only are passions of the will based upon (and partially caused by) a conceptualization of things, passions *are* a way of conceptualizing things. Therefore, it does not make sense to open a gap between the intellect that is responsible for concepts and the will that

nothing can fully cause itself, i.e., a cognition can not fully cause a cognitive passion. See *Lectura secunda*, dist. 1, q. 5, § 4 (vol. I, 277).

⁴¹ *Lectura secunda*, dist. 1, q. 5, § 4 (vol. I, 278): “Item, experientia docet quod frequenter apprehendimus quae nec odimus nec diligimus.”

⁴² *Lectura secunda*, dist. 1, q. 5, § 4 (vol. I, 278): “Secundo dico—non asserendo sed opinando—quod omnis actus appetendi et odiendi, et ita frui, est quaedam cognitio et quaedam apprehensio, quia omnis experientia alicuius obiecti est quaedam cognitio eiusdem.” Although cautiously pointing out that he holds this position “opinando”, he presents it in detail and defends it against non-cognitivist accounts. Note that the “cognitio” Wodeham refers to is not a basic cognition. It is rather a cognition that presupposes a basic cognition supplied by the intellect. He makes this clear when saying in *Lectura secunda*, dist. 1, q. 5, § 6 (vol. I, 282): “... dico quod actus amandi naturaliter causatus requirit cognitionem praeiviam quae non sit amor.”

merely causes non-cognitive desires. Rather, the will is to be understood as a capacity that makes use of the concepts supplied by the intellect and produces conceptualized passions. Let me illustrate this important point with a modern example.

Suppose that you meet an old friend and are immediately filled with joy. In this case, you do not only have a sensory cognition (you see a familiar pattern of colors and smell a well-known scent) that makes you have the sensory passion of pleasure or “feeling good”. You also recognize the person you meet as your friend and therefore conceptualize what you see and smell. This is what makes you feel joy. The important point is that in the very act of conceptualizing your friend as your friend you feel joy. Joy is not to be separated from this conceptual cognition. It is some form of cognition. Yet it is not a basic form of cognition. Otherwise, everyone conceptualizing your friend as, say, the neighbor living next door or a six-foot tall person, would feel joy. You need to conceptualize your friend *as your friend* or *as a good person* in order to feel joy.

If we understand Wodeham’s claim that every passion “is some cognition and some apprehension” in this way, it comes close to what is nowadays known as the cognitivist theory of emotions. But how then is the special way of cognizing to be understood? In the current debate, cognitivists give a clear answer to this question. M. Nussbaum, for instance, claims that emotions are “judgments of value,” i.e., ways of evaluating things and states of affairs.⁴³ Following this line, one might interpret Wodeham as claiming that passions of the will are a special kind of judgment—a judgment by which we evaluate things as good or bad for us.

Although Wodeham clearly defends a cognitivist position, we should be careful when appealing to judgments in a modern explanation of his view. If one takes a judgment to be something composed of the propositional attitude of affirming or denying and a propositional content (“I affirm/deny that p”), then Wodeham clearly denies that passions of the will are always judgments. In his third thesis, he unequivocally says that “a volition one has formed is an apprehending cognition, not an assenting one”⁴⁴ and argues for this claim as follows: “. . . something pleasurable can be loved if it is apprehended exclusively by a simple, non-complex

⁴³ She calls her theory “the cognitive-evaluative view”; see M. C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions*, Cambridge-New York 2001, 23.

⁴⁴ *Lectura secunda*, dist. 1, q. 5, § 5 (vol. I, 281): “. . . volitio aliqua creata est cognitio apprehensiva et non assensiva. Et haec potest esse tertia conclusio.”

cognition. And something can be loved when it is apprehended in a complex way, without there being any assent or dissent. Therefore, a volitional act is only an apprehension."⁴⁵ This sounds like puzzling scholastic jargon, but it makes perfect sense when we illustrate it with the example I just mentioned. When you meet an old friend, you can apprehend her *as a friend* or *as a good person*. This simple apprehension, which does not involve the objective judgment that she really is a good person (she might appear to be good just to you or just in a specific situation), suffices for a cognitive passion. You then love her as the person you apprehend under a certain aspect. And even if you apprehend your friend "in a complex way", i.e., by grasping a propositional content, all you need to apprehend is *that she is a good person*. In Wodeham's terminology, this propositional content is a "complexe significabile" that cannot be reduced to something non-complex.⁴⁶ The important point is that you do not have to come up with the full-fledged judgment "I affirm that she is a good person"—grasping the propositional content suffices. For it is one thing to grasp such a content, quite another to give an assent or dissent to that content.⁴⁷

Wodeham concedes that there may be judgments in some cases, and provides an illustrating example.⁴⁸ If someone is happy about the death of his enemy, he does form a judgment in the very act of happiness, namely "The enemy is dead", which includes an assent to the fact that a certain person, apprehended as an enemy, is dead. It may be spelled out as follows: "I affirm that the person apprehended as an enemy is dead and I am happy about this fact." But the important point is that

⁴⁵ Ibid.: "... aliquid delectabile potest diligere si apprehendatur tantummodo notitia simplici incomplexa, et aliquid potest diligere quando apprehenditur complexa absque omni assensu vel dissensu. Igitur aliqua volitio est apprehensio tantum."

⁴⁶ He presents his theory of the "complexe significabile" in *Lectura secunda*, dist. 1, q. 1, § 7-9 (vol. I, 192-7). For an analysis of this theory, see D. Perler, *Late Medieval Ontologies of Facts*, in: *The Monist*, 77 (1994), 149-169; E. Karger, *William of Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham on the Objects of Knowledge and Belief*, *Vivarium*, 33 (1995), 171-96; A. de Libera, *La référence vide. Théories de la proposition*, Paris 2002, 157-226.

⁴⁷ Note that this distinction is not identical with Seneca's famous opposition between the first and the second movement of an emotion; see *De ira* II, iv, 1, and the analysis provided by R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation*, Oxford 2000, 66-75. Seneca's first movement is involuntary and a mere "preparation for a passion", whereas Wodeham's apprehensive emotion is an act of the will and constitutes in itself a passion. The distinction between apprehensions and judgments is a distinction within the realm of volitional passions.

⁴⁸ This is his fourth thesis. See *Lectura secunda*, dist. 1, q. 5, § 5 (vol. I, 282).

there does not need to be a judgment in every case of a cognitive passion. That is why Wodeham suggests that we should carefully distinguish between (a) cognitive passions that are mere apprehensions and (b) cognitive passions that involve judgments. This distinction has an important consequence for the problem of truth-values of passions, as Wodeham is quick to point out.⁴⁹ If one has a passion of type (a), the content of the passion clearly does not have a truth-value. Thus, if you simply love your friend as a good person, the content *as a good person* is neither true nor false. If, however, someone judges that the enemy is dead and is happy about this fact, the content *that the enemy is dead* is true or false. It is precisely its truth-value that distinguishes such a propositional content from a non-propositional one.

The crucial point is that in every passion, whether it involves a judgment or not, an object or a state of affairs is apprehended in a certain way. This apprehension is not descriptive but evaluative, as Wodeham's own example of love makes clear. For even if the loving person does not form the judgment "x is a pleasurable thing", she apprehends x under a certain aspect, namely as something pleasurable (*delectabile*). In doing so, she clearly evaluates x as having a positive quality. This differs from a mere descriptive apprehension, an apprehension of x as being tall or dark, for instance. This example shows that a cognitive passion, though not being an evaluative judgment in the strict sense, includes an evaluative element that distinguishes it from basic cognitions. This is one of the main reasons why a cognitive passion is a higher-level cognition. In having such a passion, one does not simply describe perceptible features of an object. One also evaluates the object as good or bad, agreeable or disagreeable.

In light of this distinction, we can draw a picture with the following hierarchy of cognitions:⁵⁰

⁴⁹ See *Lectura secunda*, dist. 1, q. 5, § 7 (vol. I, 284-5).

⁵⁰ This picture simply presents the hierarchical structure without taking into account all the possible interrelations between the various levels. Since human beings make simultaneous use of their sensory and intellectual capacities, activities on a higher level may very well shape those on a lower level. For instance, the way we conceive of and categorize objects has an impact on the way we see and imagine them. For that reason, there are not only preconceptual acts of seeing and imagining on the first level (as in the case of brute animals), but also conceptualized ones. Following Aristotle (see *An. Post.* II, 19; 100b1), all medieval authors conceded that we do not simply see or apprehend individual items, but also universals (e.g., we see Callias as a man). This clearly presupposes the use of concepts in the very act of seeing.

- sensory cognition:* seeing or imagining x (pre-conceptual)
intellectual cognition: apprehending x as being F (conceptual and descriptive)
volitional cognition: (a) apprehending x as being good/bad (conceptual and evaluative)
 (b) judging that x is F and taking this fact to be good/bad (conceptual and evaluative)

To be sure, this appeal to different levels of cognition was by no means the standard approach chosen by all fourteenth-century authors. Gregory of Rimini and Peter of Ailly, for instance, rejected Wodeham's claim that there are various higher-level cognitions, some at the intellectual level and some at the volitional one. In particular, they criticized the thesis that passions of the will should be treated as forms of apprehension.⁵¹ Gregory tried to beat Wodeham with a typically Ockhamist weapon, namely by appealing to the principle of parsimony. He claimed: "He [Wodeham] superfluously posits a plurality of cognitions. He unnecessarily and superfluously posits something as a cognition."⁵² In Gregory's view, the will does not produce an additional cognition when it comes up with a passion like love or hate. The intellect already provides a full cognition, both descriptive and evaluative, while the will simply adds an affective component.

This reaction to Wodeham's analysis shows that the cognitivist account of passions sparked a heated debate about the structure of emotions. This debate focused on the fundamental question of how passions can acquire a cognitive element that goes beyond a mere descriptive account of a thing or a state of affairs. Whereas Wodeham tried to locate this element in a specific evaluation, others denied that the will is responsible for such an element. Consequently, they rejected the postulation of higher-level cognitions.

Yet Gregory of Rimini's claim that the will does not add a cognitive element but simply an affective one, raises an important question. Is there any place for an affective component in Wodeham's theory? It looks as

⁵¹ See Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum. Tomus I: super primum prologus et dist. 1-6*, ed. by D. Trapp and V. Marcolino, Berlin-New York 1981, dist. 1, q. 1, 212-7; Peter of Ailly, *Tractatus de anima*, edited in: O. Pluta, *Die philosophische Psychologie des Peter von Ailly*, Amsterdam 1986, 83-4.

⁵² Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, dist. 1, q. 1 (ed. Trapp and Marcolino, 212): "... superflue ponit pluralitatem notitiarum et inutiliter seu superflue ponit aliquam rem esse notitiam."

if he were presenting an analysis of emotions that identifies them with “cool-hearted” higher-level cognitions. For instance, loving someone seems to amount to coming up with an evaluation of that person as being good. But what about the aspect of desperately longing for this person or feeling good when being with her? Are these non-evaluative elements missing in Wodeham’s theory? Not quite so. In his analysis of enjoyment, Wodeham emphasizes that “beatific enjoyment is really pleasure.”⁵³ Unlike Ockham, he does not separate pleasure (*delectatio*) from love (*dilectio*). These are not two distinct states that can but need not co-exist. In Wodeham’s view, love or enjoyment always includes pleasure because enjoyment is a state “by which misery is formally excluded”.⁵⁴ Therefore, it hardly makes sense to say that the devil enjoys deceiving human beings but feels miserable about it. If he really experiences enjoyment, the feeling of pleasure necessarily goes along with it. (Of course, the devil may have another kind of emotion that includes the element of feeling miserable. But this emotion would not be plain enjoyment but, say, sadistic joy.) The fact that Wodeham explicitly includes an affective component in the emotion and even considers it to be a defining feature of that emotion, shows that he does not adopt a purely rationalist explanation of emotions that ignores all non-cognitive elements. Rather, he offers a sophisticated explanation, taking into account both a cognitive component (an evaluative apprehension or a judgment) and an affective component. In fact, it is the presence of both components that characterizes a full-fledged emotion like love or enjoyment. For it is neither a “cool-hearted” evaluation of a state of affairs nor a simple feeling, but an evaluation that *includes* a certain feeling.

V

I hope my reconstruction of Ockham’s and Wodeham’s account of the passions makes clear that these philosophers took passions to be thoroughly “cognitively penetrated”, both on the sensory and on the intellectual level. In their view, passions are not mental states that are somehow opposed to, or isolated from, cognitions. Quite to the contrary, neither the genesis

⁵³ *Lectura secunda*, dist. 1, q. 6, § 2 (vol. I, 295): “... teneo primo illam conclusionem quod fruitio beatifica est realiter delectatio.”

⁵⁴ *Lectura secunda*, dist. 1, q. 6, § 2 (vol. I, 295): “... sola illa est fruitio beatifica per quam formaliter excluditur miseria, sic scilicet quod sibi formaliter repugnet miseria.”

of passions, nor their internal structure, can be explained without an appeal to cognitive activities. This has an immediate consequence for an understanding of the relationship between the so-called “cognitive” and the “appetitive” part of the soul. When Ockham and Wodeham referred to these parts, they did not intend to divide the soul into two neatly separated sections. Nor did they want to introduce various homunculi that would somehow be hidden but nevertheless active in a human being. Rather, their intention was to refer to mental *activities* that a person performs when he or she copes with complex situations. It is in fact the coordination of various mental activities that distinguishes a person from a brute animal, on the one hand, and from an angel, on the other. For an animal, endowed with a sensory soul, is capable of having mere sensory passions that enable it to behave in an appropriate way. But it is utterly unable to conceptualize the situation with which it is confronted. Consequently, it cannot have higher-level passions by which it would evaluate or assess a given situation. Nor can it try to conceptualize the situation in various ways, so that it would come up with different passions. It is a helpless victim of its naturally caused passions. Angels, on the other hand, endowed with an intellectual soul, are clearly capable of forming intellectual and volitional acts, and are therefore able to develop a conceptualized passionate attitude toward things with which they are confronted.⁵⁵ Yet angels lack sensory cognition and therefore cannot have bodily passions that would make them cry or laugh. As fleshless beings, they are condemned to have fleshless passions. Occupying a middle position between animals and angels, human beings have both a sensory and an intellectual soul. This allows them to bring about lower- and higher-level passions, i.e., embodied *and* conceptualized emotions. In fact, it was this middle position on which Ockham, Wodeham, and many other medieval philosophers were focusing when they tried to explain human passions. This enabled them to avoid reducing a human being to a mere bodily creature, condemned to have naturally caused sensory passions, or to some kind of free-floating soul, limited to immaterial passions.

At this point, someone working on contemporary theories of emotions and influenced by neurobiological research may raise a serious objection. If Ockham and Wodeham were indeed concerned with the interplay between various mental activities, and if they located some of them in

⁵⁵ Ockham discusses angelic passions (his main example is love) in *Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, art. 9 (OTh VIII, 257-8 and 269-70).

the body, why did they not analyze their material implementation? Why did they not look at how they are present in the brain? Should an adequate theory not give a detailed explanation of the neurobiological processes that are necessary for the rise of passions?

In response to this objection, one could point out that Ockham and Wodeham, like the majority of later medieval thinkers, certainly did not locate all mental activities in the body. Since they took the intellectual soul to be an entity that is not subject to material conditions, they would have denied that there could be a neurobiological explanation (or in medieval terms: an explanation within the framework of the *physica*) of all the passions. They were quite obviously only “semi-materialists” in their metaphysics of the soul.⁵⁶ But even on the level of the sensory soul and its activities, which clearly are subject to material conditions, Ockham and Wodeham did not attempt to provide a biological or a physical analysis, as some of his contemporaries (e.g. the members of the medical school of Padova) did—for good reason. For, if one deals with passions, one should carefully distinguish between a philosophical and a scientific enterprise. In a *scientific* investigation, one does indeed look at the material implementation of passions and at the biological processes that are required for such an implementation. In the fourteenth century, such an investigation would have concentrated on the arrangement of so-called “ventricles” in the brain. In a *philosophical* investigation, however, one ought to look at the different elements that play a role in the genesis of passions and at the functional mechanisms, which may be biologically instantiated in one way or another. Such a functional explanation must not be conflated with a material one, for even if one has perfect knowledge of the somatic basis, one still ought to explain what happens on this basis. And it may well be, as modern functionalists are keen to point out, that a certain type of passion can have different material instantiations in different human beings. Therefore, Ockham’s and Wodeham’s functional explanation is not as incomplete as it may look at a first glance. It is an explanation that appeals (a) to functional elements provided by the various mental activities, and (b) to functional mechanisms that relate these elements to each other. This type of explanation may help shed light on the problem of

⁵⁶ I borrow this expression from R. Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages*, Cambridge-New York 1997, 36.

emotional conflict, probably one of the most bewildering problems we are confronted with when trying to cope with emotions. Let me highlight this advantage by returning to the example I mentioned at the very beginning of this paper.

I asked you to imagine the case of a friend who had left you without any explanation and reappeared after a couple of years. When she shows up, you are likely to react with mixed emotions: you are pleased, angry, and you may also feel guilty. How is this possible? How can you have both positive and negative emotions? Using Ockham's and Wodeham's functional model, one could give the following explanation. The sensory cognition you have when seeing your friend immediately causes the sensory passion of pleasure, a passion that arises naturally. Yet at the same time, your intellect conceives of your friend as someone who had left you without any warning. This triggers your will, which evaluates the friend as an unreliable, or even a betraying, person and brings about the passion of anger. Your intellect also conceives of yourself as a person who did not try to remain in contact with your friend. This makes your will evaluate yourself as an unreliable or betraying person as well; consequently, you feel guilty. Given the simultaneous presence of all these acts, you have all three passions at once. And you are in an emotional conflict because the three passions, based on different cognitions and evaluations, oppose each other.

It was this possibility of conflict that late medieval philosophers wanted to point out in their functional explanation: different cognitions play different causal roles in the mechanism of the mind, and consequently, they give rise to different passions. Their intention was not simply to dissolve emotional conflict by claiming that, say, the will as a higher faculty perfectly controls all the passions and unifies them. They admitted, of course, that the will has a certain ruling power, and in their theories of virtues, they assigned to it the task of bringing about the best possible higher-level passions, which would become some kind of second nature and influence the genesis of our sensory passions. Yet they insisted on the fact that the so-called lower-level passions should not be neglected. The will is not a magic power that could, or should, make the sensory passions disappear. Nor can it arrange all the higher-level passions in a harmonious way. It is just one capacity of the soul that cooperates with other capacities to bring about a multitude of passions—passions that may be in conflict with each other. One can do justice to the

complex emotional life of a person only if one acknowledges the possibility of such a conflict and if one tries to analyze the elements that play a role in this conflict.⁵⁷

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⁵⁷ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Université de Montréal, Saint Louis University, and Washington University. I am grateful to the audience in all three places for stimulating questions and critical remarks.

*Koran und Konziliarismus. Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis
von Heymericus de Campo und Nikolaus von Kues*

FLORIAN HAMANN

ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the relation between Nicholas of Cusa and the Dutch philosopher Heymericus de Campo. Nicholas is celebrated for his rather positive attitude towards Islam. In *De pace fidei* (1453) he presents the vision of *una religio in rituum varietate* and in his *Cribratio Alkorani* (1460/61) Nicholas tries to prove Christian dogmas on the basis of the Koran. This idea he had discussed with his Dutch friend several decades earlier. In his *Disputatio de potestate ecclesiastica* (1433/34) Heymeric scrutinizes the question, whether the highest authority in the church belongs to the pope or the council, on the basis of the Koran. He presents ten arguments in favour of the council and one in favour of the pope. This shows that Nicholas developed parts of his exceptional thought in conversation with Heymeric and suggests that a closer examination of Heymeric's texts will reveal a new side of the young Cusanus.

I. War Heymeric der Lehrer des Cusanus?

Rudolf Haubst und Eusebio Colomer haben in ihren bis heute einflussreichen Studien Heymericus de Campo als den Lehrer des Nikolaus von Kues bezeichnet, der das Denken des Albertus Magnus und des Raimundus Lullus sowie die Theorien der *theologia circularis* und der Koinzidenz an seinen Schüler vermittelt habe.¹ Beide verstehen Heymeric dabei nicht als originellen Denker, sondern bloß als Vermittler. Colomer

¹ R. Haubst, *Albert, wie Cusanus ihn sah*, in: G. Meyer/A. Zimmermann (Hg.), *Albertus Magnus – Doctor Universalis 1280/1980*, Mainz 1980 (Walberger Studien 6). Ders., *Das Bild des Einen und Dreieinen Gottes in der Welt nach Nikolaus von Kues*, Trier 1952. Ders., *Zum Fortleben Alberts des Großen bei Heymeric von Kamp und Nikolaus von Kues*, in: *Studia Albertina. Festschrift für Bernhard Geyer zum 70. Geburtstag*, Münster 1952 (BGPhThMA Supplementband 4) 420-47. Ders., *Der junge Cusanus war im Jahre 1428 zu Handschriften-Studien in Paris*, in: *Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft*, 14 (1980), 198-205. E. Colomer, *Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund Lull. Aus Handschriften der Kueser Bibliothek*, Berlin 1961. Ders., *Zu dem Aufsatz von Rudolf Haubst „Der junge Cusanus war im Jahre 1428 zu Handschriften-Studien in Paris“*, in: *Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft*, 15 (1982), 57-70.

schreibt: „Dabei darf man den eigentlichen philosophischen Rang Heimerics nicht überschätzen. Auch wenn ihm die logische und systematische Denkkraft nicht fehlt, bleibt sein Denken dennoch im Großen und Ganzen dem Epigonentum der spätmittelalterlichen Philosophie verhaftet. Der Eigenart seines Denkens entsprechend ist die Rolle des Heimeric in Bezug auf Cusanus die philosophisch bescheidenere, jedoch geschichtlich nicht unfruchtbare eines Vermittlers gewesen.“²

Die Vermittler-These stützt sich auf die Tatsache, dass sich Cusanus 1425 an der Kölner Universität immatrikulierte, an der auch Heymeric lehrte.³ Doch ist es zumindest diskussionswürdig, ob man aus dem Immatrikulationsvermerk von 1425 tatsächlich den Schluss ziehen darf, Cusanus sei ein Student des niederländischen Denkers gewesen. Interessanterweise listet Hermann Keussen, der die Kölner Matrikellisten edierte, Cusanus unter den Juraprofessoren auf.⁴ Es muss also zunächst der Bildungsgang beider Denker verglichen werden.

Nikolaus von Kues war 1401 geboren worden, verbrachte das Studienjahr 1416/17⁵ an der Universität Heidelberg und studierte von 1417 bis 1423⁶ in Padua Kirchenrecht. Ebendort erwarb Cusanus 1423⁷ den Titel des *doctor decretorum*, unter dem er sich auch in Köln immatrikulierte. Dabei wurden ihm aufgrund des Ansehens seiner Person (*ob reverentiam personae*) die Immatrikulationsgebühren erlassen, wie das bei hochgestellten Persönlichkeiten üblich war.⁸ Der Titel des *doctor decretorum* erhob den Träger in eine adelsähnliche wenn auch nicht adelsgleiche Stellung. Der Erwerb des Titels in Norditalien unterschied den Spitzenjuristen vom Durchschnittsjuristen, der nördlich der Alpen studiert hatte.⁹ Somit bot der Titel des *doctor decretorum* besonders für reiche Bürgersöhne gute

² E. Colomer, *Nikolaus von Kues und Heimeric van den Velde*, in: Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft, 4 (1964), 198-213, bes. 213.

³ E. Meuthen (Hg.), *Acta Cusana. Quellen zur Lebensgeschichte des Nikolaus von Kues*, Bd. 1, Lieferung 1 (1401-1437 Mai 17), Hamburg 1976, Nr. 25, 9: „Nycolaus de Cusa doctor in iure canonico Treuerensis dyocesis. Nihil dedit ob reverenciam persone, sed iuravit complete.“

⁴ H. Keussen (Hg.), *Die Matrikel der Universität Köln*, Bd. 1 (1378-1475), Bonn ²1928, ND Düsseldorf 1979, Nr. 44, 72*.

⁵ AC I (s.o., Anm. 3), Nr. 11, 3.

⁶ AC I (s.o., Anm. 3), Nr. 15-18, 5f. Für die ersten Studienjahre in Padua gibt es keine gesicherten Belege.

⁷ AC I (s.o., Anm. 3), Nr. 18, 6.

⁸ R.C. Schwinges, *Die Zulassung zur Universität*, in W. Rüegg (Hg.), *Geschichte der Universität in Europa*, Bd. 1 (Mittelalter), München 1993, 172-4.

⁹ P. Moraw, *Über gelehrte Juristen im Spätmittelalter*, in: J. Petersohn (Hg.), *Mediaevalia Augiensia*.

Chancen, in der spätmittelalterlichen Kirche Karriere zu machen. Da Nikolaus von Kues bürgerlicher Abstammung war, wäre ihm ohne diesen Titel die steile Karriere verwehrt gewesen, die ihn bis zum Kardinal und Bischof von Brixen führen sollte.

Heymericus de Campo indes wurde um 1395 in Son bei Eindhoven in den heutigen Niederlanden geboren, studierte in Paris die *artes* sowie die Theologie und immatrikulierte sich 1422 an der Universität Köln. 1423 wurde er *baccalaureus biblicus*, 1424 *baccalaureus sententiaris*, 1425 *baccalaureus formatus* und 1428 schließlich *magister theologiae*.¹⁰ Obwohl Heymerich etwa sechs Jahre älter als Cusanus war, erlangte er erst mehrere Jahre nach ihm die Promotion, da das Studium der Theologie üblicherweise länger dauerte als das der Rechtswissenschaft. Im Vergleich zu dem Titel des *doctor decretorum* eröffnete der *magister theologiae* hauptsächlich die Chance auf eine Universitätskarriere, wie sie auch Heymerich in Köln und später in Löwen gelingen sollte.

Aus dem Vergleich beider Ausbildungswege muss festgehalten werden: Cusanus besaß im Jahre 1425 eine soziale Stellung, die der des Heymericus de Campo mindestens ebenbürtig war. Erich Meuthen hat bereits 1964 darauf hingewiesen, dass Cusanus kein gewöhnlicher Student war, sondern aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach in Köln Juravorlesungen hielt.¹¹ Das Verhältnis beider zueinander sollte also eher als kollegialer Austausch oder intellektuelle Freundschaft gewertet werden.

Dennoch ist die These, Heymerich sei der Lehrer des Cusanus gewesen, keineswegs abwegig, denn die intellektuelle Biographie des Nikolaus von Kues weist eine Lücke auf: Cusanus studierte lediglich ein Jahr die *artes* in Heidelberg und sechs Jahre Kirchenrecht in Padua. Ob er in diesen Jahren die Zeit und die Möglichkeit besaß, sich derart profunde philosophische und theologische Kenntnisse anzueignen, wie sie für die Abfassung von *De docta ignorantia* erforderlich sind, ist unklar. Doch besteht zwischen dem Ende seines Studiums in Italien im Jahre 1423 und der Abfassung von *De docta ignorantia* 1440 eine Lücke von immerhin 17 Jahren.

Forschungen zur Geschichte des Mittelalters. Vorgelegt von den Mitgliedern des Konstanzer Arbeitskreises für mittelalterliche Geschichte, Stuttgart 2001, 125-47.

¹⁰ E. Meuthen, *Kölner Universitätsgeschichte*, Bd. 1 (Die alte Universität), Köln/Wien 1988, 187-9. J.-D. Caviglioli, *Les écrits d'Heymericus de Campo (1395-1460) sur les œuvres d'Aristote*, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 28 (1981), 293-371, bes. 296ff. Keussen 1928 (s.o., Anm. 4), Rektorat Nr. 132, Immatrikulation Nr. 124, 240.

¹¹ E. Meuthen, *Das Trierer Schisma von 1430 auf dem Basler Konzil. Zur Lebensgeschichte des Nikolaus von Kues*, Münster 1964, 78f.

In dieser Zeit unterhielt Cusanus tatsächlich einen engen Kontakt zu Heymericus. Beide kannten sich nicht allein von der Universität Köln, sondern nahmen zeitgleich von Ende 1432 bis zum Frühjahr 1435 am Basler Konzil teil,¹² so dass ein intellektueller Austausch von wenigstens zehn Jahren anzunehmen ist. Hiervon zeugen die Basler Schriften des Heymericus de Campo, wie sie in der ehemaligen Bibliothek des Nikolaus von Kues bis auf den heutigen Tag erhalten sind.¹³

Da die biographischen Daten zu einem zwiespältigem Ergebnis führen, vermag allein ein inhaltlicher Vergleich das Verhältnis beider Denker zu erhellen. Dabei müssen Themen ausgewählt werden, die für beide Denker gleichermaßen spezifisch sind. In wenigstens drei Gebieten ragen die beiden Philosophen gemeinsam aus der Masse der Denker des frühen 15. Jahrhunderts heraus: Das erste ist die Lullrezeption, die bereits von Colomer untersucht worden ist. Leider hat er dabei die Frage weitgehend übergangen, welche Bedeutung den lullischen Überlegungen in Heymericus' eigenem Denken zukommt.¹⁴ Zweitens verfügen beide Philosophen über eine geometrische Theologie. Heymericus bezeichnet seine *theologia figuralis* auch als *sigillum aeternitatis* und behandelt sie in wenigstens vier seiner Basler Schriften.¹⁵ Der niederländische Denker dürfte der einzige Scholastiker des Spätmittelalters sein, der eine eigene geometrische Theologie entwickelte. Die Untersuchung dieser Fragestellungen würde tief in Heymericus' Denken einführen, was an dieser Stelle nicht geleistet werden kann.¹⁶ Drittens rezipieren beide Denker den Koran. Letzteres scheint vorerst keine Eigentümlichkeit zu sein, denn unter dem Eindruck des Vormarsches

¹² Vgl. (Für Heymericus) H. Keussen, *Die Stellung der Universität Köln im großen Schisma und zu den Reformkonzilien des 15. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Annalen des Historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein*, 115 (1929), 225-54. (Für NvK) Meuthen 1964 (s.o., Anm. 11).

¹³ Bernkastel-Kues, Cusanus-Hospital, 106. Beschreibung des Cod. Cus. 106 in: Heymericus de Campo, *Opera selecta 1*, hg. von R. Imbach und P. Ladner, Freiburg/Schweiz 2001, 20/21.

¹⁴ Colomer 1961 (s.o., Anm. 1), 5-46; ders. 1964 (s.o., Anm. 2), 198-213.

¹⁵ Heymericus de Campo, *Tractatus de sigillo eternitatis*, in: *Opera selecta 1*, (s.o., Anm. 13), 99-128. P. Ladner, *Der Ablass-Traktat des Heymericus de Campo. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Basler Konzils*, in: *Zeitschrift für schweizerische Kirchengeschichte*, 71 (1977), § 54, 138. Zudem behandelt er sie noch in seiner *Disputatio de potestate ecclesiastica* und in den vier Figuren, die der Cod. Cus. 106 enthält. Eine Teiledition dieser Texte wird als Anhang meiner Dissertation mitveröffentlicht werden. Außerdem greift Heymericus die Siegelthematik nochmals in den 50er Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts auf. Vgl. L. Burie, *Proeve tot inventarisatie van de in handschrift of in druk bewaarde werken van de leuvense theologieprofessoren uit de XV eeuw*, in: *Facultas S. Theologiae Lovaniensis 1432-1797*, BEThL 45 (1977), 230.

¹⁶ Dies ist der Gegenstand meiner Dissertation mit dem Titel: *Das Siegel der Ewigkeit. Universalwissenschaft und Konziliarismus bei Heymericus de Campo*. Der vorliegende Aufsatz ist

der Osmanen wurden seit den späten 40er Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts diverse Schriften zum Islam verfasst. Doch Heymerichs Auseinandersetzung mit dem Koran datiert bereits aus dem Jahre 1433 und ist damit viele Jahre älter als alle anderen bekannten Zeugnisse der Koranrezeption des 15. Jahrhunderts, zumindest soweit sie aus der Basler Theologengeneration stammen.¹⁷ Zudem weist Nikolaus von Kues in seiner *Cribratio Alkorani* darauf hin, er habe den Koran auf dem Basler Konzil kennen gelernt.¹⁸ So ergibt sich ein direkter Zusammenhang zwischen der Koranrezeption beider Denker. Um eine vergleichende Untersuchung zu ermöglichen, werden zunächst die Grundüberlegungen der cusanischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam dargelegt. Die Forschung hat sich intensiv hiermit beschäftigt, so dass ich mir nur einige Anmerkungen erlaube.¹⁹

II. Cusanus und der Islam

Nikolaus von Kues verfasste *De pace fidei* kurz nach dem Fall Konstantinopels am 29. Mai 1453. Darin wird ein Mann geschildert, der die prachtvolle Stadt mit eigenen Augen gesehen hatte. Als dieser Mann die Nachricht vom Sieg der Osmanen und deren angeblicher Gräueltaten vernommen hatte, verfiel er ins Grübeln und flehte Gott an. Darauf wurde ihm die Schau (*visio*) eines himmlischen Religionsgespräches zuteil.²⁰ Aufgrund der Leiden der Religionskriege habe der Allmächtige die Weisen aller Völker

eine Vorstudie zu einer umfassenderen Untersuchung der Koranrezeption im Kontext seines philosophischen Denkens.

¹⁷ Vgl. F. Hamann, *Der Koran als ekklesiologische Autorität bei Heymericus de Campo* († 1460), in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 50 (2003), 150-62.

¹⁸ Nikolaus von Kues, *Cribratio Alkorani*, hg. v. Ludwig Hagemann, h VIII, Hamburg 1986, Prologus, n. 2, 5: „Feci quam potui diligentiam intelligendi librum legis Arabum quem iuxta translationem per Petrum abbatem Cluniacensem nobis procuratam Basileae habui cum disputatione eorum nobilium Arabum, quorum unus socius Mahumeti nisus fuit alium trahere, qui doctior et magnus inter Arabes Christianam fidem, quam zelose coluit, ostendit potius tenendam.“

¹⁹ L. Hagemann, *Der Kurʿān in Verständnis und Kritik bei Nikolaus von Kues. Ein Beitrag zur Erhellung islamisch-christlicher Geschichte*, Frankfurt a. M. 1976. W. A. Euler, *Unitas und Pax. Religionsvergleich bei Raimundus Lullus und Nikolaus von Kues*, Würzburg 1990.

²⁰ NvK, *De pace fidei*, hg. v. R. Klibansky und H. Bascour, h VII, Hamburg 1959, I 1, 3f: „Fuit ex hiis, quae apud Constantinopolim proxime saevissime acta per Turcorum regem divulgabantur, quidam vir zelo Dei accensus, qui loca illarum regionum aliquando viderat, ut pluribus gemitibus oraret omnium creatorem quod persecutionem, quae ob diversum ritum religionum plus solito saevit, sua pietate moderaretur. Accidit ut post dies aliquot, forte ex diuturna continuata meditatione, visio quaedam eidem zelo manifestaretur, ex qua elicuit quod paucorum sapientum omnium talium diversitatum quae in religionibus

und Religionen zu einem himmlischen Konzil (*in concilio excelsorum*) herbeigerufen.²¹ Unter dem Vorsitz des *verbum* sollten sie die Religionsstreitigkeiten diskutieren, die den Anlass zu so viel Leid gaben. Im Gespräch sollte die Wahrheit zum Vorschein kommen, dass der innerste Sinn aller Religionen identisch ist und bloß die Riten voneinander abweichen, es also nur *religio una in rituum varietate* gäbe.²² Die Weisen aller Völker diskutieren nun unter dem Vorsitz des *verbum* die wichtigsten Glaubensthemen. Die Argumentation aller Vertreter stützt sich dabei allein auf die Vernunft und nicht auf Autoritäten, denn Cusanus vertritt die Auffassung, dass allen Religionen eigentlich der gleiche christlich-platonische Gehalt zu Eigen ist.²³ Aus diesem Grunde bezeichnet Cusanus den Vorsitzenden des himmlischen Konzils nicht als Christus, sondern als *verbum*, um aufzuzeigen, dass es sich um das allen Religionen grundlegende Prinzip des göttlichen Wortes handle. Am Ende schließlich bekennen sich alle Teilnehmer zu dem Konsens, dass tatsächlich alle Religionen in ihrem Gehalt übereinstimmen und dass sich lediglich die Riten unterscheiden.²⁴

Im Winter 1460/61 verfasste Cusanus schließlich seine *Cribratio Alkorani*. In der „Siebung des Korans“ versucht Cusanus den Koran auf das Evangelium hin zu „sieben“. ²⁵ Die Wahrheit des Evangeliums soll aus

per orbem observantur peritia pollentium unam posse facilem quandam concordantiam reperiri, ac per eam in religione perpetuam pacem convenienti ac veraci medio constitui.“

²¹ NvK, *De pace fidei*, I 2, 4: „Raptus est enim ad quandam intellectualem altitudinem, ubi quasi inter eos qui vita excesserunt examen huiusce rei in concilio excelsorum, praesidente Cunctipotentis, ita habitum est.“

²² NvK, *De pace fidei*, I 6, 7: „Si sic facere dignaberis, cessabit gladius et odii livor, et quaeque mala; et cognoscent omnes quomodo non est nisi religio una in rituum varietate.“

²³ Vgl. K. Flasch, *Nikolaus von Kues. Geschichte einer Entwicklung. Vorlesungen zur Einführung in seine Philosophie*, Frankfurt/Main 1998, 330-82.

²⁴ NvK, *De pace fidei*, XIX 68, 62: „Postquam cum sapientibus nationum haec sic pertractata sunt, producti sunt libri plurimi eorum qui de veterum observantiis scripsere, et in omni lingua quidem excellentes, ut apud Latinos Marcus Varro, apud Graecos Eusebius qui religionum diversitatem collegit, et plerique alii. Quibus examinatis omnem diversitatem in ritibus potius compertum est fuisse quam in unius Dei cultura, quem ab initio omnes praesupposuisse semper et in omnibus culturis coluisse ex omnibus scripturis in unum collectis reperiebatur, licet simplicitas popularis saepe per adversam tenebrarum principis potestatem abducta non adverteret quid ageret. Conclusa est igitur in caelo rationis concordia religionum modo quo praemittitur.“

²⁵ NvK, *Cribratio Alkorani*, Prologus, n. 10, 11f: „Intentio autem nostra est praesupposito evangelio Christi librum Mahumeti cribrare et ostendere illa in ipso etiam libro haberi, per quae evangelium, si attestazione indigeret, valde confirmaretur, et quod, ubi dissentit, hoc ex ignorantia et consequenter ex perversitate intenti Mahumeti evenisse Christo non suam gloriam sed dei patris et hominum salutem, Mahumeto vero non dei gloriam et hominum salutem sed gloriam propriam quaerente.“

dem Koran heraus bewiesen werden.²⁶ Es handelt sich also um eine besonders ausgeklügelte christliche Apologie, die den Koran nicht mit Väterziten oder mit Vernunftargumenten widerlegen will, sondern sich auf die höchste Autorität der Muslime selbst stützt. Entsprechend ist der Tonfall vergleichsweise konzilient, auch wenn gewisse polemische Äußerungen nicht fehlen. Dieses Unterfangen setzt freilich voraus, dass die christliche Botschaft – wenn auch entstellt – im Koran durchscheint. Mit der gesamten mittelalterlichen Tradition verstand Cusanus den Islam nicht als eingeständige oder gar neue Religion, sondern als christliche Häresie. Cusanus erzählt die klassische christliche Polemik, wonach Muhammad den Koran unter dem Einfluss des verstoßenen Mönches Sergius und von Juden aus der Bibel kompiliert habe. Es handle sich somit um eine nestorianisch geprägte christliche Häresie.²⁷ Tatsächlich handelt der Koran an vielen Stellen von Jesus und Maria, was erst die cusanische Interpretationsstrategie erlaubt.²⁸

III. Die Koranrezeption bei Heymerich

Heymerich schrieb seine *Disputatio de potestate ecclesiastica* zwischen April 1433 und Februar 1434 auf dem Basler Konzil. Er erörtert die damals aktuelle Streitfrage, ob dem Generalkonzil oder dem Papst die oberste Gewalt in der Kirche zusteht. Zunächst werden die Argumente für die Superiorität des Generalkonzils angeführt, anschließend die für die Superiorität des Papstes und in der *Determinatio* wird die Streitfrage schließlich entschieden.²⁹

²⁶ NvK, *Cribratio Alkorani*, Prologus, n. 4, 7: „Ego vero ingenium applicui, ut etiam ex Alkorano evangelium verum ostenderem . . .“

²⁷ NvK, *Cribratio Alkorani*, Alius prologus, n. 11, 13: „Refert nobilis ille Arabs Christianus, de quo supra memini, Sergium monachum de monasterio suo eiectum Mecham applicuisse ibique duos populos repperisse idolatras et Iudaeos praedicasseque ibidem fidem Christianam, prout Nestorius illam tenuit, ut fratres suos illius sectae placaret ad gratiam, et omnes idolatras convertisse ad fidem suam, inter quos Mahumetus erat, qui conversus de idolatria mortuus est Christianus Nestorianus. Sed tres astutissimi Iudaei se Mahumetum coniunxerunt, ut ipsum averterent, ne perfectus fieret, et illi suaserunt varia mala. Post vero mortem Mahumeti omnibus ad suam sectam revertentibus illi Iudaei accesserunt Hali filium Habitalip, cui Mahumetus suas collectiones dimisit, et persuaserunt ei, ut sicut Mahumetus ita et ipse se in prophetam elevarer, et apposuerunt et deposuerunt de libro Mahumeti, quae voluerunt.“

²⁸ Zur cusanischen Koranhermeneutik, s. Hagemann 1976 (s.o., Anm. 19), 69ff.

²⁹ Hamann 2003 (s.o., Anm. 17), 152ff.

Obwohl die *Disputatio* nur eine sehr enge Fragestellung behandelt, zählt sie samt den Anhängen an die 100 fol., denn Heymerich versucht die Superioritätsfrage auf möglichst breitem Fundament zu untersuchen. Es ist sein erklärtes Ziel, hierzu alle Wissenschaften und Gegenstandsbereiche heranzuziehen: das Trivium, das Quadrivum, die Hauptwissenschaften, die *ars generalis* Lulls und schließlich seine eigene Universalwissenschaft.³⁰ Doch Heymerich greift noch weiter aus und versucht die Superioritätsfrage schließlich sogar auf der Grundlage des Korans zu erörtern. Der Koran wird damit zu einer ekklesiologischen Autorität aufgewertet, eine Stellung die kein anderer Autor des Mittelalters dem Koran zubilligte.³¹ Im Einzelnen listet Heymerich zehn Argumente für die Superiorität des Konzils auf; ein weiteres Argument für die Superiorität des Papstes findet sich unter den propäpstlichen Syllogismen.

1. Laut dem Koran sei ein Heilsgesetz umso besser, je mehr es den Kräften der Gläubigen angepasst ist, die jenem Gesetz unterliegen. Da dies eher auf das Generalkonzil als auf den Papst zutreffe, gebühre der Synode die Superiorität über den obersten Pontifex. Dies ergibt sich aus dem Selbstverständnis des Generalkonzils, wonach es die gesamte Kirche, alle Gläubigen also, repräsentiert. Das Konzil als gesetzgebende Gewalt ist demnach mit den Gläubigen, die seiner Gesetzgebung unterliegen, zumindest tendenziell identisch. Der Papst indes unterscheidet sich von den übrigen Gläubigen, die seiner Rechtsprechung unterstehen. Folglich ist die Übereinstimmung bei dem Generalkonzil größer als beim Papsttum, woraus dessen Superiorität resultiert.³²

³⁰ Die *Disputatio de potestate ecclesiastica* wird als DPE zitiert. Eine erste Transkription findet sich auch in: Hamann 2003 (s.o., Anm. 17), 160-2. DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 158r, Z. 27-31: „... et sic de aliis prius per discursum septem arcium liberalium, artis Lullii, artis mee, que dicitur sigillum eternitatis, et utriusque iuris necnon per auctoritates sacre pagine assumptis, que, si ad medium revocentur, nedum comparabitur numerus rationum pro papa adduci possibilibus rationibus preinductus pro concilio generali, sed habundanter excrescerent.“

³¹ Im Unterschied zu fast allen Koraninterpretationen des Mittelalters verfolgt Heymerich hier kein apologetisches Interesse. Zum polemischen Grundton der christlichen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam im Mittelalter, s. N. Daniel, *Islam and the West. The Making of an Image*, Edinburgh 1960.

³² DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116r, Z. 21-8: „Ad idem potest argui ad hominem ex Alchorano Machometi, in quo dicitur, quod lex salvacionis proporcionata viribus recipiendum est melior quam, que non est talis. Sed certum est, quod lex canonica conciliorum generalium est ecclesie universali salubrior quam lex apostolica pape, tum quia diviniore utputa immediate procedens a providencia spiritus sancti, tum quia universalior utputa regulans papam et suos subiectos et procedens {que} ex iudicio plurium sapientum sinodaliter

2. Der zweite Syllogismus geht auf die Aussage des Korans zurück, wonach das evangelische Gesetz Christi die Rechtleitung, das Licht und die Wahrheit ist. Der Koran stützt also das Evangelium und laut dem Evangelium muss zwischen den versammelten und den einzelnen Aposteln unterschieden werden. Petrus ist zwar der erste der Apostel, doch ist er selbst der Gemeinschaft der Apostel untergeordnet. Ebenso untersteht der Papst als oberster Richter dem Generalkonzil.³³

3. Im dritten Argument stützt sich Heymerich auf die mittelalterliche Überzeugung, dass der Koran eine häretische Kompilation aus dem Alten und Neuen Testament sei. Dadurch impliziert der Koran auch die Auffassung, dass die beiden Testamente zusammen heilsamer und vollkommener sind als eines der beiden Testamente für sich allein. Die Autorität des Generalkonzils, *canones* zu erlassen, beruht auf beiden Testamenten. Das apostolische Gesetz des Papstes jedoch stützt sich allein auf das Neue Testament. Heymerich reduziert das päpstliche Gesetz auf die Verpflichtung zur Pastoralfürsorge, indem er Jo 21, 17 zitiert: *pasce oves meas*.³⁴

4. Nach dem vierten Schluss ist dasjenige Gesetz vorzuziehen, das universaler ist, indem es viele Menschen zum Heil führt. Dies trifft auf das kanonische Gesetz des Generalkonzils zu, weshalb ihm auch ein höherer Rang gebührt als dem Papsttum. Aus der Universalität des Generalkonzils resultiert auch seine Legitimation zur Streitvorbeuge, Ketzerbekämpfung und Sittenreform. Da Friede, Glaube und Reform die drei Aufgaben des Basler Konzils waren, führt Heymerich auch sie über den Mittelbegriff der Universalität auf den Koran zurück.³⁵

congregatorum et sic de aliis, ut predictum est. Ergo legitima auctoritas concilii generalis est potior quam potestas legitima sedis apostolice.“

³³ DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116r, Z. 28-31: „Ad idem in eodem Alchorano habetur, quod lex ewangelica Iesu, filii Marie, est directio, lux et veritas manifesta. Sed in illa habetur, quod apostoli ecclesiastice collecti sunt iudices singulorum seorsum delinquencium, inter quos est Petrus primus papa. Ergo idem, quod prius.“

³⁴ DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116r, Z. 32-7: „Ad idem in eodem habetur, quod lex coniuncta ex lege veteri et nova, cuius dicit esse legem Machometi, mediocriter complexa est perfectior et salubrior quam altera tantum. Sed lex, ex qua formantur canones conciliorum generalium, non est tantum ewangelica, sed etiam veteris testamenti, sicut patet diffuse in volumine Decretorum, lex autem apostolica pape innititur dumtaxat legi nove, utputa illis verbis Christi: pasce oves meas etc. Ergo etc.“

³⁵ DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116r, Z. 37-41: „Ad idem in eodem habetur, quod illa lex est prior, que est universalior et plures ducit ad salutem quam, que non est huiusmodi. Sed lex canonica conciliorum generalium est huiusmodi, ex quo per hanc eradicantur hereses, sed anteceduntur lites et reformantur mores in toto mundo seu universo Christi nomine dedicato. Ergo etc.“

5. Das fünfte Argument stützt sich auf die Aussage des Korans, wonach Gott durch sein Wort und seinen Geist alles geschaffen habe.³⁶ Derartige Wendungen finden sich tatsächlich an vielen Stellen des Korans.³⁷ Cusanus sah hierin einen Hinweis darauf, dass auch der Koran die Logostheologie aufweist, wonach Christus das Wort Gottes ist. Selbst nach dem Koran wäre Christus nicht nur Prophet oder Bote, sondern Sohn Gottes.³⁸ Heymerich indes interpretiert diese Suren ekklesiologisch. Muhammad habe sein Gesetz aus der Vorsehung des göttlichen Wortes erhalten. Das Verhältnis zwischen dem Wort Gottes und Muhammad entspricht also dem zwischen Konzil und Papst. Heymerich sieht hierin seine Grundbestimmung des Konzils als legislative Gewalt und des Papstes als exekutive Gewalt begründet. Der Zusammenhang mit der Logostheologie ergibt sich aus der konziliaristischen Überzeugung, wonach das Konzil vom Heiligen Geist beseelt ist.

6. Im sechsten Argument zitiert Heymerich die berühmte Sure 4, 3 des Korans, worin Muhammad die Polygamie erlaubt. Dies verstand die christliche Polemik als Aufruf zu sexueller Ausschweifung, wie sie beispielsweise Johannes von Segovia den Muslimen vorwarf.³⁹ Doch Heymerich sieht selbst in der Sure 4, 3 einen Hinweis des Korans auf die Superiorität des Generalkonzils. Die Erlaubnis zur Polygamie dürfe nicht nur wörtlich verstanden werden, sondern man müsse sie auch mystisch verstehen. Nach der christlichen Brautmystik repräsentiert die Kirche die Braut Christi. Wenn die Kirche durch den Papst repräsentiert wird, herrscht eine monogame Ehe zwischen Kirche und Christus; wenn allerdings das Konzil die Kirche repräsentiert, könne man von einer polygamen Ehe sprechen, da die vielen Konzilsteilnehmer die Braut Christi ausmachen. Wenn man

³⁶ DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116r, Z. 41—fol. 116v, Z. 6: „Ad idem in eodem habetur, quod deus per suum verbum, quod est extra ipsum ad modum, quo Plato ponit mentem et Perypatetici ponunt intelligencias, [116v] et cum eius spiritu, qui se habet ut anima mundi secundum Platonem vel anima nobilis secundum Peripateticos, fecit universa et per concors decretum illorum sermo dei Machometo est data lex salvacionis, ex hoc arguens illius legis perfeccionem, quod prodierit de superno concilio plurium. Cum ergo se papa habeat ad concilium generale sicut Machometus ad providenciam dei verbi et suscipit suam legem, ut fingit, per modum mutui concilii dictatam, patet propositum.“

³⁷ Koran 4, 171; Vgl. Koran 2, 117; 36, 82; 6, 73.

³⁸ NvK, *Cribratio Alkorani*, I 13, n. 60, 52: „Adhuc sic certum est ex Alkorano verbo dei omnia esse creata. Verbum igitur dei increatum est, quoniam per ipsum omnia creata sunt.“

³⁹ Johannes de Segovia, *Liber de magna auctoritate episcoporum in concilio generali*, hg. v. Rolf de Kegel, Freiburg/Schweiz 1995, X, 6 § 1, 377f.

den Wortlaut des Korans mittels des *sensus mysticus* interpretiert, dann sei die Polygamie tatsächlich der Monogamie vorzuziehen.⁴⁰

7. Laut dem siebten Argument habe Muhammad den Koran von Gott erhalten, als er durch seinen Diener, den Erzengel Gabriel, in den siebten Himmel getragen worden sei.⁴¹ Hiermit gibt Heymerich die muslimische Legende von Muhammads Himmelsreise wieder.⁴² Bei seiner Himmelsreise habe Muhammad den Koran ohne eigene Verdienste als Gnadengabe empfangen. Muhammads Funktion war die eines Dieners und Boten Gottes, was tatsächlich dem Verständnis Muhammads im Koran entspricht. Das Verhältnis Gottes zu Muhammad gleicht dem zwischen Generalkonzil und Papst. Der Papst fungiert also als Knecht und Bote des vom Heiligen Geist inspirierten Konzils.

8. Das achte Argument verbindet den Koran mit der christlichen Zweischwerterlehre. Das geistliche und das weltliche Schwert stehen für die zwei Gewalten, das geistliche für die Amtskirche und das weltliche für Könige und Fürsten. Im Konzil sind nun beiderlei Gewalten vertreten. Der Papst indes führt nach Heymerich lediglich das geistliche Schwert. Folglich ist die konziliare Gewalt höher anzusiedeln als die des Papstes.⁴³

⁴⁰ DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116v, Z. 6-14: „Ad idem secundum diffinicionem Alchorani lex poligamie est pocior lege monogamie, propter quod Machometus concedit nedum bigamiam, ymmo quoscumque luxurie concubitus, sed spiritualiter et mystice loquendo, quisque discipulus externe sapiencie contra hic cum eadem quoddam coniugium nupciale secundum illud Sapiencie 7: quesivi michi pro sponsa habere eam. Ergo concilium generale, ubi convenit multitudo sapiencium, continet tale multiforme coniugium, quod in solo papa est uniforme et monogamum. Eciam quilibet pastor ecclesie est spiritualis sponsus eiusdem, concurrunt autem in concilio plures ecclesie prelati seu pastores, et papa est tantum unus eiusmodi. Ergo idem, quod prius.“

⁴¹ DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116v, Z. 14-21: „Ad idem secundum idem Alchoranum Machometus suscipit legem suam a deo per ministerium Gabrielis ipsum superius usque ad septimum celum portantis ratificatam per testimonium eiusdem Gabrielis et Michaelis angelorum, cuius legis profitetur se servum sine meritis. Ergo, cum se papa habeat ad legem dictatam a spiritu sancto et eius testibus fide dignis sinodaliter collectis sicut Machometus ad dictacionem testesque sue legis, patet propositum, cum constat ex supradictis, quod nuncius et servus est subiectus suo missori.“

⁴² Auf der Basis der Sure 17, 1 hatte sich die Legende von Muhammads Himmelsreise im Islam entwickelt. Der *Liber scalae Machometi* wurde im 13. Jahrhundert ins lateinische übersetzt und wurde in einigen Versionen der *collectio toletana* mitüberliefert, s. E. Werner (Hg.), *Liber scale Machometi. Die lateinische Fassung des Kitāb al mi'radj*, Düsseldorf 1986.

⁴³ DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116v, Z. 21-30: „Ad idem dicitur in eodem Alchorano, quod ideo lex Machometi est potissime salutaris, quia coniungit gladium spiritus gladio temporalis, obedientes variis blandimentis, fabulis, promissionibus et libertatibus consolando et delectando, rebelles vero penaliter coercendo. In signum pretor illius regis tenet nudatum gladium in manu. Sed in concilio generali uterque illorum gladium universaliter concurrat,

Heymerich kann hierfür den Koran zitieren, da der Islam tatsächlich keine Unterscheidung zwischen geistlicher und weltlicher Gewalt kennt. 9. Laut dem neunten Argument verbietet der Koran das Hören, Studium und die Riten jedweden anderen Gesetzes.⁴⁴ Ebenso verhält sich die Gesetzgebung des Konzils gegenüber dem Papst. Das Generalkonzil kann also dem Papsttum Gesetze und Urteile untersagen. Heymerich bringt dies ausdrücklich mit dem Nichtigkeitsdekret (*decretum irritans*) in Verbindung, das 1433 auf dem Konzil diskutiert wurde. Im Rahmen der Kirchenreform versuchte das Konzil die Ämter- und Pfründenvergabe durch die Kurie zu reduzieren, was im Wahldekret geschah.⁴⁵ Während der Vorbereitung dieses Dekretes kam es unter den Konzilsteilnehmern zum Streit, ob ihm eine *clausula irritans* eingefügt werden sollte oder nicht. Demnach wären alle Eingriffe in die Ämtervergabe durch das Papsttum, die dem Wahldekret zuwiderliefen, vorab für ungültig erklärt worden, was eine harsche Beschneidung päpstlicher Vorrechte gewesen wäre. Doch in der verabschiedeten Fassung des Wahldekretes vom 13. Juli 1433 findet sich diese Klausel nicht, denn die gemäßigte Linie des Konzilspräsidenten Giuliano Cesarini hatte sich durchgesetzt.⁴⁶ Mit der These, dass sich das Nichtigkeitsdekret aus dem Koran ergebe, spricht sich Heymerich an dieser Stelle für die radikalere Fraktion innerhalb des Konzils aus.

10. Der zehnte Syllogismus stützt sich auf die Unterscheidung von *vis coactiva* und *vis executiva*. Laut dem Koran ist dasjenige Gesetz gerechter, bei dem beide am ehesten übereinstimmen.⁴⁷ Die *vis coactiva* stellt die

ex quo representat ecclesiam catholicam et potestatibus regalibus celi et terre virtuosam secundum illud: data est mihi omnis potestas in celo et in terra et illud: ecce duo gladii sunt hic, papa autem habet dumtaxat usum gladii spiritualis secundum illud: mitte gladium in vaginam. Ergo illud, quod prius.“

⁴⁴ DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116v, Z. 30-4: „Ad idem lex fungens decreto universaliter irritante est potissima, siquidem talis est lex Machometi prohibens auditum, studium et ritum seu usum cuiuslibet alterius legis sub pena mortis aut tributis. Sed lex canonica conciliorum generalium est huiusmodi respectu pape, sicut patet de plerisque casibus in corpore iuris contentis, contra quos simpliciter prohibetur dispensatio summi pontificis.“

⁴⁵ *Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta*, hg. v. G. Alberigo u. a., Freiburg i. Br. 1962, Sessio XII, 13. Juli 1433, 445-8. R. Zwölfer, *Die Reform der Kirchenverfassung auf dem Konzil zu Basel*, in: Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde, 28 (1929), 169ff. Zum päpstlichen Provisionswesen s. A. Meyer, *Zürich und Rom. Ordentliche Kollatur und päpstliche Provisionen am Frau- und Grossmünster 1316-1523*, Tübingen 1986, 25-114.

⁴⁶ COD (s.o., Anm. 45), Sessio XII, 13. Juli 1433, 445-8.

⁴⁷ DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116v, Z. 34-43: „Ad idem ex eodem accipitur, quod lex, cuius vis coactiva est proporcionata virtuti proprie sui nuncii sive executoris, est equior et iustior quam, que non potest huiusmodi adequari. In signum cuius dicit Machometus,

Richter dar und die *vis executiva* führt ihre Urteile aus. Zur Konzilszeit stimmen beide überein, denn die apostolische Kirche und die katholische Kirche machen die Gesamtkirche aus, die vom Konzil repräsentiert wird. Der Papst allein kann für sich nur die exekutive Gewalt beanspruchen, die der Gewalt der Gesamtkirche untergeordnet ist. Heymerich zitiert hierfür die klassische christliche Polemik, wonach der Koran nicht durch Wunder, sondern allein durch die Gewalt des weltlichen Armes bestätigt worden sei.⁴⁸

Im zweiten Teil der *Disputatio* führt Heymerich die Gegenargumente für die Superiorität des Papstes an. Dabei stützt er sich weitgehend auf die gleichen Autoritäten wie in den Argumenten für die Oberhoheit des Konzils. Doch ist der propäpstliche Abschnitt wesentlich kürzer und zählt lediglich ein Argument auf Grundlage des Korans.

Laut dem Koran sei jene Rechtsprechung heilsamer, die sich den Bedürfnissen der gefallenen Natur des Menschen anpasst und ihm angenehmes und leichtes vorschreibt als jene Rechtsprechung, die den Menschen die volle Härte des abstrakten Gesetzes auferlegt.⁴⁹ Hiermit thematisiert Heymerich das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen dem Sinn und dem Wortlaut des Gesetzes. Durch die unerbittliche Anwendung kann sich ein Gesetz in sein Gegenteil verkehren, was an dem Umstand liegt, dass ein Gesetz notwendigerweise abstrakt ist und nicht jeden Einzelfall berücksichtigen kann. Heymerich spricht hier also den Grundsatz der Epikie an und zitiert die einschlägige Stelle aus der aristotelischen Politik, wonach es besser sei, dass ein Gemeinwesen vom besten Mann als vom

quod sua lex non est confirmata miraculis, sed fortitudine amoris brachii secularis. Sed vis executiva iurium in concilio generali decretorum adequatur viribus apostolicis suorum executorum, ex quo idem sunt tempore concilii executores iudicii, qui iudices iuxta illud: quecumque alligaveritis. Sed constat hoc iudicium supervenire iudicium pape, ex quo ipse est per illud iudicabilis secundum illud prelibatum: si peccaverit in te frater tuus, dic ecclesie.“

⁴⁸ Vgl. Daniel 1960 (s.o., Anm. 31), 73ff.

⁴⁹ DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 152v, Z. 19-29: „Si liceat ratiocinari ad hominem ex ypothesi Alchorani ipsius perversoris legis christiane Machometi, tunc liqueret ex lege sua superius recolecta, quod illa iurisdiccio est finaliter salubrior, que disponit omnia suaviter et leviter secundum exigenciam infirmitatis nature lapse et ad fruendum oblecta mentis, carnis vehementer inclinate, quam illa, que imponit onus dis<pro>porcionatum et difficile tali nature, dicente domino: iugum enim suave et onus leve meum. Sed iurisdiccio legis animate boni hominis, cuiusmodi est papa, qui ideo dicitur pater sanctissimus, est huiusmodi respectu iurisdiccio legis abstracte, quam fert concilium generale, prout patet ex auctoritate Philosophi dicentis III Politice, quod melius est civitatem regi viro optimo quam lege optima. Ergo etc.“

besten Gesetz regiert werde.⁵⁰ Der Papst müsse nun dieser beste Mann sein, der das Gesetz im Einzelfall außer Kraft setzen könne, um die Gerechtigkeit zu wahren. Das Generalkonzil sei indes für die abstrakten Gesetze verantwortlich, die in den Konzilsdekreten formuliert werden. Da der Papst die Gesetze außer Kraft setzen kann, um unnötige Härten zu vermeiden, steht er auch über dem Generalkonzil. Indem der Koran ein leichtes Gesetz ist, spricht er sich also für die Epikie aus. Interessanterweise wird hier abermals eine christliche Polemik gegen den Koran ins Positive gewendet, denn dass der Koran von seinen Gläubigen keine Strenge verlange, sondern sogar zu einem angenehmen lasterhaften Leben ermuntere, ist ein klassisches christliches Vorurteil.

IV. *Die ähnliche Koranhermeneutik beider Denker und das Basler Konzil*

Schon in *De pace fidei* lässt Cusanus Auffassungen erkennen, die mit dem Basler Konzil zusammenhängen, was sich vor allem an der angenommenen Gesprächssituation zeigt: Es wird von einem Konzil als Versammlung der Weisen gesprochen. Es hat universalen Charakter, da alle Völker und Religionen vertreten sind. Den Vorsitz übt das *verbum* aus, das zumindest die christlichen Vertreter unschwer mit Christus identifizieren. Die Teilnehmer sind prinzipiell gleichberechtigt, der Christ hat also keinen Vorrang vor dem Araber. Es besteht Redefreiheit und im Gespräch soll die Wahrheit zum Vorschein kommen, woraus am Ende der einmütige Konsens aller Teilnehmer resultiert.

Cusanus konstruiert hier also den Idealtyp eines Generalkonzils, wobei er weniger an eine vom Papst dominierte Synode denkt als vielmehr an die Basler Verhältnisse, denn das Basler Konzil verstand sich ebenfalls als eine universale Versammlung der Weisen, nämlich der Kleriker aus der gesamten westlichen Christenheit. Das Konzil sollte direkt von Christus gelenkt werden und nicht vom Papst, was freilich spirituell zu verstehen ist.⁵¹ Die verschiedenen Konzilsteilnehmer besaßen trotz unterschiedlicher

⁵⁰ Aristoteles, Pol. III 15, 1286a9-11. K. Mörsdorf, *Aequitas*, in: Staatslexikon, 6. Aufl., Bd. 1 (1957), 54-60.

⁵¹ Diese Auffassung geht auf das Konstanzer Dekret *haec sancta* zurück, das eine wichtige Basis für konziliaristisches Gedankengut darstellt, s. COD (s.o., Anm. 45), Concilium Constantiense, Sessio V, 6. April 1415, 385: „Et primo declarat, quod ipsa in Spiritu sancto legitime congregata, generale concilium faciens, et ecclesiam catholicam militantem repraesentans, potestatem a Christo immediate habet...“

Weihegrade das gleiche Stimmrecht⁵² und durften sich frei äußern.⁵³ In den Konzilsverhandlungen sollte die Weisheit hervortreten, da das Konzil als vom Heiligen Geist erleuchtet verstanden wurde. Schließlich sollten die Diskussionen in den Konsens der Konzilsentscheidungen münden. In Glaubensfragen war dabei nicht die Mehrheitsentscheidung, sondern der Totalkonsens das Ziel, wie er in *De pace fidei* präsentiert wurde.⁵⁴

Das Basler Konzil, wie später auch das Konzil von Ferrara-Florenz, sah tatsächlich seine Aufgabe unter anderem darin, die Glaubenseinheit wiederherzustellen. Über die Streitpunkte sollte disputiert und verhandelt werden, bis schließlich eine einmütige Lösung gefunden werden konnte. Dazu fand die große Hussitendisputation im Frühjahr 1433 in Basel statt.⁵⁵ Nach den anschließenden Verhandlungen schloss das Konzil schließlich die Prager Kompaktaten ab und führte die Hussiten damit in den Augen der Konzilsväter zur katholischen Kirche zurück. Ebenso strebten die Konzilsteilnehmer und der Papst eine Vereinigung mit der Ostkirche an, wie sie nicht in Basel, sondern auf dem Konzil von Ferrara-Florenz 1439 verabschiedet wurde.⁵⁶

Die Vision des Himmelskonzils von Nikolaus von Kues hat also eine realgeschichtliche Basis in den konziliaren Bemühungen um die Glaubenseinheit. Der literarische Kunstgriff der Schau des Himmelskonzils erlaubte es Cusanus, die realpolitischen Probleme dieser Bestrebungen auszublenden, um den Idealtyp eines Glaubenskonzils zur Geltung zu bringen, wie er es offensichtlich auch mit den Muslimen anstrebte. Möglicherweise wurde eine solches Konzil mit den Muslimen zumindest theoretisch am Rande des Basler Konzils erörtert.

Mit Sicherheit jedoch wurde in Basel auch die Möglichkeit einer positiven Koranhermeneutik zwischen Heymerich und Cusanus diskutiert, was sich an ihrer sehr ähnlichen Interpretationsstrategie nachweisen lässt. Heymerichs Verwendung des Korans als ekklesiologische Autorität setzt nämlich voraus, dass man die Wahrheit des Christentums auf der Basis

⁵² P. Lazarus, *Das Basler Konzil. Seine Berufung und Leitung, seine Gliederung und seine Behördenorganisation*, Berlin 1912, 33-7.

⁵³ J. Helmrath, *Das Basler Konzil 1431-1449. Forschungsstand und Probleme*, Köln 1987, 27ff.

⁵⁴ Vgl. W. Krämer, *Konsens und Rezeption. Verfassungsprinzipien der Kirche im Basler Konziliarismus*, Münster 1980 (BGPhThMA 19). Vgl. Helmrath 1987 (s.o., Anm. 53), 32ff. Der Begriff „Totalkonsens“ wurde von Helmrath geprägt.

⁵⁵ F. Šmahel, *Die Hussitische Revolution*, übers. v. Thomas Krzenk, Bd. 3, Hannover 2002, 1560ff.

⁵⁶ COD (s.o., Anm. 45), Concilium Florentinum, Sessio VI (6. Juli 1439), 499-504.

des Korans beweisen kann, wie es Cusanus Jahrzehnte später in seiner *Cribratio Alkorani* unternommen hat. Der Aufbau der Kirche beruht nach christlicher Überzeugung selbstverständlich auf der Bibel und dem christlichen Glauben. Wenn nun ekklesiologische Fragen aus dem Koran heraus beantwortet werden können, muss der Koran die christliche Botschaft—wenn auch dunkel—beinhalten. Die einschlägigen Argumente aus der *Disputatio de potestate ecclesiastica* und die *Cribratio Alkorani* beruhen also auf der gleichen Überzeugung, wonach der Koran selbst von Christen positiv gedeutet werden kann.

Der niederländische Philosoph erläutert seine Koranhermeneutik nur kurz, indem er mehrfach darauf verweist, dass es sich bei seinen Darlegungen um eine *ad-hominem*-Argumentation handle.⁵⁷ Bei einer derartigen Argumentationsweise werden fremde Thesen für den eigenen Beweis herangezogen, auch wenn zweifelhaft ist, ob sie wahr sind. Heymerich kann somit die Superioritätsfrage auf der Grundlage des Korans diskutieren, selbst wenn er den Koran für häretisch hält. Eben diese Theorie findet sich auch bei Cusanus in einem Brief, den er am 29. Dezember 1454 an Johannes von Segovia schrieb: Die Paradiesfreuden, die der Koran seinen Anhängern verheißt, dürfe man nicht wörtlich verstehen. Schon Avicenna habe in seiner Metaphysik das intellektuelle Paradies dem der Sinnenfreuden vorgezogen. Muhammad habe also durch das Bild der sinnlichen Freuden die intellektuelle Glückseligkeit beschrieben. Wenn man von der wörtlichen Bedeutung des Korans absehe, könne man ihn für seine eigenen christlichen Argumentationszwecke verwenden.⁵⁸ Cusanus verweist also ebenfalls auf eine *ad-hominem*-Argumentation, um seine Koranhermeneutik zu skizzieren. Demnach verfolgen beide Denker eine sehr ähnliche Koranhermeneutik, die derart ungewöhnlich ist, dass ein

⁵⁷ Die konziliaristischen Argumente werden wie folgt eingeleitet, DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 116, Z. 21f: „Ad idem potest argui ad hominem ex Alchorano Machometi . . .“, ebenso das propäpstliche Argument, DPE, Cod. Cus. 106, fol. 152v, Z. 19-21: „Si liceat ratiocinari ad hominem ex ypothesi Alchorani ipsius perversoris legis christiane Machometi . . .“

⁵⁸ NvK, *Epistula ad Ioannem de Segobia*, hg. v. Raymond Klibansky u. Hildebrand Bascour, h VII, 99: „De paradiso potest de facili conclusio capi, etiam ex dictis suorum, maxime Avicennae, qui in Methaphisica sua praeferat paradisum intellectualium deliciarum paradiso sensibilibum in Alchorano descriptum. Etiam videtur scriptorem Alchorani locutum per similitudinem corporalium deliciarum de futuris deliciis. Nam post multas recitationes metse glosat dicens: ‘Ista et ista habebitis, hoc est omne bonum et quidquid desiderabitis.’ Unde videtur quod semper ad hoc conandum sit quod liber iste, qui apud eos est in auctoritate, pro nobis allegetur. Nam reperimus in eo talia quae serviunt nobis; et alia quae contrariantur, glosabimus per illa.“

Diskussionszusammenhang zwischen ihnen als erwiesen gelten kann. Auch die historischen Umstände bestätigen diese These: Beide pflegten einen jahrelangen Kontakt und Heymerichs *Disputatio de potestate ecclesiastica* ist nach heutigem Kenntnisstand allein in der Cusanus-Bibliothek in Bernkastel-Kues überliefert.

Obgleich Heymerichs *Disputatio* über 20 Jahre älter ist als der Brief des Cusanus an Johannes von Segovia, lässt sich hieraus nicht schließen, Cusanus habe seine Koranhermeneutik von Heymerich übernommen. Anders als Lull und Meister Eckhart kannte Cusanus Heymerich nicht vornehmlich aus seinen Büchern, sondern stand mit ihm in engem persönlichen Austausch. Die Diskussionen, die beide am Rande des Basler Konzils führten, fanden also auch Eingang in Heymerichs Basler Schriften. Falls seine Islamkenntnisse hauptsächlich aus solchen Gesprächen stammen sollten, würde dies erklären, wieso seine Koranzitate derart ungenau sind. Heymerich war demnach weniger der innovationslose Lehrer des jungen Cusanus, wie Colomer meinte,⁵⁹ als vielmehr einer seiner wichtigsten intellektuellen Freunde und ein origineller Gesprächspartner.

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⁵⁹ Vgl. Colomer 1964 (s.o., Anm. 2), 213.

“Secundum processum et mentem Versoris”:
*John Versor and His Relation to the Schools of Thought Reconsidered**

PEPIJN RUTTEN

ABSTRACT

Johannes Versor († after 1482) was a prominent philosopher in the late fifteenth century, whose works were widely diffused. In recent scholarship, Versor has been associated with two schools of thought: Thomism and Albertism. These, however, were rivals—especially in Cologne, where Versor’s works were printed repeatedly. Given this historical context, how should Versor’s position amidst the quarrels of the schools be interpreted? Although he evidently used the works of both Albert and Thomas, there is no evidence that Versor ever committed himself to either Albertism or Thomism. In addition, the Cologne printings of his works suggest that Versor’s contemporaries considered him an independent authority. Therefore, Versor cannot be rated among the members of either school.

1. *John Versor and the Schools of Thought in the Fifteenth Century*

When the fifteenth-century philosopher Johannes Versor († after 1482), in his commentary (*Quaestiones*) on Aquinas’ *De ente et essentia*,¹ discusses

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¹ I quote from the following edition: Johannes Versor, *Super omnes libros novae logicae*, Köln 1494, Unveränderter Nachdruck Frankfurt/Main 1967. This volume also includes Versor’s commentary on *De ente et essentia*, entitled here *Questiones magistri Johannis Versoris super De ente et essentia sancti Thome de Aquino ordinis fratrum predicatorum* (below: Johannes Versor, *Questiones super De ente et essentia*), on ff. s4ra-u2rb. The quotation is from q. 2, f. s5ra-b. Cf. L. Hain, *Repertorium bibliographicum*, vol. II-2, Stuttgartiae-Lutetiae Parisiorum 1838, 487a (*16029, *16030); E. Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns bis zum Ende des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Bonn 1903, 520 (no. 1215). As for the name of John Versor: Scholars generally seem to prefer the surname “Versor”, although there is some evidence that this philosopher should rather be called “Versoris”; cf. L. Mahieu, *Dominique de Flandre (XV^e siècle). Sa métaphysique*, Paris 1942, 22–5.

the question whether the essence of a composite substance comprises both matter and form, he first follows Thomas' answer, but then adds a short note on how to respond according to Albert the Great: "Dubitatur primo qualiter est respondendum ad quesitum secundum Albertum." Versor explains that according to Thomas the definition comprises both matter and form, whereas Albert believes that it comprises form, and that matter is only included as the end term of the *fluxus* of a form.² At first sight Versor seems to take over Thomas' view, but he does so without rejecting Albert's opinion. The doubt ("Dubitatur . . .") obviously does not concern the truth of Albert's answer to the question, because the passage merely tells us what that answer is.³ This awkward passage is difficult to interpret for two reasons: First, Versor is generally regarded as an important Thomist.⁴

² Johannes Versor, *Questiones super De ente et essentia*, ff. s4vb-s5ra: "Conclusio prima: Essentia substantie composite non est materia tantum, nec forma tantum, nec relatio que est inter materiam et formam, nec aliquid superadditum istis . . . Conclusio secunda: Essentia in substantiis compositis per se comprehendit materiam et formam . . . Dubitatur primo qualiter est respondendum ad quesitum secundum Albertum. Respondetur quod contrarium sententie iam habite est de opinione Alberti . . . Et dicit ulterius Albertus quod materia non ponitur in diffinitione substantie materialis tanquam pars essentie forme totius, sed tanquam terminus fluxus forme naturalis." *Fluxus* is a central notion in Albert's thought, which cannot be discussed here; what concerns us here is merely the way in which Versor treats Albert's position. Albert gives a long account of the nature of flowing in his commentary on the *Book of Causes*; cf. Albertus Magnus, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. 1, tr. 4, ed. W. Fauser (ed. Coloniensis, vol. XVII-2), Monasterii Westfalorum 1993, 42.35-58.30; this passage is discussed by T. Bonin, *Creation as Emanation. The Origin of Diversity in Albert the Great's On the Causes and the Procession of the Universe*, Notre Dame 2001, 15-21. Cf. also A. de Libera, *Albert le Grand et la philosophie*, Paris 1990, 117-77. On the notion of *forma totius*, see below, § 4.2.

³ K. Feckes, however, sees an indubitable rejection of Albert's views in Versor's commentary (except for the distinction between being and essence); cf. K. Feckes, *Das opusculum des hl. Thomas von Aquin 'De ente et essentia' im Lichte seiner Kommentare*, in: A. Lang, J. Lechner, M. Schmaus (eds), *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet*, Münster 1935, 1. Halbband, 667-81, at 672.

⁴ C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, Reprint Berlin 1955, IV, 200 (note 126), 220-1; M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, Band III, München 1956, 230; Feckes 1935 (above, n. 3), 671-672; A. Birkenmajer, *Die Wiegendrucke der physischen Werke Johannes Versors*, in: *Bok- och bibliotekshistoriska studier tillägnade Isak Collijn*, Uppsala 1925, 121-35 [Repr. in: A. Birkenmajer, *Etudes d'histoire des sciences et de la philosophie du Moyen Age* (Studia Copernicana, I), Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1970, 551-65], at 121; C. Lohr, *Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Johannes de Kanthi—Myngodus*, in: *Traditio: Studies in Ancient and Medieval History, Thought, and Religion*, 27 (1971), 251-351, at 290; E.J. Ashworth, *The Eclipse of Medieval Logic*, in: N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge etc. 1982, 787-96, at 788. For further references, see O. Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500)*, V. Répertoire des noms commençant par J (suite: à partir de Johannes D.), Turnhout 2003, 170-6.

Second, his commentary on *De ente et essentia* (as so many of his other works) was printed in Cologne—home of the fierce doctrinal quarrels between Albertists and Thomists.⁵ Why does Versor refrain from taking a stand on a matter of obvious disagreement between Albert and Thomas? Scholastic thought in the fifteenth century, of which Versor would seem a typical exponent, has one ubiquitous characteristic: the formation of schools of thought. Philosophers and theologians at many universities considered themselves as belonging to a particular intellectual tradition that was in one way or another distinct from other intellectual traditions. To distinguish these traditions, they used such denominations as *thomistae*, *scotistae*, *nominales*, *albertistae* and of course *antiqui* and *moderni*.⁶ The University of Paris, where Versor studied and taught, was no exception to this.⁷ What, then, is Versor's role in this setting? Does he belong to one of the schools of thought or not? This question is relevant for three reasons: First, Versor's works were so widespread that he became one of the most influential authors of his time. His commentaries on Aristotle and Peter of Spain all appeared in print before 1500 and were reprinted several times.⁸ Second, in the recent literature there is a tendency to regard

⁵ Cf. Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1), 58-60 (nos. 144, 145, 147, 148) and 518-33 (nos. 1211-43); Lohr 1971 (above, n. 4), 290-9. See also below, §§ 2 and 6. For Albertism and Thomism in Cologne, see the literature listed in the next note, esp. Meersseman 1935.

⁶ Fundamental studies are: G. Ritter, *Studien zur Spätscholastik*, 2: *Via antiqua und via moderna auf den deutschen Universitäten des XV. Jahrhunderts*, Heidelberg 1922; F. Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen in der Scholastik des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Wegestreites*, Münster 1925; G. Meersseman, *Geschichte des Albertismus*, Heft I: *Die Pariser Anfänge des Kölner Albertismus*, Lutetiae Parisiorum 1933; id., *Geschichte des Albertismus*, Heft II: *Die ersten Kölner Kontroversen*, Romae 1935. More recent titles include: A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Antiqui und Moderni. Traditionsbewußtsein und Fortschrittsbewußtsein im späten Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 9), Berlin-New York 1974; Z. Kaluza, *Les querelles doctrinales à Paris. Nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIV^e et du XV^e siècles*, Bergamo 1988; M.J.F.M. Hoenen, J.H.J. Schneider and G. Wieland (eds), *Philosophy and Learning. Universities in the Middle Ages*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1995; M.J.F.M. Hoenen and A. de Libera (eds), *Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus. Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1995.

⁷ For the doctrinal quarrels in Paris, cf. Ehrle 1925 (above, n. 6), 114-40 and 297-326; Kaluza 1988 (above, n. 6). For Versor in Paris, cf. H. Keussen, *Die Matrikel der Universität Köln*, III, Bonn 1931, 54 (n. 897); Lohr 1971 (above, n. 4), 290; Weijers 2003 (above, n. 4), 170-1 (with further references). The main source for the (now no longer accepted) view that Versor taught at Cologne seems to be J. Hartzheim, *Bibliotheca Coloniensis*, Coloniae 1747, 206. Hartzheim may have come to his conclusion (that Versor first was a member of the *Bursa Montana* and subsequently of the *Corneliana*) on the basis of some of the colophons of Cologne editions of Versor's works; cf. below, §§ 2 and 6.

⁸ Prantl 1955 (above, n. 4), 220-1; Birkenmajer 1925 (above, n. 4), 121. On Versor's influence in Cologne cf. G.-R. Tewes, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät bis zur Mitte des*

Versor not as a Thomist, but (at least in some of his works) as an Albertist, which reinforces the impression that Versor is a problematic case.⁹ Third, the “Versor case” urges us to reflect on the very notion of philosophical schools. The real problem may not be Versor’s position, but rather that we need to fine-tune our concepts in order to be able to understand that position.

There has been some discussion in the literature about what a school of thought really is. Hans Gerhard Senger raised the issue when he questioned the existence of an Albertist school in the fifteenth century. Discussing the influence of Albert the Great on thinkers such as Heymericus de Campo (1395-1460), Senger sharply distinguished the writings of Heymericus from those of his successors at the *Bursa Laurentiana* in Cologne. He considered Heymericus (who was certainly inspired by Albert) closer to Cusanus and to humanism, than to those later heads of the *Laurentiana*, whom he regarded as mere epigones of Albert. In Senger’s view, this difference meant that the *Bursa Laurentiana* may have been the home of an Albertist school during the late fifteenth century, but that its instigator Heymericus was not properly speaking an Albertist.¹⁰ This conclusion followed from

16. *Jahrhunderts*, Köln-Weimar-Wien 1993, 389-90; on his influence in Cracow, cf. S. Swieżawski, *La philosophie à l’université de Cracovie dès origines au XVI^e siècle*, in: *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge*, 30 (1963), 71-109, at 89; M. Markowski, *Die wissenschaftlichen Verbindungen zwischen der Kölner und der Krakauer Universität im Mittelalter*, in: A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter. Geistige Wurzeln und soziale Wirklichkeit* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 20), Berlin-New York 1989, 274-86, at 285; Z. Kuksewicz, *Die Einflüsse der Kölner Philosophie auf die Krakauer Universität im 15. Jahrhundert*, in: Zimmermann 1989, 287-298, at 289-292. See also below (§ 2).

⁹ For instance Weijers 2003 (above, n. 4), 170; her source is E.P. Bos, *John Versor’s Albertism in his Commentaries on Porphyry and the Categories*, in: P.J.J.M. Bakker (ed.), *Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza*, Turnhout 2002, 47-78. Cf. also Lohr 1971 (above, n. 4), 290, who notes, without reference to a source, that Versor is a “Thomist, ‘sed Albertizabat’”; cf. also Bos 2002, 49, and C.H. Kneepkens, *Nam defecatum vas quandoque servat amatum. Elementary Aids-to-study: An Unconventional Access to Late-Medieval University Philosophy*, in: *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 45 (2003), 105-29, at 116 (note 29). I am indebted to Henrik Wels for pointing out to me the source of the quotation given by Lohr (‘sed Albertizabat’): It was Versor’s pupil Dominic of Flanders who qualified the opinion of his teacher on the subject of logic as being influenced by Albert the Great. Cf. Dominicus de Flandria, *Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicorum*, lib. 4, q. 5, a. 2, ad 5, ed. Venice 1499 (Nachdruck Frankfurt 1967), f. 15ra. The passage was already quoted by Mahieu 1942 (above, n. 1), 22, and (though incorrectly) by G. Meersseman, *Een Vlaamsch Wijsgeer: Dominicus van Vlaanderen*, in: *Thomistisch tijdschrift voor katholiek kultuurleven*, 1-2 (1930), 385-400, at 395.

¹⁰ H.G. Senger, *Albertismus? Überlegungen zur ‘via Alberti’ im 15. Jahrhundert*, in: A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Albert der Grosse: seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 14), Berlin-New York 1981, 217-36, esp. 229-36. On the *bursae* in Cologne, see Tewes 1993 (above, n. 8), esp. 279-394.

the criteria Senger formulated: In order to speak meaningfully of an Albertist school, he argued, there must be a distinguishable, consistent and coherent philosophical system which is based upon Albert's principal philosophical tenets and which can be reconstructed historiographically.¹¹ Senger convincingly argued that by such criteria Heymericus was not simply an Albertist; for one thing, he was heavily influenced by other traditions and thinkers, such as Raymond Lull.

Still, Heymericus wrote the *Tractatus problematicus* about the differences between Albertism and Thomism, which paved the way for the doctrinal quarrels that were to pervade intellectual life at Cologne for the next hundred years. Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen therefore rightly criticized Senger's criteria and showed that it is possible to identify a school of thought by its own (limited) set of characteristic theses.¹² This is obvious, e.g., from Heymericus' method in his Albertist manifesto, the so-called *Tractatus problematicus*: He does not present a synthetic philosophical programme, but a list of eighteen problems (*problemata*) divided over all branches of philosophy.¹³ Whether or not, in the case of Albertism, the characteristic theses all derive from Albert is of secondary importance. The interests of fifteenth-century philosophers may have been different from Albert's interests. To a certain degree the appeal to Albert's authority is a different issue from the actual inheritance of Albert's thought. Furthermore, Hoenen distinguished the notion of a philosophical school from the more general notion of an intellectual tradition. He defined a philosophical school as a tradition of thought which (1) expressly claims to follow the doctrine of a school leader, (2) is connected mainly to a teaching program or to a particular scientific education (in which philosophy has a preparatory or instrumental function), (3) defends a particular set of axiomatic theses, and (4) is also characterized by external factors, such as the writings on which its doctrine is based.¹⁴ The schools of thought are not restricted to university education. As C.H. Kneepkens has recently shown, the

¹¹ Senger 1981 (above, n. 10), 218-9.

¹² M.J.F.M. Hoenen, *Heymeric van de Velde († 1460) und die Geschichte des Albertismus: Auf der Suche nach den Quellen der albertistischen Intellektlehre des Tractatus problematicus*, in: Hoenen and de Libera 1995 (above, n. 6), 303-31, esp. 305-6.

¹³ Heymericus de Campo, *Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam ad utriusque opinionis intelligentiam multum conferentia*, Cologne 1496; cf. Meersseman 1935 (above, n. 6), Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1), 246 (no. 546).

¹⁴ M.J.F.M. Hoenen, *Thomismus, Skotismus und Albertismus. Das entstehen und die Bedeutung von philosophischen Schulen im späten Mittelalter*, in: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, 2 (1997), 81-103, esp. 81-94 (definition at 81-5).

different *viae* manifest themselves even on the very elementary levels of linguistics that were taught in grammar school.¹⁵

A confession of discipleship (the first characteristic mentioned) should not be regarded as an external characteristic or a purely strategical manoeuvre, even if it does have rhetorical qualities. There are numerous examples of authors who explicitly claim to follow a leader. Consider these examples of Albertists who pledge their loyalty to Albert: *iuxta viam et expositionem venerabilis domini Alberti doctoris magni acerrimique philosophi* (Arnold of Tongeren), *secundum sententiam peripatheticorum, quam tribuit eis venerabilis dominus Albertus Magnus* (Johannes de Nova Domo), *ego (. . .) subtilitatis magni peripateticorum Alberti (. . .) interpretis incultus discipulus* (Heymericus de Campo).¹⁶ A school is named after the philosopher who is regarded as its leader; this school name is used by the authors themselves: *Albertiste, de quorum numero me esse fateor* (Heymericus).¹⁷ Statements such as these may seem obligatory, but they are historical data that must be accounted for. In fact, they are (or should be) the reason why we investigate schools of thought in the first place. In the historiography of late medieval thought (and of philosophy in general) we may use whatever labels we consider convenient to categorize individual philosophers and philosophical movements. For instance, we may say that Albertism is a form of neo-platonism. This may not be uninformative or inaccurate, but we should carefully distinguish such categories from those that are present in the sources themselves. Understanding the philosophical schools of the fifteenth century means interpreting the use of school designations in the sources; it does not mean justifying whatever alternative designations we may prefer.

When we investigate the works of John Vector anew, these works may be used as a test case for the notion of philosophical schools as described above. If the characteristics mentioned are universally applicable, they

¹⁵ Kneepkens 2003 (above, n. 9), 125-7 (with further references). Cf. also the answer of the University of Cologne (24 December 1425) to the letter of the Prince Electors, edited in Ehrle 1925 (above, n. 6), 281-5, at 283. The professors claim that all students have already been introduced to one of the *viae* before they come to the university, namely by their teachers in grammar school.

¹⁶ Arnoldus de Tungeris, *Epitomata sive reparationes logice veteris et nove Aristotelis*, Cologne 1496, title page; cf. Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1), 69 (no. 164). Johannes de Nova Domo, *Tractatus de esse et essentia*, praefatio, ed. G. Meersseman, in: Meersseman 1933 (above, n. 6), 91-191, at 91; Heymericus de Campo, *Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam* (above, n. 13), f. a2r. For similar, Thomistic examples, see note 111 below.

¹⁷ Heymericus de Campo, *Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam* (above, n. 13), f. h6v.

should enable us to define Versor's position with respect to the philosophical debates of the schools (whether he will eventually be regarded as belonging to one of the schools or not); and that is the aim of this paper. Of course, it is not necessary that Versor was either a Thomist or an Albertist. He may have been neither or he may have been both, at different moments in time or in different works. In the following, I will first discuss the reasons put forward in the literature for considering Versor a Thomist or an Albertist (§ 2), then Versor's alleged confession of Albertism (§ 3), next Versor's position on some of the fundamental doctrinal differences between Albertists and Thomists (§ 4) and his use of Albert's and Thomas' Aristotle commentaries (§ 5), and finally some aspects of the Cologne editions of Versor's works that urge us to reconsider his "Thomism" (§ 6).

2. *Was Versor a Thomist?*

The Parisian Master of Arts Johannes Versor is generally (at least since Prantl's *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*) considered one of the most influential Thomists of his time.¹⁸ In the last two decades of the fifteenth century, his commentaries on the *corpus aristotelicum* were printed many times: all of them in Cologne, some of them also in Lyon, one in Leipzig and one in Metz.¹⁹ Later, his works were printed for instance at Cracow (Questions on *De anima*, 1514) and in Venice (Commentaries on Peter of Spain, 1572).²⁰ E.J. Ashworth notes that "the Thomist John Versor" was perhaps "the most successful commentator" on the logical works of Aristotle and Peter of Spain.²¹ Prantl, Grabmann and Swiezawski all qualify Versor as a Thomist, although they appreciate his works in different ways. Where Grabmann finds "rich contents and clarity", Prantl sees "dry and dull" explanations and Swiezawski a "banal and popular form of Thomism".²² The

¹⁸ For references, see above, notes 4 and 8.

¹⁹ Lohr 1971 (above, n. 4), 292-9.

²⁰ Lohr 1971 (above, n. 4), 296; Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae Logicales cum Versorii Parisiensis Clarissima Expositione*, Venetiis 1572 (reprint Hildesheim-New York 1981). Versor's commentary on Peter of Spain was printed as early as 1473 and 1477 (in Italy) and as late as 1622 (in Cologne); cf. Ashworth 1982 (above, n. 4), 788, and Hain 1838 (above, n. 1), 487 (nos. 16031 and 16032).

²¹ Ashworth 1982 (above, n. 4), 788.

²² Prantl 1955 (above, n. 4), 200 (n. 126: "der entschiedene Thomist Versor"), 200-21 ("zeigt er sich als einen trocknen und langweiligen Erklärer"); Grabmann 1956 (above, n. 4), 230 ("Inhaltsfülle und Klarheit"); Swiezawski 1963 (above, n. 8), 89 ("thomisme . . .

reason why these scholars put the label "Thomism" on Versor seems to be a general impression given by his writings. In Prantl's perception, Versor basically explains the works of Aristotle according to Thomistic principles: He does not quote many authorities, but generally follows Thomas.²³ Moreover, he wrote a commentary on Thomas' *De ente et essentia*. In this work he may not always dismiss Albert's opinion decidedly, but on the whole he certainly seems to take over Thomas' line of thought.²⁴

Versor might also be considered a Thomist for other reasons. The Thomists at Cologne repeatedly commissioned Cologne printers to print his works. The *Bursa Montana* had some of his *Quaestiones* on Aristotle's physical works (namely those on *De generatione*, *De caelo*, *Meteora* and *Parva naturalia*) printed by Theodoricus Molner in 1485/6, again by Conradus Welker in 1488, and again by Henricus Quentell in 1493.²⁵ Between 1489 and 1497, Quentell also printed Versor's commentaries on the *Physics* (twice), *De anima*, the *Ars vetus* and the *Nova logica*, all of them commissioned by the Thomistic *Bursa Cornelianiana*. Tewes argues that there probably were personal contacts between members of this college and Versor himself.²⁶ The colophons of these Cologne printings suggest that Versor was a Thomist of the Cologne type: *Et sic est finis questionum versoris super duos libros aristotelis de generatione scilicet et corruptione secundum processum burse montis; Questiones versoris iuxta textum de anima diligentissime correcte in bursa Corneli in Colonia; etc.*²⁷ It seems reasonable to presume that these works were meant to be used in the educational programs of the colleges mentioned. This presumption is corroborated by the fact that Thomists of the *Montana* refer to Versor in their own writings (in spite of the fact that it was rather unusual to mention contemporary authors by name).²⁸ Thus, it would seem that Versor can indeed be regarded as a Thomistic author.

sous forme banalisée et populaire, comme dans les écrits de Jean Versorius"). Markowski also qualifies Versor's thought as a banal form of Thomism; cf. M. Markowski, *Albert und der Albertismus in Krakau*, in: Zimmermann 1981 (above, n. 10), 177-92, esp. 187. Cf. also Ritter 1922 (above, n. 6), 73, note 3: "tatsächlich gehören Versors Lehrbücher (soweit sie mir bekannt sind) zu dem Verwaschensten und Farblosesten, das es damals gab. Eben darauf beruhte wohl ihre große Verbreitung und ihre Verwendbarkeit als Materialsammlung."

²³ Prantl 1955 (above, n. 4), 200-21.

²⁴ Feckes 1935 (above, n. 3), 672; cf. above, § 1.

²⁵ Tewes 1993 (above, n. 8), 389; Birkenmajer 1925 (above, n. 4), esp. 134.

²⁶ Tewes 1993 (above, n. 8), 389-90.

²⁷ Cf. Voullième 1903 (above, n. 1), 520-9 (nos. 1214, 1216, 1220, 1224, 1225, 1230, 1234).

²⁸ *Copulata pulcherrima diversis ex autoribus logice in unum corrogata in veterem artem Aristotelis cum*

However, Egbert P. Bos has recently investigated some of Versor's logical writings (namely, his commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories*) and has come to an entirely different conclusion. According to Bos "Versor unquestionably was a prominent Albertist in Paris between 1407 and 1437".²⁹ Just as Prantl's conclusion (based on the same works!) that Versor was a Thomist, Bos' contrary conclusion that he was an Albertist also reflects a general impression of the contents of these logical works. Bos notes that on several issues (such as the number of the categories, the analogy of the notion of being, the nature of substance and the theory of universals) Versor agrees with Albert.³⁰ In addition, Versor refers to Albert more often than to Aquinas.³¹ More importantly, he rates himself among the Albertists. In a passage in his commentary on the *Categories*, where he explicitly claims to follow Albert, Versor repeatedly speaks of "our way of understanding". Bos explains this phrase as a confession of loyalty to the Albertist school: When Versor writes "our way" he refers to the Albertist way.³² On the basis of these facts, the long-standing conclusion that Versor was a Thomist suddenly seems to have become untenable.

3. *Versor's Alleged Confession of Albertism*

In view of the importance attached to what I have labeled "confessions of discipleship" (cf. § 1), the first point to consider is Versor's alleged confession of Albertism.³³ As said above, in his commentary on the *Categories*

textu eiusdem secundum viam divi doctoris Thome de Aquino et iuxta processum magistrorum Colonie in bursa Montis regentium, Cologne 1494, f. 22vb: "et hanc opinionem (scilicet Egidii de Roma de principio individuationis, PR) tangit Versor super De ente et essentia sancti Thome et eam ibidem improbat." Cf. Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1), 51 (no. 134).

²⁹ Bos 2002 (above, n. 9), 78.

³⁰ Bos 2002 (above, n. 9), 65-75.

³¹ Bos 2002 (above, n. 9), 53.

³² Bos 2002 (above, n. 9), 53 and 78. For Versor's text, see Appendix 1 below.

³³ This study is based on several of Versor's works as they appeared in print at the end of the fifteenth century. In general, I will have to assume that these are reliable editions of authentic writings. It should however be noted that their authenticity has not yet been proven; indeed, by reason of some attributions in manuscripts (of several of "Versor's" works to other authors) their attribution to Versor in the incunable editions may be doubted: Cf. C. Flüeler, *Die verschiedenen literarischen Gattungen der Aristoteleskommentare: Zur Terminologie der Überschriften und Kolophone*, in: J. Hamesse (ed.), *Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universités médiévales. Actes du colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve (9-11 septembre 1993)*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, 75-116, at 80-4. On the other hand, other authors may have adapted Versor's writings and thus transformed them into their "own" commentaries,

Versor uses the phrase “our way of understanding”; in the same passage he mentions Albert explicitly and also follows his explanation of Aristotle’s text. Hence Bos’ interpretation of that phrase: According to Bos, Versor “professes to belong to a certain way of thought, namely Albertism” and “is conscious of belonging to a distinct school in contrast to others”, when he uses the phrase “secundum nostrum modum intelligendi”.³⁴ However, this interpretation is a misunderstanding. The expression “secundum nostrum modum intelligendi” does not refer to a particular way of thought at all—in which case one should have expected something like the usual *via*, *expositio*, *doctrina* or *processus*, but not *modus intelligendi*.³⁵ Versor’s words concern the human way of understanding in general. He uses them when discussing the question whether the notion of substance is the most general genus in the category of substance.³⁶ His exposition of the problem closely resembles a passage from Albert’s commentary on the *Categories*.³⁷ Indeed, a comparison of the two texts suggests that Versor based his text on Albert’s. (I have included both texts in Appendix 1.) Versor distinguishes three meanings of the term “substance”: (1) the metaphysical

a procedure which was certainly not uncommon at the time; cf. P. Rutten, *Contra occanicam discoliam modernorum: The So-Called De universali reali and the Dissemination of Albertist Polemics against the via moderna*, in: *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 45 (2003), 131-65 (which demonstrates that the *Tractatus problematicus* of Heymericus de Campo met with the same fate during the course of the fifteenth century). Lohr 1971 (above, n. 4), 297-8, already noted that some manuscripts of Versor’s works have “variant incipits reflecting possibly different redactions or different authorship.” As Flüeler has stressed elsewhere, Aristotle’s medieval commentators (including Versor himself; cf. below, § 5) usually based their commentaries on those of other commentators; cf. C. Flüeler, *Die stemmatischen Verhältnisse der Aristoteleskommentare*, in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 48 (2001), 182-90.

³⁴ Bos 2002 (above, n. 9) discusses this passage on 71-3; for his interpretation of the phrase “secundum nostrum modum intelligendi” (as quoted), cf. 53 and 78. I use the following edition (which is the same as Bos used): Johannes Versor, *Quaestiones super totam veterem artem*, Köln 1494 (unveränderter Nachdruck Frankfurt/Main 1967). The table of questions on ff. 75rb-76ra of this edition gives the titles for the different parts, some of which I will use when referring to or quoting from this edition: *Quaestiones (primi libri scilicet) quinque predicabilium Porphyrii*, *Quaestiones libri predicamentorum Aristotelis*, *Quaestiones primi libri Perihermeniarum Aristotelis*.

³⁵ Cf. M.J.F.M. Hoenen, *Via Antiqua and Via Moderna in the Fifteenth Century: Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church Political Factors in the Wegestreit*, in: R.L. Friedman and L.O. Nielsen (eds.), *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700*, Dordrecht 2003, 9-36, at 13-4. See also the examples in note 111 below.

³⁶ Johannes Versor, *Quaestiones libri predicamentorum Aristotelis* (above, n. 34), q. 6, f. 30rb: “Queritur utrum substantia sit genus generalissimum.”

³⁷ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 2, c. 1, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisii 1890, 166a-167b.

notion of essence (*essentia simplex*), which is the first and principal part of a being (*prima et principalis pars entis*), (2) the logical notion of the first thing predicable of any substance (*primum et simplicissimum predicabile*), and (3) the notion of an individual substance (*substantia particularis*), which is the subject of all other things (accidents) and of all predications.³⁸ Logic, says Versor, is concerned with two notions of substance, namely the second and the third meaning of the term. The second meaning of “substance” is a generic notion and is the subject of logical enquiry, because it is the “first predicable”, to which anything else that can be predicated of any substance whatsoever (e.g., “horse”, “man”, “angel”) can be reduced.³⁹ With respect to this *primum praedicabile* Versor (still following Albert) formulates a sub-question: What is this genus composed of, since there is nothing before it, of which it could be composed? In his answer to this question, Versor mentions *nostrum modum intelligendi*. The highest genus itself cannot be composed of genus and difference, because there is no higher genus: Being (*ens*) is not a genus with respect to the categories of being, since there cannot be specific differences constituting the categories, because nothing evades being in the way that a difference evades a genus. Hence, in the highest genus there is no real composition of genus and species, nor of matter and form. Nevertheless, we conceive of this genus as being composed of potency and act, or *quod est* and *quo est*, or *ens* and *per se*. In Albert’s words, there is an “intellectual composition” of *ens* and *per se*: “Est enim ens, et est per se, quod addit super ens intellectualem compositionem.”⁴⁰ In Versor’s words: *secundum nostrum modum intelligendi* we can only think of the most general genus according to the model of composition of act and potency.⁴¹

³⁸ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 2, c. 1, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 166a; Johannes Versor, *Questiones libri predicamentorum Aristotelis* (above, n. 34), q. 6, f. 30rb-30va. The complete texts are in Appendix 1 below.

³⁹ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 2, c. 1, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 166a-167b; Johannes Versor, *Questiones libri predicamentorum Aristotelis* (above, n. 34), q. 6, f. 30va. See Appendix 1.

⁴⁰ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 2, c. 1, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 167a; Johannes Versor, *Questiones libri predicamentorum Aristotelis* (above, n. 34), q. 6, f. 30va. See Appendix 1.

⁴¹ In other words: The composition is not real but rational. Thomas Aquinas uses the expression “modus intelligendi” (albeit without adding “noster”) in the same way, contrasting what is real (*secundum rem*, *in re* or *realiter*) and what is merely in the intellect (*tantum in intellectu* or *secundum modum intelligendi*). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, lib. 1, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, corp., ed. R.P. Mandonnet (vol. I), Parisiis 1929, 68: “. . . sicut nos dicimus de relationibus quae ex tempore de Deo dicuntur; huiusmodi enim relationes

... according to our way of understanding a substance is understood to be composed of being and per se, which composition we understand by way of a composition of act and potency, namely of by-which-it-is (*quo est*) and that-which-is (*quod est*) ... However, there is no composition there of genus and difference, because being can have no differences, since there is nothing which evades the notion of being. And thus it is clear that matter and form do not compose substance in general, nor genus and difference, but, as said, according to our way of understanding it is composed of act and potency or of that-which-is and by-which-it-is.⁴²

In using the expression "our way of understanding" Versor is not professing to belong to the Albertist way of thought, but nonetheless his text is evidently based on Albert's (see Appendix 1). In as much as Versor rephrases Albert's text, he also seems to adhere to Albert's philosophy. For that reason, Versor might still be regarded as an Albertist. One could argue that doctrinal congruence is more important in this respect than overt loyalty to Albert or the Albertist school.

4. *Fundamental Doctrinal Differences*

When we look for doctrinal agreement or disagreement, in order to find symptoms of school formation in a particular period of time, the question is what problems or positions are relevant in that particular time. With respect to philosophy in the late Middle Ages, a general doctrinal agreement between two or more thinkers does not necessarily constitute a philosophical school. Yet for some scholars this was precisely the criterion for using labels such as "Thomist" and "Albertist" in relation to Versor (cf. § 2). Above (§ 1) it was stated that the doctrinal profile of a

in Deo secundum rem non sunt, sed sequuntur modum intelligendi ... rationes horum attributorum sunt tantum in intellectu, et non in re, quae Deus est." Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestiones de quolibet*, Quodlibet 6, q. 1, a. 1, corp., ed. Leonina, vol. XXV-2, Roma-Paris 1996, 295.42-5: "... unitas personae non ponit in numerum cum unitate essencie quasi realiter ab ea differens, set solum secundum modum intelligendi." Closely related to this topic is the question about composition in the intellectual substances; these are also said to be composed of *quo est* and *quod est*. Cf., e.g., Thomas de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 4, ed. Leonina, vol. XLIII, Roma 1976, 376.90-377.166; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3, ed. Leonina, vol. V, Romae 1889, 6b.

⁴² Johannes Versor, *Questiones libri predicamentorum Aristotelis* (above, n. 34), q. 6, f. 30va: "... secundum nostrum modum intelligendi substantia intelligitur componi ex ente et per se, que quidem compositio a nobis intelligitur per modum compositionis ex actu et potentia, scilicet ex quo est et quod est ... Non tamen est ibi compositio ex genere et differentia, quia ens differentias habere non potest, cum nihil sit quod rationem entis subterfugere possit. Et sic patet quod materia et forma non componunt substantiam in communi accepta neque etiam genus et differentia, sed ut dictum est secundum nostrum modum intelligendi componitur ex actu et potentia seu ex quod est et quo est." (See also Appendix 1.)

school of thought rather ensues from a set of axiomatic theses concerning fundamental issues. What, in the case of Albertism vs. Thomism, these issues are becomes apparent from several sources contemporary to Versor's writings. In this section I will discuss three of these issues: First, Albert's doctrine of *inchoatio formarum* (incipient actuality or inchoateness of forms);⁴³ second, the distinction between *forma partis* and *forma totius* (§ 4.2); third, the principle of individuation (§ 4.3). A consideration of Versor's position on these issues will cast light on his place in the battle of the schools.

4.1. *The Doctrine of inchoatio formarum*

When Aristotle, in the first book of the *Physics*, discusses the principles of nature, he distinguishes three principles: matter, form and privation. These are the three principles that account for all change in the physical world. Matter is the subject which is in itself undetermined and which underlies the forms determining it. Form and privation are two contrary principles that account for any particular thing being so-and-so or not being so-and-so. Change means that matter receives some form which it was previously deprived of; it is a transition from privation to form. Every form is a kind of perfection, or "something divine, good, and desirable", as Aristotle admits in his discussion with Plato, whereas matter is imperfect. All natural change should thus be considered as a natural striving for perfection: Matter desires to be perfected by form.⁴⁴ At this point difficulties arise. On the one hand, it is matter that desires form, for privation is contrary to form: When any form is received by matter, the corresponding privation contrary to that form must necessarily cease to exist. Nothing, however, desires its own destruction. Therefore, the desire for form cannot be in its privation, but must be in matter itself.⁴⁵ On

⁴³ The metaphysical and historical backgrounds of Albert's doctrine of *inchoatio formarum* are explored by B. Nardi, *La dottrina d'Alberto Magno sull' "inchoatio formae"*, in: id., *Studi di filosofia medievale* (Storia e letteratura, 78), Roma 1960, 69-101 [Reprint from *Rendiconti della Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche dell'Accademia dei Lincei*, ser. 6, vol. 12, fasc. 1-2 (1936), 3-38]. Cf. M.J.F.M. Hoenen, *The 'Reparationes librorum totius naturalis philosophiae' (Cologne 1494) as a source for the late medieval debates between Albertistae and Thomistae*, in: *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, IV (1993), 307-44, esp. 323-6. The translation "incipient actuality" is suggested by J.A. Weisheipl, *The Concept of Matter in Fourteenth Century Science*, in: E. McMullin (ed.), *The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy*, Notre Dame 1963, 147-69, at 151-2.

⁴⁴ Aristotle, *Physics* I, 9, ed. I. Bekker, Berolini 1831, 192a16-34.

⁴⁵ On Albert's discussion of the nature of matter's appetite for form, cf. Hoenen 1993 (above, n. 43), 324-6.

the other hand, since matter has nothing in common with form, how can it be susceptible at all to the perfection entailed by a form? There must be some intrinsic principle to account for the fact that matter desires form, in particular because that desire must be natural, not violent.⁴⁶ According to Aristotle, privation is that principle. The controversy between Albert and Thomas concerns the question whether privation is to be regarded as purely passive potentiality, or rather as a potency which is in some way active.

According to Albert, privation in itself is just the absence of a form (*carentia formae*); it does not contribute anything positively (*nihil ponit*).⁴⁷ This is in accordance with Aristotle's distinction between matter and form as the principles *per se* of any composite being and privation as a principle *per accidens*, which distinction is taken over by Albert and Thomas alike. Yet privation cannot be reduced to absolutely nothing, in Albert's words, because it leaves an aptitude behind in the subject (*relinquit aptitudinem in subiecto*). This aptitude is the potentiality of matter with respect to form; it is therefore also that which makes matter receptive to change.⁴⁸ Nothing, however, desires anything else, unless it already has some incomplete likeness to it. Therefore, the appetite for form in matter must be of such a nature that it has a beginning of form: an *inchoatio* (or *inchoatio*) *formae*.⁴⁹

As Albert explains, the "Peripatetic" account he gives of the nature of matter's susceptibility to form avoids the problems caused by the two

⁴⁶ Albertus Magnus, *Physica*, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 15, ed. P. Hossfeld (ed. Coloniensis, vol. IV-1), Monasterii Westfalorum 1987, 69.22-30.

⁴⁷ Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Physica*, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 9, ed. P. Hossfeld (ed. Coloniensis, vol. IV-1), Monasterii Westfalorum 1987, 54.74-91.

⁴⁸ Albertus Magnus, *Physica*, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 9, ed. P. Hossfeld (ed. Coloniensis, vol. IV-1), Monasterii Westfalorum 1987, 54.39-50.

⁴⁹ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 5, c. 4, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 96b: "... materia non est materia per hoc quod est nudum subiectum formae ab omni forma denudatum, sed potius in materia (*lege*: potentia) ad formam per inchoationem formae in ipsa. Et ideo dicitur, quod materia desiderat formam, sicut foemina masculum: non in quantum est foemina, sed in quantum est imperfecta. (...) nec perfici potest, in quo non est aptitudo ad perfectionem. Aptitudo autem illa necessario aliquid est perfectionis, quia aliter non appeteret ad perfectionem." The suggestion to read "potentia" for "materia" comes from Nardi 1960 (above, n. 43), 84. Albertus Magnus, *Physica*, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 10, ed. P. Hossfeld (ed. Coloniensis, vol. IV-1), Monasterii Westfalorum 1987, 72.92-73.6: "Et ideo verissime dictum est, quod nihil appetit aliud nisi per similitudinem incompletam, quam habet ad ipsum. Et ideo appetit compleri per transmutationem ad ipsum, quod appetit; licet enim ens completum salvari appetat, tamen appetitus transmutationis non est nisi incompleti. Et ideo talis appetitus est materiae, quae per mixturam privationis cum ipsa formae habet inchoationem, ad quam transmutari desiderat."

extreme positions of Anaxagoras and Plato (which Aristotle himself also discusses). Anaxagoras postulated the latent pre-existence of all forms in matter (*latentia formarum*), which entails the false conclusions that generation is really alteration and that ultimately everything is everything else. According to Plato, on the other hand, matter has no privation and no incipient form; all forms come from the giver of forms (*dator formarum*). This leads to the false conclusion that change in the physical world is not natural, but violent (*violentum*), because it has an external efficient cause.⁵⁰ According to a Peripatetic dictum, however, forms are extracted from matter (*educuntur de materia*).⁵¹ Therefore, although the positions of both Anaxagoras and Plato are to be avoided, the Peripatetic solution to the problem is closer to Anaxagoras than to Plato.⁵²

On this last point Thomas Aquinas agrees with his teacher: The idea of incipient forms comes close to assuming a latency of forms in matter.⁵³ For Thomas, this is all the more reason to dismiss the idea of incipient formality, which he does consistently, both in his theological and in his

⁵⁰ Albertus Magnus, *Physica*, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 15, ed. P. Hossfeld (ed. Coloniensis, vol. IV-1), Monasterii Westfalorum 1987, 68.72-70.76, and *ibid.*, c. 16, 71.15-73.27.

⁵¹ The origin of the formula *formae educuntur de materia* or *formae educuntur de potentia materiae* is unclear. The reference to *De generatione animalium* in Mandonnet's edition of Thomas' *Scriptum* seems mistaken; cf. the quotation in note 56 below. Cajetan calls it a *secretum peripateticum* and does not give a reference; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2, ed. Leonina, vol. V, Romae 1889, 387b (Commentaria Cardinalis Caietani).

⁵² Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 5, c. 4, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 95a-b: "Ad omnia autem haec determinanda praenotandum est, quod ut dicit Averroes, genus non est materia, sed forma generalis, et confusa, et indistincta, et diffusa in materia non determinata per formam: quam diffusam formam et confusam vocant quidam formae inchoationem: propter quam inchoationem formae in materia diffusam ipsa materia a quibusdam antiquis locus formae dicebatur, in quo latent formae: et ideo latentiam formarum principium fecerunt, ut dictum est in *Physicis*, et erat hoc dictum Anaxagorae: propter quod etiam Aristoteles et omnes Peripatetici dixerunt educi de materia omnes formas, et non esse eas a datore extrinseco." Elsewhere Albert claims with Averroes that the other philosophers meant the same as Aristotle, but lacked the words to express themselves correctly; cf. Albertus Magnus, *Summa theologiae*, pars 2, q. 4, m. 2, a. 4, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. XXXII), Parisiis 1895, 90a: "ideo dicit Commentator super XI *primae philosophiae*, quod omnes alii Philosophi, scilicet et ponentes latentiam, et ponentes datorem formarum, qui mediantibus virtutibus coelestibus et elementalibus et formativis generantium virtutibus, influit et invehit formas in materiam, voluerunt idem dicere quod dixit Aristoteles, quod scilicet formae potentia in materia essent: sed verbis propriis nesciverunt exprimere . . ."

⁵³ Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, lib. 7, lect. 8, ed. M.-R. Cathala / R.M. Spiazzi, Taurini-Romae 1950, 352-3 (no. 14428): "Haec autem opinio videtur propinqua ponentibus latitatem formarum. Cum enim nihil agat nisi secundum quod est in actu: si partes vel inchoationes formarum quae sunt in materia,

philosophical works. In the *Summa theologiae*, in his commentary on the *Sentences* and in his commentaries on the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*, Thomas rejects the notion of *inchoatio formae* in the sense explained by Albert.⁵⁴ Thomas explains that matter cannot have an intrinsic active principle. Such a principle would mean that something has the ability to effect change in itself, which only occurs in living creatures, not in inanimate things.⁵⁵ Thomas endorses the view that forms are extracted from matter, but denies that this entails an active potency in matter. He also expressly counters Albert's argument concerning the supposedly violent (i.e. unnatural) character of change effected without the participation of an active potency in matter; for matter assists in generation, not by actively contributing to the process, but by reason of its aptness to receive forms. That aptness may be called "appetitus materiae" or "inchoatio formae", but it is a purely passive potency.⁵⁶

habent aliquam virtutem activam, sequitur quod sint aliquo modo actu, quod est ponere latitudinem formarum."

⁵⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio*, lib. 1, lect. 13, ed. M. Maggiolo, Taurini-Romae 1954, 58 (no. 114): "Patet ergo secundum intentionem Aristotelis quod privatio, quae ponitur principium naturae per accidens, non est aliqua aptitudo ad formam, vel inchoatio formae, vel aliquod principium imperfectum activum, ut quidam dicunt, sed ipsa carentia formae vel contrarium formae, quod subiecto accidit." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, lib. 7, lect. 8, ed. M.-R. Cathala / R.M. Spiazzi, Taurini-Romae 1950, 352-3 (no. 1442α-ζ); Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, lib. 2, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, ed. P. Mandonnet (vol. II), Parisiis 1929, 450-4; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IIIa, q. 32, a. 4, corp., ed. Leonina, vol. XI, Romae 1903, 337a-b.

⁵⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, lib. 7, lect. 8, ed. M.-R. Cathala / R.M. Spiazzi, Taurini-Romae 1950, 353 (no. 1442ε).

⁵⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, lib. 2, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, corp., ed. R.P. Mandonnet (vol. II), Parisiis 1929, 450-454: "... alii dicunt quod cum omnes formae, secundum Philosophum, *De gener. animal.*, lib. II, cap. 3, de potentia materiae educantur, oportet ipsas formas praexistere in materia incomplete, secundum quamdam quasi inchoationem... aliter enim non esset generatio mutatio naturalis, sed violenta... Hoc autem verum non videtur: quia quamvis formae educantur de potentia materiae, illa tamen potentia materiae non est activa, sed passiva tantum; sicut enim... in motu locali oportet esse aliud movens et motum, ita etiam in motu alterationis; et ponit exemplum quod, quando corpus naturaliter sanatur, cor est sanans, et alia membra sanata... Nec tamen sequitur, si in materia est potentia passiva tantum, quod non sit generatio naturalis: quia materia coadjuvat ad generationem non agendo, sed in quantum est habilis ad recipiendum talem actionem, quae etiam habilitas appetitus materiae dicitur et inchoatio formae... Et ideo concedo quod in materia nulla potentia activa est, sed pure passiva". Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 45, a. 8, corp., ed. Leonina, vol. IV, Romae 1888, 477a-b, and *Ibid.*, q. 65, a. 4, corp., ed. Leonina, vol. V, Romae 1889, 152a-153a.

Albert's position is adopted by his early followers, such as his pupil Udalricus de Argentina (Ulrich von Strassburg).⁵⁷ It is again taken up by fifteenth-century Albertists such as Johannes de Nova Domo and Heymericus de Campo. In his treatise on being and essence, Johannes de Nova Domo ascribes an essence to prime matter, because every being (*esse*) is the act of an essence and in matter there is formable formal being (*esse formale formabile*, as opposed to *formale formans* and *formale formatum*). This essence of prime matter comprises a subjective potency and an aptitude for form. From this essence flows (*fluit*) the formable formal being, which is also called *esse formalis inchoationis* and which is essentially the same as form. Thus, Johannes takes over Albert's position that matter's potency with regard to form is already something formal itself.⁵⁸ Heymericus de Campo does the same in the treatise which explicitly discusses the "problems" between Albertists and Thomists, the *Tractatus problematicus*.⁵⁹ Heymericus also adopts Albert's doxographic perspective on the history of philosophy (from Albert's commentary on the *Metaphysics*), according to which there are three main philosophical sects: Peripatetics, Epicureans and Stoics.⁶⁰ The Peripatetics follow Aristotle, the Epicureans (including the pre-socratic natural philosophers) follow Anaxagoras and the Stoics (including Pythagoreans and Platonists) follow Plato. Heymericus' account of the Platonist, Epicurean and Peripatetic (*Peripatetici . . . viam mediam tenentes*)

⁵⁷ Cf. Ulrich von Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 4, tr. 2, cap. 7, ed. S. Pieperhoff (*De summo bono, Liber 4, Tractatus 1-2,7*), Hamburg 1987, 128.251-131.364; at 128.257-8: "materia non appetit formam, nisi inquantum est in ipsa privatio, quae est inchoatio formae in materia"; *Ibid.*, at 131.345-6: "forma est in materia per essentiam secundum esse imperfectum et confusum potentiale."

⁵⁸ Johannes de Nova Domo, *Tractatus de esse et essentia*, q. 4, prop. 2, ed. G. Meersseman, in: Meersseman 1933 (above, n. 6), 91-191, at 135-7 (with references to Albert): "Quia esse secundum totum suum ambitum est actus essentiae . . . ideo ubicumque recipitur esse, ibi recipitur essentia. Omnis enim essentia formalis est, quia ab ea fluit esse, et ita habet modum formalis formae; formalis dico vel formabilis vel formantis vel formatae. In natura materiae primae reperitur esse formale formabile, et proportionabile reperitur in essentia. In essentia primae materiae invenitur aliquid quod importatur nomine potentiae subiectivae, cui concreata est aptitudo seu habilitas ad formam; quae quidem aptitudo cum potentia materiae vocatur essentia, a qua fluit esse formale formabile, quod vocatur esse formalis inchoationis, de quo solet dici quod est idem secundum essentiam cum forma."

⁵⁹ Heymericus de Campo, *Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam* (above, n. 13), probl. 7, f. e1r-v: "... privatio est negatio forme cum formali aptitudine ad eandem, et per consequens oportet ponere in materia formalem aptitudinem et inchoationem."

⁶⁰ On Albert's philosophical doxography in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, cf. G. Santinello, *Storia della filosofia e storia dei filosofi: Il commento di Alberto al libro I della "Metafisica"*, in: Medioevo, XVI (1990), 43-70.

views on the relation between matter and form completely corresponds to Albert's.⁶¹ Heymericus warns that the Albertists with their "formable formal essences" may incline towards Anaxagoras' theory of latent forms, whereas the Thomists, who acknowledge only a passive potency in matter, may incline towards the "stoic" theory of "sterile" matter.⁶²

The passage from the *Tractatus problematicus* in which Heymericus sketches this spectrum of positions is incorporated almost word for word in a work that was published by the *Bursa Laurentiana* in 1494, the *Reparationes librorum totius naturalis philosophiae*.⁶³ In addition, this work also includes an independent assimilation of Albert's thought, which repeats the main arguments advanced by Albert: Only on account of the inchoate status of forms can one explain that forms are extracted from matter, that matter can be perfected by form, and that change in natural things does not come from outside.⁶⁴ In sum, there is an obvious, Albertist line of thought which clearly has a direct relation to the writings of Albert himself.

⁶¹ Cf. above. Heymericus de Campo, *Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam* (above, n. 13), probl. 7, f. d5r-v: "Dicebat enim Plato quod materia est coeterna datori formarum . . . cui ille dator sola sua bonitate stimulatus imprimit ymagines conformes suis ydealibus rationibus . . . E contra autem dicunt Epicurei, quorum caput fuit Anaxagoras, quod materia est universorum primum et perfectissimum principium quod in se prehabet omnium formas quas subiective sustentat sed velamento accidentium ipsam vestientium occultantur ne alicui appareant preter eam que dat materie in hoc vel in illo nomen. Et dicit huiusmodi latentias illucescere per agentia naturalia remouentia ab ipsa materia talia accidentia occultantia et obumbrantia lucem talium formarum, ita quod generatio non est aliud quam revelatio forme substantialis intus sepulte in caligine materie. Et alteratio est revelatio alicuius forme accidentaliter similiter latitantis . . . Peripatetici vero, quorum archipater fuit Aristoteles, viam mediam tenentes dixerunt materiam nec omnino esse nudam et sterilem, sicut aiunt Platonici et Stoyci, nec prorsus fecunditate formarum actuata, sicut pretendunt Epicurei, sed prehabere eas formas secundum potentiam et ab agentibus expectare illius potentie formativos [formativus ed.] actus, qui sermo ab omnibus sectatoribus Aristotelis concorditer accipitur."

⁶² *Ibid.*, f. d5v: "Sed eius intelligentia adeo dispar invenitur sic, quod hii videntur declinare ad opinionem Stoycorum, hii vero ad positionem Epicureorum. Nobis enim, iuxta viam et intellectum Doctoris Magni tales formas preesse in materia per essentias suas formales formabiles ponentibus, inponitur error Anaxagore, sicut et sectatoribus Doctoris Sancti, solam potentiam subiectivam materie confitentibus, error impingitur Stoycorum."

⁶³ *Reparationes librorum totius naturalis philosophiae* (anonymous), Cologne 1494; cf. Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1), 443 (no. 1016). See the part concerning the *Physics*, lib. 1, tr. 4, ff. c2v-c3r. On these *Reparationes* and the genre of *reparationes* in general, cf. Hoenen 1993 (above, n. 43).

⁶⁴ *Reparationes librorum totius naturalis philosophiae* (above, n. 63), in *Phys.* lib. 1, tr. 4, f. c2r: "Queritur quomodo patet quod forme secundum aliquod esse earum sint inchoate in materia . . . Ratione sic primo patet, quia nihil educitur de aliquo nisi aliquo modo prefuerit in eo. Sed forme educuntur de potentia materie, ergo secundum aliquod esse earum fuerunt in materia. Hoc autem esse est formale formabile. Secundo probatur sic. In omni motu

Johannes Versor briefly discusses the same topic of incipient formality in his commentary on the *Isagoge*. Again (cf. § 3), his text is based loosely on Albert's commentary, but he keeps his distance from the kind of loyalty to Albert displayed by Heymericus or the *Reparationes*. Instead of defending either Albert's or Thomas' position, he juxtaposes their views without showing a preference for either one.⁶⁵ The theory of *inchoatio formarum* is encountered here in a logico-metaphysical context, because it elucidates the relation between a genus and its differences. Just as prime matter is not purely passive and uninformed, so a genus is a "general, confuse and indistinct form" which potentially (i.e. on account of a *potestas*) contains the specific differences and which is called *inchoatio formae*.⁶⁶ Versor's paraphrase of the passage from Albert's commentary does not contribute a single original thought, but he does mention the fact that Thomas Aquinas holds a different opinion: "It seems that the Holy Doctor contradicts him, negating the inchoateness of forms in matter."⁶⁷ On the next page, Versor mentions the same disagreement between Albert and Thomas

vel mutatione oportet aliquod intrinsece et formaliter perfici. Sed hoc quod sic intrinsece perficitur non potest esse substantia materie, scilicet potentia eius subiectiva, quia illa semper eadem manet sub diversis formis. Sed erit aliquod preter materiam ipsi materie superadditum, scilicet potentia formalis materie que identice transit in actum. Et hoc vocatur forme inchoatio. Tertio probatur ratione sic. Si non essent forme secundum aliquod esse in materia inchoate, tunc omnes forme venirent de foris, quod tamen est contra omnes rationales philosophos."

⁶⁵ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 5, c. 4, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 91b-97a; Johannes Versor, *Questiones quinque predicabilium Porphyrii* (above, n. 34), q. 26, ff. 21ra-21vb.

⁶⁶ See Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 5, c. 4, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 95b (quoted above, n. 52). For the question of whether one should speak of *potentia* or *potestas*, cf. *Ibid.*, 94a-96b and the summary by Johannes Versor, *Questiones quinque predicabilium Porphyrii* (above, n. 34), q. 26, f. 21vb.

⁶⁷ Johannes Versor, *Questiones quinque predicabilium Porphyrii* (above, n. 34), q. 26, f. 21rb: "Ex quo oritur dubitatio de modo quomodo differentie oppositae sunt in genere, et a quo genus habet eas, aut scilicet a seipso vel ab alio . . . respondet venerabilis dominus Albertus notando aliqua, et ibi in aliquibus punctis sibi contradicere videtur doctor sanctus, sicut notabitur caute advertenti. Notat igitur primo venerabilis dominus Albertus . . . quod genus non est materia, sed est forma generalis, confusa et distincta diffusa in materia, quam formam vocat Albertus inchoationem formarum in materia, qui ponit quod in naturalibus forma ante generationem formaliter preest in materia, in esse tamen confuso, indistincto, formabili et distinguibili. (. . .) Doctor Sanctus videtur sibi contradicere negans inchoationem formarum in materia (. . .) Et de ista inchoatione formarum habetur primo Philicorum. Vide ibi." Note that the pronoun "sibi" is used in a non-reflexive way here, which was common at the time; cf. C. Du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis*, vol. 6, Parisiis 1846, 235b; O. Weijers / M. Gumbert-Hepp, *Lexicon Latinitatis Nederlandicae Medii Aevi*, vol. VII, Leiden 2002, 4602 (S 433): "sibi, = ei: passim".

twice.⁶⁸ Yet compared to the way in which, for instance, Heymericus de Campo opposes Albert to Thomas and refutes Thomas' views, Versor's text reads like a truce. Versor does not side with Albert like Heymericus or Johannes de Nova Domo did, he merely repeats him. He does not side with Thomas either. He mentions the difference of opinion, and that is all.

In his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, however, John Versor unambiguously rejects Albert's notion of inchoate forms.⁶⁹ Although this work bears traces of both Albert's and Thomas' influence (through their commentaries on the *Physics*), Versor decidedly follows Aquinas on the issue of matter's susceptibility to form.⁷⁰ As in his commentary on the *Isagoge*, Versor mentions the controversy between Albert and Thomas explicitly. Here, he also devotes a separate question to its solution.⁷¹ After a lengthy discussion of arguments, including a sketch of the doctrinal spectrum (Anaxagoras, Plato, Peripatetics), Versor concludes with Thomas ("Conclusio responsalis cum doctore sancto") that substantial forms have no formal being in matter before the composite thing is generated. The main argument he advances here to support this conclusion is that substantial forms give substantial being; hence, if a substantial form were essentially present

⁶⁸ Johannes Versor, *Questiones quinque predicabilium Porphyrii* (above, n. 34), q. 26, f. 21vb: "Et cum querebatur an differentie sint in genere sicut in quodam seminario, respondit dominus Albertus quod sic, quia realis inchoatio formarum in materia dicitur esse semen omnium formarum specificarum . . . Sed sanctus Thomas bene convenit cum eo in hoc quod genus est principium differentiarum in genere cause formalis non formantis et determinantis, sed formabilis et distinguibilis. Sed in ponendo talem inchoationem realem disconvenit cum eo. Ideo non ponit quod differentie sint inchoate in genere realiter sed tantum secundum rationem."

⁶⁹ I use the edition printed by Mathias Huss in Lyon: *Physica Versoris*, Lyon 1489 (= Hain *16023), ff. c1va-c4va. This edition includes questions-commentaries on all physical works (*Physica*, *De caelo*, *De generatione*, *Meteora*, *De anima*, *Parva naturalia*). Cf. Birkenmajer 1925 (above, n. 4), 131-5; Hain 1838 (above, n. 1), 486.

⁷⁰ One of the manuscripts (Praha, Knihovna Metropolitní Kapituly, cod. L 37, at f. 252r) of Versor's physical works explicitly notes that they are "Collecte ex Commentariis clarissimorum et illustrium virorum, videlicet doctoris sancti Thome de Alquino et domini Alberti magni Episcopi Ratisponensi"; as quoted (sic) by Flüeler 1994 (above, n. 33), 83.

⁷¹ *Physica Versoris* (above, n. 69), f. c1vb: "secundum sanctum Thomam talis aptitudo (scilicet aptitudo materie ad formam, PR) non est aliquid realiter [reale *ed.*] distinctum a materia sed solum ratione . . . Dicit tamen Albertus quod hec aptitudo seu appetitus est habitualis inchoatio forma superaddita materie et distincta realiter a materia, quia talis inchoatio est eiusdem essentie cum forma . . . De ista controversia in sequentibus latius videbitur." The discussion of the controversy then follows in the second next question; *Ibid.*, f. c2vb: "Queritur decimooctavo utrum forma substantialis ante generationem rei cuius est forma sit in materia secundum esse formale formabile."

in matter before the generation of the composite thing, substantial generation would be impossible and only accidental change would be possible: All generation would be mere alteration. Thus, Versor accuses Albert of falling into the error of Anaxagoras.⁷² This is the same argument that Thomas Aquinas had already advanced against Albert.⁷³

To sum up: Versor is obviously aware of the controversy over the notion of inchoate formality, but, whereas in his commentary on the *Physics* he defends Thomas' position, in his commentary on the *Isagoge* he leaves the matter undecided. In order to know whether this disparity is accidental or structural, we will have to investigate other contentious issues. In the following I will briefly discuss two more problems put forward by Versor himself. The first concerns the distinction between *forma totius* and *forma partis* in substances composed of matter and form (§ 4.2); the second concerns the principle of individuation (§ 4.3).

4.2. *The Theory of forma totius and forma partis*

The theory of *forma partis* and *forma totius* plays an important role in Albert's thought. In his discussion of the ontological status of universals in his commentary on Porphyry, Albert raises the question whether the universal is matter or form. Since it cannot be matter, the next question is: Is it the *forma partis* or the *forma totius*? The *forma partis* is the form which is part of a composite and which informs the other part, namely matter. The *forma totius* is the form of a composite whole, i.e. its essence. In man, the *forma partis* is his soul which informs his body, whereas the *forma totius* is human nature. The *forma partis* cannot be the universal, since it is not predicated of that which it informs: Man is not his soul.⁷⁴ Hence

⁷² *Phisica Versoris* (above, n. 69), f. c4ra: "Conclusio responsalis cum doctore sancto: Forma substantialis ante generationem rei cuius est forma non est in materia secundum esse formale formabile . . . Probatur . . . De ratione forme substantialis est dare esse simpliciter. Si ergo forma substantialis est in materia secundum essentiam, sequitur quod ipsa dat esse simpliciter materie et per consequens quicquid advenit post est accidens. Et ita destrueretur omnis generatio substantialis et omne fieri esset alterari, ut ponebant antiqui Philosophi."

⁷³ Cf. above, n. 53.

⁷⁴ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 2, c. 8, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 37b: "... quaeritur cujusmodi forma sit? Est enim forma totius, ut humanitas est forma hominis: aut forma partis, sicut anima est forma corporis humani. Forma autem partis sive materiae non praedicatur de re cuius est forma, sed universale bene praedicatur. Universale ergo non est forma partis vel materiae secundum quod materia perficitur per formam."

the universal must be the *forma totius*, but this form can be designated in two ways: Either it is designated as the mere form (*forma tantum*) or formal essence (*essentia formalis*) of the composite being; or it is designated as expressing the whole being (*totum esse*) of a composite of which it is the form. In the first case, a man's form is expressed by the word "humanity" (*humanitas*). In the second case, a man's form is expressed by the word "man" or "human" (*homo*). Only when designated in the second way can the form of the whole (*forma totius*) be predicated of the composite whole, for we cannot say "Socrates is humanity" but we can say "Socrates is human".⁷⁵ Therefore, the universal is the form of the whole, designated as expressing the whole being of the particular thing.⁷⁶

One of Johannes Vectors's questions on the *praedicabilia* is whether the universal is matter or form or the composite whole; it mirrors the passage just discussed from Albert's commentary on Porphyry.⁷⁷ Vector takes over both Albert's division of the two kinds of form and his account of the twofold designation of the *forma totius*.⁷⁸ Having concluded that the universal is the form of the whole in as much as it expresses the whole

⁷⁵ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 2, c. 8, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 38a: "Sed forma totius dupliciter designatur in nomine: designatur enim ut forma tantum, sicut humanitas est forma designata ut forma tantum, quae est essentia formalis: et ideo non praedicatur de eo cuius est forma, quia homo non est essentia sua formalis, nec aliquid aliorum quae formas habent. Designatur etiam ut forma totius totum esse dicens cuius est forma: et tunc designatur per esse quod dat ei in quo est et nomen, sicut homo dicit esse formale quod forma totius dat huic composito quod est hic homo."

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*: "Relinquitur ergo, quod universale sit forma totius ut totum esse dicens designata". Cf. G. Wieland, *Untersuchungen zum Seinsbegriff im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Grossen* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, 7), Münster 1972, 27-31.

⁷⁷ Johannes Vector, *Questiones quinque predicabilium Porphyrii* (above, n. 34), q. 15, ff. 13va-14ra; Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 2, c. 8, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 37b-39a.

⁷⁸ Johannes Vector, *Questiones quinque predicabilium Porphyrii* (above, n. 34), q. 15, f. 13va-b: "Sciendum quod duplex est forma, scilicet forma partis que est actus et perfectio partis compositi tantum, scilicet materie, sicut anima in homine est actus materie hominis. Alia est forma totius que scilicet non est actus materie tantum, sed est actus totius compositi ex materia et forma partis. Et hec forma dupliciter designatur: Uno modo per nomen abstractum per quod significatur per modum forme tantum cum prescindione materie, sicut hoc nomen humanitas significat formam totius per modum forme tantum, et ideo non predicatur de eo cuius est forma. Alio modo designatur per nomen concretum per quod significatur ut diceret totum esse eius cuius est forma, et ita significatur forma totius per universale nomen ut est in habente, sicut hoc nomen homo significat formam totius ut est in habente, et ob hoc predicatur de eo cuius est forma."

esse of that of which it is the form, Versor goes on to ask whether the form of the part and the form of the whole are one and the same form *secundum rem*.⁷⁹ Versor responds to this question by distinguishing the opinions of Thomas and Albert. They agree as far as the separate substances are concerned, in which there is no real composition according to both Dominican doctors, but they disagree with respect to composite substances. Thomas says that in composite substances there is also a real distinction, because the *forma totius* comprises the essence of both matter and *forma partis*, and hence the *forma partis* is a part of the *forma totius*. According to Albert, however, the *forma totius* of a composite substance does not include matter, but merely form.⁸⁰

Versor notes that the Albertists (*albertiste*) explain this position in different ways.⁸¹ Some Albertists, says Versor, interpret Albert's words in terms of a rational distinction, whereas others take him to mean a real distinction.⁸² He does not mention any Albertists by name, but it seems reasonable to assume that if he knew anything about Albertism, he would have been acquainted with some works of the Parisian Albertist Johannes de Nova Domo (Versor himself being active in Paris). Johannes de Nova Domo also elaborates on the relation between the two forms in order to solve

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 13vb: "Conclusio secunda: Universale est forma totius ut totum esse rei dicens illius cuius est forma . . . Dubitatur primo: Utrum forma partis et forma totius sint una forma et eadem secundum rem."

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*: "Ad hoc respondet sanctus Thomas quod in rebus compositis ex forma et materia distinguuntur secundum rem, quia secundum ipsum forma totius complectitur essentiam forme partis et etiam materie. Et sic forma totius se habet ad formam partis sicut totum ad partem. Sed in rebus separatis a materia forma partis et forma totius non distinguuntur secundum rem, quia una nihil continet preter aliam. Et in hac parte bene convenit Albertus cum doctore sancto. Sed in rebus compositis ex materia et forma dicit Albertus quod forma totius ut humanitas in homine non includit materiam sed est forma tantum." Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 2, ed. Leonina, vol. XLIII, Roma 1976, 373.281-91: "nomen autem significans id unde sumitur natura speciei, cum precisione materie designate, significat partem formalem. Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius; non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet forme et materie, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus integralibus eius: sed magis est forma que est totum, scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum precisionem eorum per que nata est materia designari." For Albert's view, cf. Wieland 1972 (above, n. 76), 29-31.

⁸¹ Johannes Versor, *Questiones quinque predicabilium Porphyrii* (above, n. 34), q. 15, f. 13vb: "Et illud diversimode exponunt albertiste."

⁸² *Ibid.*, ff. 13vb-14ra: "Quidam enim dicunt Albertum intellexisse quod a forma totius non distinguuntur <forme partis> re sed ratione tantum . . . Sed alii dicunt Albertum intellexisse scilicet quod ex unione forme partis cum materia resultat una forma distincta realiter a forma partis et a materia et a toto composito et materia et forma."

the problem whether the distinction is real or rational.⁸³ His account of the relation places him in the second group of Albertists mentioned by Versor. According to Johannes de Nova Domo, in substances composed of matter and form there is a real distinction between *forma partis* and *forma totius*.⁸⁴ The *Copulata pulcherrima* compiled by the Thomists from the *Bursa Montana* at Cologne also note that the opinions concerning the distinction of *forma partis* and *forma totius* diverge. This text argues against those who deny that in composite substances the distinction is real, and thus it represents a position corresponding to Versor's account of Thomas' position (namely, that the distinction is real).⁸⁵ On this point, then, Thomas Aquinas, Johannes de Nova Domo and the Thomists seem to agree. Both Versor and the Thomists in Cologne mention the opinion of others (some of the Albertists, according to Versor) that the distinction is rational. Now this position can be found in the works of Heymericus de Campo—not in the *Tractatus problematicus*, but in the *Compendium divinarum*. Here, Heymericus explicitly denies that the distinction is real.⁸⁶ Thus, although it is obvious that the problem of the distinction between *forma totius* and *forma partis* plays a role in the school debates, at this point it seems too complicated to contribute to our understanding of Versor's place in those debates. From a doctrinal point of view, it remains unclear which position would count as distinctly Thomistic doctrine and which as distinctly Albertist doctrine. However, the way in which Versor treats the problem does reveal something else: Although Versor mentions the Albertists, he does not count himself among them. Moreover, as in the case of his discussion of *inchoatio formae* in his commentary on the *Isagoge*, he does not

⁸³ Johannes de Nova Domo, *Tractatus de esse et essentia*, q. 4, prop. 2, ed. G. Meersseman, in: Meersseman 1933 (above, n. 6), 149-68.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 149-50: "Quamvis in substantia composita secundum rem sit reperire formam partis distinctam realiter contra formam totius, tamen esse formae totius resultat et emanat ab esse formae partis. Esse formae totius voco quod per diffinitum dicitur implicate et per diffinitionem explicite, quod quidam vocant quiditatem rei, alii essentiam rei, alii naturam formalem. Esse vero formae partis est esse entelechia corporis. Actus autem sive entelechia corporis distinguitur a toto esse rei."

⁸⁵ *Copulata pulcherrima* (above, n. 28), f. 11rb. The famous Lambertus de Monte is sometimes regarded as the most important contributor to works such as these *Copulata*, which are collective efforts of the masters of the *Bursa Montana*; cf. Kneepkens 2003 (above, n. 9), 117. Lambertus de Monte was head of the *Montana* for nineteen years (1480-1499); cf. Tewes 1993 (above, n. 8), 34.

⁸⁶ Heymericus de Campo, *Compendium divinarum* IV, ed. J.B. Korolec, in: J.B. Korolec, "Compendium divinarum" *Heimeryka de Campo w rkp. B7 695. Dokończenie*, in: *Studia mediewistyczne*, 9 (1968), 3-90, see 55.860-56.925, esp. 56.911-9.

even take position in the debate. Here, Versor merely lists what Thomas, Albert and the different Albertists say. But again there is another work in which he discusses the same topic and argues in favour of Thomas. In his commentary on *De ente et essentia*, Versor poses the same question about *forma partis* and *forma totius* again.⁸⁷ Here, he is not commenting upon an Aristotelian or Porphyrian text, but on a work of Thomas Aquinas. The difference with the parallel passage from his commentary on the *Isagoge* is revealing. Again, Versor writes that Thomas Aquinas argues that in composite substances there is a real distinction between *forma partis* and *forma totius*. One reason is that the form of the part can remain when the form of the whole is corrupted; e.g., when Socrates dies, his soul survives. Yet now Versor adheres to this view and declares that, although Albert and others hold the opposite, their opinion “can easily be proven wrong.”⁸⁸

4.3. *The Principle of Individuation*

The last topic I want to address briefly is advanced by Johannes Versor himself as a much disputed problem: the principle of individuation in corporeal substances.⁸⁹ In Versor’s commentary on *De ente et essentia* it is the third question he proposes; his discussion reflects the controversial status of the issue.⁹⁰ Having said that there were many opinions about

⁸⁷ Johannes Versor, *Questiones super De ente et essentia* (above, n. 1), q. 6, ff. t1vb-t2ra: “Dubitatur primo utrum in substantiis compositis forma totius et forma partis ab invicem realiter distinguuntur.”

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, f. t2ra: “In oppositum est doctor sanctus et Avicenna. Et arguitur ratione sic, quia in eodem potest corrumpi forma totius remanente forma partis, ut corrupto Sorte corrumpitur humanitas eius et non sua anima. Igitur forma partis et forma totius realiter distinguuntur. Tunc respondetur ad dubium quod in substantiis materialibus forma partis et forma totius sunt realiter distincte . . . Unde licet Albertus et quidam alii teneant oppositum, hoc tamen potest ex supradictis faciliter improbari.”

⁸⁹ Backgrounds and analyses in: J.A. Aerts and A. Speer (eds), *Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 24), Berlin-New York 1996. Cf. in this volume esp. A. Speer, “*Yliathin quod est principium individuandi*”. *Zur Diskussion um das Individuationsprinzip bei Johannes de Nova Domo, Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin*, 266-86, M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “*Aliiter autem dicunt Thomistae*”. *Das Prinzip der Individuation in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen den Albertisten, Thomisten und Scotisten des ausgehenden Mittelalters*, 338-52; for Albert, cf. in the same volume also H. Anzulewicz, *Grundlagen von Individuum und Individualität in der Anthropologie des Albertus Magnus*, 124-60, esp. 132-6. For the Thomistic view cf. also M.J.F.M. Hoenen, *The Thomistic Principle of Individuation in 15th-Century Thomistic and Albertist Sources*, in: *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale*, XVIII (1992), 327-57.

⁹⁰ Johannes Versor, *Questiones super De ente et essentia* (above, n. 1), q. 3, ff. s5ra: “Utrum materia sit principium individuationis.”

the principle of individuation, Versor decides to consider only three of them: The first, which is ascribed to Giles of Rome, is that the principle of individuation is quantity; the second, which is ascribed to Albert the Great, is that it is matter; the third, which is defended by Thomas Aquinas in *De ente et essentia*, is that it is signate matter.⁹¹

Heymericus de Campo offers a similar account of this issue in the *Tractatus problematicus*. He does not consider Giles' view, but he represents Albert and Thomas in the same way.⁹² The same holds for the professors who lead the *Bursa Laurentiana* after Heymericus, such as Arnold of Tongeren and Gerald of Harderwijk. They defend the "sententia venerabilis domini Alberti" (Arnold) that the principle of individuation is matter against the Thomistic thesis that it is matter signated by quantity—a position which is indeed defended by the Thomistic *Copulata pulcherrima*.⁹³ Again, the same issue and the same Albertist and Thomist positions occur in the *Promptuarium argumentorum* (Cologne 1492), which discusses Albertist and Thomist solutions to a number of logical questions.⁹⁴ In short, it is apparent from many

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, f. s5va: "Sciendum est secundo quod de principio individuationis multe fuerunt opiniones, sed solum ad presens de tribus videndum est. Prima opinio est Egidii de Rhoma dicentis quod quantitas de se est principium individuationis. Secunda est Alberti dicentis quod materia est de se hec et incommunicabilis et de se sufficiens reddere formam quam suscipit incommunicabilem; et sic est totale et sufficiens principium individuationis secundum ipsum. (. . .) Tertia vero fuit opinio sancti Thome dicentis quod materia signata quantitate est principium individuationis et non materia quocumque modo accepta." Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 2, ed. Leonina, vol. XLIII, Roma 1976, 371.73-7: "Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata; et dico materiam signatam que sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur."

⁹² Heymericus de Campo, *Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam* (above, n. 13), probl. 3, ff. b4v-b6v. For Johannes de Nova Domo, cf. Speer 1996 (above, n. 89).

⁹³ Heymericus de Campo, *Ibid.* Gerardus de Harderwyck, *Commentaria in Isagogas Porphyrii* (part of his complete commentary on the old logic), Cologne 1494, ff. EE1ra-EE2vb; cf. Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1), 195 (no. 439). Arnoldus de Tungeris, *Epitomata sive reparationes logice veteris et nove Aristotelis* (above, n. 16), ff. d2v-d3r: "Queritur quid est principium individuationis. Solutio quod de hoc sunt apud diversos valde diverse et varie opiniones, quibus omnibus dimissis verior videtur sententia venerabilis domini Alberti dicentis quod materia se sola est principium individuationis." *Copulata pulcherrima* (above, n. 28), ff. 20vb-21va, at f. 20vb: "relictis omnibus istis opinionibus dicendum quod in materialibus materia signata sit principium adequatum individuationis." Arnold of Tongeren also discusses and rejects the Scotist theory of *haecceitas* (Arnoldus de Tungeris, *Ibid.*, f. d3r), and the Thomists of the *Montana* even discuss (besides Albert and of course Thomas) the views of Scotus, Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome (*Copulata pulcherrima* (above, n. 28), ff. 20vb-21va).

⁹⁴ The *Promptuarium argumentorum* was (anonymously) printed by H. Quentell in Cologne in 1492; it has been falsely ascribed to Heymericus and was reprinted as Heymericus de Campo, *Promptuarium*, Frankfurt/Main 1992. Cf. Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1), 431 (no. 980). See *Promptuarium*, ff. i1r-i3v and Hoenen 1992 (above, n. 89), 351-3. For the question

sources that the problem of individuation was a highly controversial issue at the time and, in particular, that Albertists and Thomists held different opinions about it.

In his commentary on *De ente et essentia*, Johannes Versor, determining his solution to the question proposed, takes over Thomas' standpoint and states that matter "signated" by quantity is the sufficient principle of individuation.⁹⁵ He reaffirms this in the second conclusion, stating that the only difference between the essence of a species and the essence of an individual lies in the fact that in the first case matter is not signate, whereas in the second case it is. Again, these are almost literally Thomas' words.⁹⁶ Thereafter, Versor discusses the doctrines of Giles of Rome and Albert the Great. His rejection of both opinions is unequivocal.⁹⁷ As in the case of the distinction between *forma partis* and *forma totius*, Versor's commentary on Thomas' text amounts to a clear-cut defence of the *doctor sanctus*. There is no sign at all of sympathy towards Albert's point of view.⁹⁸ Compared to his writings on the *logica vetus*, the commentary on

of authorship and an analysis of the contents, see M.J.F.M. Hoenen, *Late Medieval Schools of Thought in the Mirror of University Textbooks. The Promptuarium argumentorum (Cologne 1492)*, in: Hoenen, Schneider and Wieland 1995 (above, n. 6), 329-69.

⁹⁵ Johannes Versor, *Questiones super De ente et essentia* (above, n. 1), q. 3, f. s5va: "Conclusio prima: Materia quantitate signata est sufficiens principium individuationis."

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*: "Conclusio secunda: Essentia speciei et individui, ut Sortis et hominis, non differunt nisi penes signatum et insignatum." Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 2, ed. Leonina, vol. XLIII, Roma 1976, 371.77-87: "Hec autem materia in diffinitione que est hominis in quantum est homo non ponitur, sed poneretur in diffinitione Sortis si Sortes diffinitionem haberet. In diffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata: non enim in diffinitione hominis ponitur hoc os et hec caro, sed os et caro absolute, que sunt materia hominis non signata. Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia Sortis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum."

⁹⁷ Johannes Versor, *Questiones super De ente et essentia* (above, n. 1), q. 3, f. s5va-b: "Dubitatur primo utrum quantitas de se sit principium individuationis sufficiens, ut dicit Egidius de Rhoma . . . Respondetur ad dubium quod quantitas de se non est sufficiens principium individuationis . . . Dubitatur secundo utrum materia sit de se totale et sufficiens principium individuationis, ut dicit Albertus . . . Respondetur ad dubium quod materia secundum se accepta non est totale nec sufficiens principium individuationis."

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. s5vb-s6ra: "Dubitatur secundo utrum materia sit de se totale et sufficiens principium individuationis, ut dicit Albertus. Et videtur quod sic, quia seclusis [seclusus ed.] omnibus accidentibus a Sorte et Platone adhuc remanent duo individua et habent formas et materias realiter distinctas. Respondetur ad dubium quod materia secundum se accepta non est totale nec sufficiens principium individuationis. Patet quia materia secundum se accepta est communis et indifferens ad multas species vel ad multa individua. Igitur non est principium determinationis ad hic et nunc vel ad particulare. Et sic materia secundum se accepta non potest dici sufficiens principium individuationis. Ad rationem dubii dicitur quod seclusis omnibus accidentibus a Sorte et Platone adhuc remanent individu[i]a, quia in quolibet esset materia signata, nam materia retineret suam

De ente et essentia is of an entirely different character. Whereas in the first Vector remains neutral on the issues of *inchoatio formae* and *forma totius*, in the second he sides with Aquinas, not just on these issues but also on the principle of individuation. Therefore it seems that his neutrality towards Albert in his commentaries on Porphyry and the *Categories* is a matter of choice rather than a slip of the pen. How could this apparently deliberate strategy be accounted for?

5. Vector's Use of Albert's and Thomas' Commentaries on the Old Logic

The reason why Vector often seems to agree with Albert in his commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories* is that large parts of these commentaries are based on those of Albert. We have seen several examples of this in the previous sections (see also Appendix 1). The reason why he used Albert's commentaries is obvious: Thomas did not write commentaries on these works. Hence, even if Vector preferred to draw on Thomas' writings, in the case of the *Isagoge* and the *Categories* he had no choice but to rely on Albert. For a fifteenth-century scholastic author such as Vector, Thomas and Albert were the most prominent authorities from within the scholastic tradition. He may have preferred Thomas, but still Albert would have been the natural second choice. Below, we will see that Vector indeed preferred Thomas, for in the case of *Peri hermeneias* he did have a choice, and he chose to use Thomas' commentary. First, some more samples will illustrate precisely how Vector used Albert's commentaries.

The second question Vector poses in his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* is: Whether logic should be called a part of philosophy.⁹⁹ Albert the Great discusses the same question in the second chapter of the first treatise of his *Liber de praedicabilibus*.¹⁰⁰ A comparison of the two texts clearly indicates that Vector's text is an adaptation (in some instances no more than an excerpt) from Albert's chapter, although Vector does not refer to Albert at all.¹⁰¹ Vector rephrases Albert's arguments according to

signationem quam prius habuit sub quantitate, ratione cuius esset determinata ad esse particulare."

⁹⁹ Johannes Vector, *Quaestiones super totam veterem artem* (above, n. 34), q. 2, ff. 2vb-3ra.

¹⁰⁰ Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisii 1890, 2b-4a.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Flüeler 2001 (above, n. 33), esp. 183, for an account of this common medieval practice.

the rigid scheme of his own text, which is composed and formulated in a way that guarantees maximum structural clarity: Questions start with *queritur*, arguments are counted (*primo*, *secundo*, etc.) and series of arguments and counter-arguments are introduced by phrases like *arguitur quod non*, *in oppositum arguitur*, etc. In addition, conclusions are marked as *conclusio prima*, etc.; important distinctions and other points of interest are marked by *sciendum primo*, etc.; additional counter-arguments are introduced by *dubitatur* and their rejections by *respondetur*. Versor's argumentation follows along the lines set out by Albert. Their answer to the question raised is that logic is a part of philosophy, if philosophy is taken in a general sense.¹⁰² In the first argument *quod non* (to prove that logic is not a part of philosophy) Versor rephrases Albert's words in the manner described and also adds a reference to Aristotle:

Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. A. Borgnet, 2b-3a:

"Hanc autem scientiam qui modus est omnis philosophiae, quidam nullam partem esse philosophiae contendunt, dicentes *non nisi tres esse partes philosophiae, scilicet physicam, mathematicam sive disciplinabilem, et metaphysicam sive divinam.*"

Johannes Versor, *Questiones quinque predicabilium Porphyrii*, q. 2, f. 2vb:

"Arguitur quod non primo autoritate Philosophi sexto Metaphisice ponentis *tantum tres partes philosophie, scilicet physicam, mathematicam et metaphysicam*, ergo et cetera."

The second argument *quod non* also corresponds to Albert's argument (see Appendix 2). The third argument wordly reflects Albert's text again, the only changes being some stylistic and linguistic simplifications. In Albert's text, the argument begins by: "Addunt etiam ad suae assertionis confirmationem, quod . . ."; Versor replaces this phrase by the words "Tertio arguitur." Likewise, Albert's final phrase "nec videtur . . . contineri" is abridged by Versor:

Albertus Magnus, *Ibid.*, 3a:

"Addunt etiam ad suae assertionis confirmationem, quod *nullius rei modus, cum re cuius modus est, venit in generis sui divisionem.* Constat autem, quod *logica generaliter dicta modus philosophiae est.* Non ergo venire videtur ad philosophiae divisionem, nec videtur in aliqua parte hujus generis quod est philosophia contineri."

Johannes Versor, *Ibid.*, f. 3ra:

"Tertio arguitur: *Nullius rei modus cum re cuius est modus venit in sui generis divisionem.* Sed *logica est modus philosophie*, ergo non venit in divisionem philosophie tanquam pars eius."

¹⁰² Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 4a-b; Johannes Versor, *Questiones quinque predicabilium Porphyrii* (above, n. 34), q. 2, f. 3rb.

The arguments *quod sic* are again roughly the same in both texts, although Vectors's version of the first is considerably shorter than Albert's: Where Albert offers a lengthy exposition of the diverse ways in which beings can be related to human understanding, Vector omits this part and simply concludes that since logic concerns secondary intentions, which are beings, it is a part of philosophy. Vector's second and third arguments are again copied almost wordly from Albert's text (see Appendix 2).

In his commentary on *Peri hermeneias* (published in the same volume as the commentaries on Porphyry and the *Categories*¹⁰³) Vector follows a similar procedure. Only this time, his text does not derive from Albert's commentary, but from that of Thomas Aquinas.¹⁰⁴ The close relation between parts of Vector's text and that of Aquinas becomes apparent from a passage concerning Aristotle's remark that truth and falsity pertain to the intellect in so far as it composes and divides.¹⁰⁵ Vector lists several points to notice (*sciendum . . .*) that are all taken from Thomas. His own contribution consists mainly of changing the order of the words: Whereas Thomas first names both operations ("indivisibilium intelligentia" and "secundum quod huiusmodi simplicia concepta simul componit et diuidit") and then states that truth and falsity are not in the first but in the second operation ("in hac secunda operatione . . . inuenitur ueritas et falsitas . . . in prima operatione non inuenitur"), Vector places the denial of truth and falsity in the first operation right after the description of this operation ("Una est simplicium intelligentia . . . et in hac operatione . . . non est veritas vel falsitas . . . Alia est . . . compositio et divisio . . . et in hac operatione . . . est veritas vel falsitas). In addition, Vector simplifies Thomas' text by omitting the word "indivisibilia" and instead using "simplicia" twice, whereas Thomas uses both words to denote simple concepts:

¹⁰³ Johannes Vector, *Quaestiones super totam veterem artem* (above, n. 34).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. also Kneepkens 2003 (above, n. 9), 116-7.

¹⁰⁵ The complete text of this passage is given below in Appendix 3. Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Periermenias*, lib. 1, lect. 3, ed. Leonina, Editio altera retractata, vol. I*1, Roma-Paris 1989, 14.39-16.138; Johannes Vector, *Questiones primi libri Periermeniarum Aristotelis* (above, n. 34), q. 3, ff. 61va-b. For other examples, compare Thomas de Aquino, *Ibid.*, 6.80-8.168, *Ibid.*, lect. 2, 9.20-11.133 and 12.184-208, *Ibid.*, lect. 4, 21.85-107 and 23.207-24.279 to Johannes Vector, *Ibid.*, ff. 59va-b, 60rb-60va, 60vb, 62va, and 62vb-63ra, respectively.

Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Peryermenias*, lib. 1, lectio 3, ed. Leonina, vol. I*1, 14.39-16.138.

Johannes Versor, *Questiones primi libri Perihermeniarum Aristotelis*, q. 3, ff. 61va-b.

Vbi oportet intelligere quod una duarum operationum intellectus est indivisibilium intelligentia, in quantum scilicet intellectus intelligit absolute cuiuscunque rei quidditatem siue essenciam per se ipsam, puta quid est homo uel quid album uel aliud huiusmodi; alia uero operatio intellectus est secundum quod huiusmodi simplicia concepta simul componit et diuidit. Dicit ergo quod in hac secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et diuidentis, inuenitur ueritas et falsitas, relinquens quod in prima operatione non inuenitur . . .

Sciendum secundo quod, ut prius dicebatur, duplex est operatio intellectus. Una est simplicium intelligentia, quando scilicet intellectus absolute intelligit cuiuscunque rei quidditatem siue essentiam per seipsam, utputa quid est homo uel quid est album; et in hac operatione, ut habet textus, non est ueritas uel falsitas. Alia est operatio intellectus que est compositio et diuisio, que fit cum intellectus simplicia simul componit et diuidit; et in hac operatione intellectus sic diuidentis et componentis est ueritas uel falsitas.

In Versor's next three items, fragments of Thomas' commentary keep appearing (see Appendix 3). From these textual comparisons, it becomes clear that John Versor does not limit his resources to the works of a single authoritative thinker. He draws inspiration from both Albert and Thomas. In particular, his use of Albert's commentaries on the *Isagoge* and the *Categories* explains why he would seem to agree with Albert in his own commentaries on these writings: His discussion of Porphyry's or Aristotle's text is often not much more than a copy of Albert's exposition. This has been demonstrated for the passage about the category of substance from Versor's commentary on the *Categories* (§ 3; cf. Appendix 1) and for two passages from his commentary on Porphyry: one about incipient formality (§ 4.1), and one about logic as a part of philosophy (this section). However, the consensus is only apparent. In the same sections (and in § 4.2) I have shown that Versor does not take sides with either Albert or Thomas in these logical works, whereas in some of his other works (his commentaries on the *Physics* and on *De ente et essentia*) he commits himself to the doctrine of Aquinas—even if these works are based (as is the case with the commentary on the *Physics*, cf. § 4.1) on the commentaries of both Thomas and Albert.

6. Versor's "Thomism" reconsidered

The reason why Versor relies on Albert for his own commentaries on the *Isagoge* and the *Categories* is that he had no choice, because Thomas did not write commentaries on those works. This also explains Versor's neutrality towards Albert. It would have been no sinecure for Versor to base his own commentary on Albert's, while at the same time criticising

Albert for every disagreement with Thomas. However that may be, it should be clear by now that neither on account of his use of Albert's works, nor by reason of the philosophical views defended in his own works Versor can be regarded as an Albertist.¹⁰⁶ On the whole, Versor's doctrinal profile seems indistinct and at best a blurred form of Thomism.¹⁰⁷ This "albertizing Thomism" may have been typical of a realist tradition in an environment (probably Paris) where "Albertists" and "Thomists" were not so much rival parties as allies facing a common enemy (e.g., nominalism or Scotism).¹⁰⁸ However, several of Versor's works were printed at Cologne by order of the Thomists, who evidently also used them. This was one of the reasons put forward for accepting the view that Versor should be considered a Thomist (cf. § 2). Let us have a closer look at those Cologne editions of Versor's philosophical works.

At the end of the fifteenth century, Cologne was at the same time the centre of Thomist-Albertist rivalry and of the promotion and expansion of Versor's legacy. Both phenomena are closely related to the educational program of the arts faculty in Cologne, and they are both reflected in the book production in Cologne during the last two decades of the fifteenth century. The works of Aristotle and the *Tractatus* or *Summulae logicales* by Peter of Spain occupied a central place in the educational program of the arts faculties at late medieval universities.¹⁰⁹ In his *Der Buchdruck Kölns bis zum Ende des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts*, E. Voullième compiled a list of books printed at Cologne before 1500, which includes over 1200 titles. Among these are 88 titles concerning different kinds of works (*quaestiones*,

¹⁰⁶ Remember that Versor, when discussing incipient formality in his commentary on Porphyry, refers to the first book of the *Physics*, in which he rejects Albert's theory; cf. the quotation in note 67 above. That it is not suspicious for a Thomist to quote Albert (even quite frequently) is shown, with respect to John Capreolus, by S.-Th. Bonino, *Albert le Grand dans les Défenses de Jean Cabrol († 1444). Contribution à la recherche sur les origines de l'albertisme tardif*, in: *Revue thomiste: Revue doctrinale de théologie et de philosophie*, 99-1 (1999), 369-425.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. the remarks by Ritter and Zwierzawski quoted in n. 22 above.

¹⁰⁸ For the "albertizing Thomism" cf. note 9 above. Interesting in this respect is the explicit of a manuscript of Versor's commentary on the *Metaphysics* which remarks that it follows the *modus parisiensis*. Cf. the manuscript Praha, Národní knihovna České Republiky, cod. IV.E.25, f. 96v, as quoted by Flüeler 1994 (above, n. 33), 82: "Expliciti questiones XII librorum Metaphysicae secundum modum parisiensem...". Cf. also the quotation from another manuscript in note 70 above, to the effect that Versor's physical works are collected from the commentaries of both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.

¹⁰⁹ For Cologne, see F.J. von Bianco, *Die alte Universität Köln und die spätere Gelehrten-Schulen dieser Stadt*, I. Theil, Köln 1855, 71 (statutes of the Arts Faculty from 1398).

copulata, *reparationes*, etc.) related to writings of Aristotle and Peter of Spain (*Tractatus* or *Summulae logicales* and *Parva logicalia*).¹¹⁰ In a general sense I will refer to these works as “commentaries”. All of these are works by fifteenth-century authors; not one of Albert’s or Thomas’ commentaries on the *corpus aristotelicum* were printed. The titles and colophons quoted by Voulliéme give a clear indication of the situation at Cologne: 31 of the 88 commentaries include a reference to the Thomistic doctrine of the *Bursa Montana*; 20 include a reference to the Albertist doctrine of the *Bursa Laurentiana*; three include a reference to Scotism; one volume of *copulata* (on Peter of Spain’s *Summulae*) has no reference to any *via*.¹¹¹ Clearly the only school doctrines relevant in Cologne at the time were Thomism and Albertism. The rest of the 88 titles are works by John Versor: in total 33 titles of commentaries on works of Aristotle (28) and Peter of Spain (5).¹¹² Thus, John Versor is the author of more than one third of all commentaries on the basic philosophical works printed at Cologne before 1500, which makes him by far the most printed author in this domain.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1). Voulliéme’s study is precious because of its extensive quotations from title pages and colophons. A small number of dubious cases (such as untraceable works listed by other repertories) is listed without such quotations; these I have not included in my statistics. It should be noted that some of the titles listed separately by Voulliéme (and regarded by him as separately published volumes) were actually published together (as parts of one and the same volume); cf. Birkenmajer 1925 (above, n. 4).

¹¹¹ Some examples of titles are: *Copulata pulcherrima diversis ex autoribus logice in unum corrogata in veterem artem Aristotelis cum textu eiusdem secundum viam divi doctoris Thome de Aquino et iuxta processum magistrorum Coloniae in bursa Montis regentium* (no. 133); *Metheororum Aristotelis secundum processum albertistarum burse laurentii studii Coloniensis* (no. 149); *Commentaria librorum de celo et mundo Aristotelis iuxta viam venerabilis domini Alberti et processum magistrorum regentium Coloniae in bursa Laurentii* (no. 408); *Copulata super tres libros de Anima Aristotelis cum textu iuxta doctrinam excellentissimi doctoris sancti Thome de Aquino* (no. 723); *Copulata omnium tractatum Petri Hispani etiam sincathegrematum et parvorum logicalium cum textu secundum doctrinam divi Thome Aquinatis iuxta processum magistrorum Coloniae in bursa Montis regentium* (no. 928); *Positiones circa libros phisicorum et de anima Aristotelis iuxta ordinarium et disputativum processum magistrorum Coloniae in bursa montis regentium ad opponendum et respondendum non minus utiles quam necessarie* (no. 977); all quoted after Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1). I have not included works that are related to the *bursae* but not (explicitly) to Aristotle or Peter of Spain, such as the *Promptuarium argumentorum* (above, n. 94) or commentaries on Donatus.

¹¹² For example: *Questiones venerabilis domini Joannis Versoris super totam veterem artem* (no. 1213); *Dicta versoris super septem tractatus Magistri Petri hyspani cum textu* (no. 1240); cf. Voulliéme 1930 (above, n. 1).

Table 1: *Commentaries on Aristotle and Peter of Spain printed in Cologne before 1500.*

School designation or author	Voullième nos.		Total number of titles
	Commentaries on Aristotle	Commentaries on Peter of Spain	
Thomistic/ <i>Bursa Montana</i> ¹¹³	132-134, 136-140, 150, 720-731, 977	921, 922, 927-932, 1135	31
Albertist/ <i>Bursa Laurentiana</i> ¹¹⁴	141, 142, 149, 159, 160, 164, 165, 408, 438-443(a), 610, 1016 ¹¹⁵	167, 443(b), 444-446	20
Johannes Vectors	144, 145, 147, 148, 1211-1218, 1220- 1222, 1224-1236	1239-1243	33
“ad mentem Johannis Scoti”	352-354		3
no designation		925	1

Source: Voullième 1903 (cf. above, n. 1).

Of those 33 works by Vectors, 25 contain no references to the Cologne *bursae* at all. Five are works that were (according to their explicits) revised by masters of the *Bursa Corneliiana*. Of the three remaining works, two are presented as being *secundum processum burse montis* and one as *in via sancti Thome*. Whereas 51 works by other authors contain references to the rival parties (Thomists and Albertists) of the University at Cologne, only these three (out of 33) works by Vectors suggest that he may have been regarded as a Thomist at Cologne. Two of the 25 titles without reference to the colleges in Cologne are intriguing because of their explicits, which mention a *processus et mens Versoris: Et sic terminantur questiones versoris super duos*

¹¹³ The most important author among the Thomists is Lambertus de Monte (nos. 720-731).

¹¹⁴ The most important author among the Albertists is Gerardus de Harderwyck (nos. 438-446). No. 442, although ascribed by Voullième to Gerardus, is actually by Johannes de Nuringen; cf. Birkenmajer 1925 (above, n. 4), 135, n. 1.

¹¹⁵ No. 1016 is the crypto-Albertist work *Reparationes librorum totius naturalis philosophiae secundum processum Albertistarum et Thomistarum* (above, n. 63), which summarizes Aristotle's physical works in accordance with Albert, although the title might suggest a neutral approach; cf. Hoenen 1993 (above, n. 43).

libros de generatione et corruptione Arestotelis secundum processum et mentem eiusdem versoris diligentissime correcte (no. 1231); *Et sic terminantur questiones magistri Joannis versoris super duos libros de generatione et corruptione Arestotelis secundum verum processum et mentem eiusdem versoris diligentissime correcte* (no. 1232). These titles suggest a different solution to our problem. Could it be that Versor was regarded as an authority *sui generis*?

Table 2: *Versor’s commentaries on Aristotle and Peter of Spain printed in Cologne before 1500.*

School designation	Voullième nos.	Total number of titles
no designation	144, 145, 147, 148, 1211-1213, 1215, 1217, 1218, 1221, 1222, 1226-1228, 1233, 1235, 1236, 1239-1243	23
revised by masters of the <i>Bursa Cornelianiana</i>	1214, 1216, 1220, 1224, 1225	5
“secundum processum burse montis”	1230, 1234	2
“in via sancti Thome”	1229	1
“secundum (verum) processum et mentem eiusdem versoris diligentissime correcte”	1231, 1232	2

Source: Voullième 1903 (cf. above, n. 1).

The two editions of Versor’s questions on *De generatione et corruptione* (Voull. 1231 and 1232) that are presented as being *secundum processum et mentem eiusdem Versoris* were printed by Henricus Quentell in 1489 and 1493 respectively. These questions were also printed twice before, namely by Theodoricus Molner in 1485/6 and by Conradus Welker in 1488 (Voull. 1230 and 1234). In all four cases, the questions on *De generatione* were part of a larger volume which also included Versor’s questions on *De caelo et mundo*, the *Meteora* and the *Parva naturalia*.¹¹⁶ In addition, the first (Molner 1485/6), third (Quentell 1489) and fourth (Quentell 1493) volumes all included works by the Thomist Gerardus de Monte: both his commentary on *De ente et essentia* (with Thomas’ text) and his *Tractatus ostendens concordantiam*

¹¹⁶ Birkenmajer 1925 (above, n. 4).

dictorum Sancti Thomae et Domini Alberti.¹¹⁷ These volumes were therefore probably commissioned by the *Bursa Montana*, of which Gerardus de Monte (critic of Heymericus de Campo) had been one of the most illustrious leaders.¹¹⁸ That explains why the first two editions (Voull. 1230 and 1234) of Versor's commentary on *De generatione* are (according to their explicits) *secundum processum burse montis*. This means that the Thomists of the *Montana* initially used Versor's commentary as if it were a genuine Thomistic text. They may even have adapted it to make it harmonize with their own doctrines. However, the reprints (Voull. 1231 and 1232) indicate that the text has been "carefully corrected according to the true procedure and intention of Versor", which makes sense if it means that the text has been restored to its original form. So it would seem that the Thomists of the *Montana* first regarded Versor as a Thomist, but eventually had to recognize that he was not "one of their own". The contraposition of the *processus burse montis* and the *verus processus Versoris* clearly shows that Versor does not fit in the Thomist-Albertist rivalry.

The editions that were in all probability commissioned by the *Bursa Cornelianiana* (the other Thomistic college at Cologne) confirm that Versor's writings were used for instruction, and also that they were revised for that purpose: Some of them are only *accuratissime correcte . . . in bursa magistri Cornelii de Dordraci ad communem scholarium utilitatem* (Voull. 1225; 1220 and 1224 similar), but others are *a magistris burse Cornelianae quibus ipsas incumbit exercere summo studio atque diligentia denuo revise, correcte ac emendate* (Voull. 1214 and 1216). From the fact that they used Versor's texts for instruction, it is evident that the Thomists in Cologne recognized Versor's affinity with Thomas Aquinas. One edition of his commentary on *De caelo* (included in the volume printed by Quentell in 1493; Voull. 1229) bears the title *Questiones subtilissime in via sancti Thome magistri Johannis versoris super libros de celo et mundo*, which is an explicit confirmation of that recognition. But it is also the only explicit statement of Versor's connection to the "way of Thomas Aquinas" in the titles and colophons of all the Cologne editions. Moreover, four of the five works corrected by the *Cornelianiana* masters and printed by Quentell bear a woodcut on their title pages, which is the same in all four of them: The woodcut depicts a teacher surrounded by four pupils. Written below it are the words: "Versor cum discipulis suis."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Cf. inter al. Meersseman 1935 (above, n. 6), *passim*.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1), 520-4 (nos. 1214, 1216, 1220, 1225).

Similar woodcuts depicting Thomas or Albert in the same way can be found in many works of the other colleges (*Montana* and *Laurentiana*).¹²⁰ This is another clear indication that Versor was not deemed a Thomist, in which case a woodcut representing Thomas and his pupils would have been more appropriate. Instead, these woodcuts in Versor's works (edited by those Thomists at Cologne who supposedly had the closest connection to Versor)¹²¹ promote his authority as an independent teacher, on a level with Albert and Thomas.

7. Conclusion

All of Versor's commentaries on Aristotle and Peter of Spain were printed in Cologne, most of them several times. The Thomists in Cologne, especially at the *Bursa Cornelianiana*, used them for instruction. Yet in most of the titles and imprints there is no link between Versor and these Thomists—which is telling precisely because of Versor's affinity with Aquinas. Rather, the titles suggest (as does the sheer quantity of editions) that Versor was an authority on a par with Albert and Thomas.¹²² Versor's commentaries do not follow the *processus Thomistarum* or the *processus Albertistarum*, but are composed *secundum processum et mentem eiusdem Versoris*. In the eyes of the Thomists and Albertists at Cologne, Versor obviously had his own way of commenting on Aristotle. The fact that he was not from the Cologne milieu, that he was not a member of one of the rival colleges, is decisive here. The books printed by order of the *bursae* show how the philosophical schools in Cologne defined themselves: by reference to the *via* of Thomas or Albert and to the *processus* of their own college (in most cases either the *Montana* or the *Laurentiana*).¹²³ In this setting, Versor had to be regarded as an outsider, not as a Thomist.

¹²⁰ Cf. Voulliéme 1903 (above, n. 1), 56-7, 61, 66, 70, 197, 199, 413, 487 (nos. 141, 142, 150, 159, 164, 441, 442, 932, 1135) and XLVIII-LV. A relevant study of this type of woodcuts is W.L. Schreiber and P. Heitz, *Die deutschen "Accipies" und Magister cum discipulis-Holzschnitte als Hilfsmittel zur Inkunabel-Bestimmung*, Strassburg 1908.

¹²¹ Cf. above, § 2, and Tewes 1993 (above, n. 8), 389-90.

¹²² This is also suggested by the fact that he was mentioned as an authority; cf. above, § 2, esp. n. 28. Markowski 1981 (above, n. 22), 183 and 187, even speaks of "Versorismus".

¹²³ See the examples in note 111 above and Hoenen 2003 (above, n. 35), 13-4. The examples I have given suggest (as opposed to Hoenen, *Ibid.*) that in the incunables from Cologne the terms "via" and "processus" have different meanings, since "via" is generally connected with an authoritative philosopher, whereas "processus" is associated with a college. My conjecture would be that "via" refers above all to the doctrinal content and that

In sum, it has been shown that neither Versor himself nor his contemporaries attest to his alleged Thomism (not to mention his alleged Albertism). From a doctrinal point of view, one might still want to argue that Versor nevertheless was a Thomist. After all, upon examination of some of the fundamental issues that divided the schools of thought (in particular Albertism and Thomism) in the fifteenth century, Versor's writings reveal more affinity to the thought of Thomas Aquinas than to that of Albert the Great. However, if John Versor receives the designation "Thomist" on account of this affinity, that predicate is not historically justified. In his proper historical context, i.e. the philosophical school debates of the fifteenth century, Versor cannot be regarded as a Thomist. Thus John Versor's position in the *Wegestreit* has become clearer by judging it in relation to the four characteristics of schools of thought (cf. § 1): Although his works were used by Thomists and his views accord with Aquinas and the Thomist school on several fundamental issues, they do not reveal any confessions of loyalty to Aquinas and they are certainly not exclusively based on Aquinas' works. Whether that is precisely the reason why they were so popular, as Ritter suggested, remains to be investigated.¹²⁴

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"processus" refers more to the pedagogical practice (the way and order of explaining the authoritative texts), but this needs further investigation.

¹²⁴ See above, n. 22.

Appendices

The following appendices offer some of the passages discussed from Versor's commentaries on the *Isagoge*, the *Categories* and *Peri hermeneias*. In each case Versor's source text (i.e., Albert's or Thomas' commentary) is presented in the left column. To facilitate the comparison, I have italicised the corresponding words. Therefore, the original italics in Borgnet's edition of Albert's text have been omitted.

Appendix 1

Cf. § 3.

Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 2, c. 1, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 166a-167b:

Caput I. *In qua significatione substantia accipiat.* Jam de praedicabilibus secundum ordinationem eorum ad unum quod est generalissimum in ordine illo tractandum est. Quia autem *omnium prima est substantia, ideo primo de substantia dicamus. Est autem substantiae triplex consideratio.* Una quidem secundum quod substantia est *pars entis prima et principalis*, quae in se vera est et causa est omnibus aliis existendi. Secunda autem secundum quod substantia *praedicabile est primum, ad quod est reductio omnium praedicabilium* suae coordinationis. Tertia autem secundum quod substantia *primum subiectum* est, ad quod sicut ad subiectum omnium quocumque modo praedicabilium est reductio, sicut ad id de quo est praedicatio.

Primo quidem igitur modo substantia est ens per se existens, nec in alio nec ab alio suae existentiae causam habens: et hoc modo substantia est primum et vere ens, et est *essentia* invariabilis et incorruptibilis quae *omnibus aliis causa est existendi*. Est autem actus simplex primae causae, per quem omnia subsistunt quae per se sunt: et talem actum ad similitudinem substantiae suae producit prima causa: et est per se existens quia non per aliud vel ab alio est quod sit causatum, sed ipsum est causatum primum in modo existendi ad similitudinem primae substantiae productum. Et haec substantia *simplex est essentia*, sicut habetur ex libro Causarum. Et

Johannes Versor, *Questiones libri predicamentorum Aristotelis* (above, n. 34), q. 6, f. 30rb-30va:

Sciendum primo quod *substantia est primum ens*, quia precedit alia natura, diffinitione et tempore, ut habetur septimo Metaphisice. *Ideo de predicamento substantie prius tractandum est.* Et primo videndum est *in qua significatione accipiat substantia* secundum quod a logico consideratur. Est igitur circa hoc advertendum quod, ut inquit dominus Albertus, *substantie est triplex consideratio.* Prima est inquantum substantia est *prima et principalis pars entis*. Secunda est secundum quod est *primum predicabile ad quod est omnium reductio praedicabilium* et subiicibilium quae substantiam significant. Tercia est secundum quod est *primum subiectum* quod omnibus substat.

Primo modo substantia est *essentia simplex*, quae in se vere est et *omnibus aliis est causa essendi*. Et secundum se *nec est genus nec est species* nec differentia nec proprium *neque individuum* nec accidens nec universale nec particulare, sed hec omnia sibi accidunt. Et substantiam hoc modo consideratam *considerat primus philosophus*, qui considerat qualiter substantia *sensibilis ad insensibilem reducitur et insensibilis ad intellectualem, et intellectualis ad divinam*. Sed substantia secundo modo considerata est primum inter omnia dicibilia incomplexa, quae substantiam significant. Ideo ad ipsam tamquam ad *primum* et simplicissimum *predicabile omnia alia quae substantiam*

haec substantia secundum processum habet materialitatem et variabilitatem et particularitatem: quorum nihil habet secundum quod in prima causa est, et secundum hoc quod est ab ipsa. Et sic de substantia agitur, ubi *sensibilis substantia ad insensibilem reducitur, et insensibilis ad intellectualem, et intellectualis ad divinam*: cujusmodi tractatus de substantia *pertinet ad primum philosophum* [Philosophum ed.]. Secundo modo substantia est *primum commune praedicabile*, ad quod *omne praedicabile (quod est substantia) reducitur*. Et quia nihil praedicatur de aliquo nisi quod est totum ipsius et forma totius quae totum dicit ipsius, et esse ipsius quod est in potentia vel actu. Cum subjectum autem primum in substantia (de quo omnia alia praedicantur) sit compositum, oportet quod et proprium primum praedicatum sit compositum, et forma totius *totum esse* totius dicens secundum quod est ipsius totum, in quo praedicatio potest designari: et haec est substantia de qua *intendit logicus*. Haec autem substantia est primum quod supponitur vel subjicitur in tota coordinatione eorum, a per ordinem descensus et species specialissimas et individua: hoc enim est genus formabile in omnia quae sunt suae coordinationis genera et species et individua. Et cuilibet potest patere, quod haec totius illius coordinationis est primum principium et est compositum, quia aliter non esset in se per se existens. Est autem *compositum formale a forma*, quae dicit *totum esse secundum primam notionem substantiae, in qua ratio substantiae intelligi potest* . . . Tertio autem modo substantia *dicitur ab actu substandi*, et tunc dicitur substantia quae per se substat, et *omnibus aliis quae substant*, dat quod substant: et hoc modo substantia *individua est substantia sola, a qua tamen nulla, ut inferius patebit, est praedicatio*: sed omnis subjicibilitas *omnium quae quibuscumque subjiciuntur* est ab ipsa. Et quia nos in hoc libro intendimus de praedicabilium secundum suas *coordinationes* reductione ad unum, ideo hanc substantiam primam oportet ponere: quae tamen ultima est secundum ordinem primo et secundo modo dictae substantiae. Secundum ergo primam intentionem substantia est essentia, quae *nec genus est, nec species, nec individuum*, sed est simplex. Secundo autem modo dicta substantia composita est,

significant reducuntur. Et sic dicitur confuse et in potentia *totum esse* cuiuslibet substantie, et est quid *formabile et determinabile per differentias ad diversas species* substantie. Et hoc modo *a logico consideratur*, scilicet sub ratione primi predicabilis ad quod tanquam ad genus generalissimum omnia quae substantiam significant reducuntur. Tercio modo est *ab actu substandi dicta*. Et hoc modo *sola substantia particularis* dicitur substantia, *a qua nulla praedicatio exit*. Sed est subjectum *omnium quae quocumque modo subjiciuntur et substant*. Et quia in hoc libro intendit Philosophus de *ordinabili* in genere tam in ratione subjicibilis quam predicabilis, ideo substantia isto modo accepta etiam considerat logicus, scilicet sub ratione primi subjecti in quo omnia sunt vel de quo omnia dicuntur. Et sic patet quomodo substantia a logico consideratur.

et est primum genus omnibus sequentibus *differentiis formabile et determinabile ad esse specierum* et individuorum. Tertio autem modo dicta substantia est determinata materia et superficie et loco ad hoc singulare vel illud.”

Ibid., 167a (between “ratio substantiae intelligi potest” and “Tertio autem modo substantia”):

“Si autem quaeritur, quae sint *componentia* ipsum, cum *nihil habeat ante se ex quo componi possit?* Dicendum quod *nihil extrinsecum ei ante se habet*: intra se tamen habet intellectum componentium ipsum. Est enim *ens*, et est *per se*, quod addit super ens intellectuale compositionem: quia *ex ente* est, et ex eo quod *est per se*, est hoc. Et, ut dicit Boetius, aliud habet *quo est aliquid*, aliud habet *quo hoc est*: et haec est forma *compositionis* ejus, quia nihil habet materiae, quamvis habeat id *quod est et esse*. Et haec est prima notio substantiae quae de omnibus praedicatur quae in recta linea praedicamentali sunt in praedicamento substantiae. Sunt tamen quae dicuntur substantiae, non quia hanc substantiae recipiunt vel participant rationem, sed quia sunt principia essentialiter constituenta substantiam, sicut forma dicitur substantia, et materia dicitur substantia, ut dicit Aristoteles. Sed haec non sunt in substantia secundum rectum ordinem praedicamenti, sed reducuntur ad substantiam ut principia substantiae per hanc dignitatem, quod nihil quod per sui essentiam facit substantiam, est non substantia. Hoc igitur modo substantia *consideratur a logico* et est praesentis intentionis.”

Sed hic oritur dubium de *compositione* substantie ut est genus generalissimum. Respondet dominus Albertus quod substantia in genere generalissimo accepta dicit *aliquid formatum per formam* distinguentem totum esse cuiuslibet substantie *secundum primariam notionem* seu rationem *substantie*, in qua scilicet *ratio substantie primo intelligi potest*. Et huiusmodi forma a qua sic sumitur prima notio substantie *nihil ante se habet ex quo sit composita*, neque re neque ratione. Et ita substantia in genere generalissimo accepta non est composita compositione actuali ex aliquibus precedentibus ipsam formaliter, et ideo non est diffinibilis. Est tamen hic advertendum quod secundum nostrum modum intelligendi substantia intelligitur componi *ex ente et per se*, quae quidem *compositio* a nobis intelligitur per modum compositionis ex actu et potentia, scilicet *ex quo est et quod est*, ita quod ens habeat modum potentie et quod est, et per se habeat modum actus et [ex ed.] quo est. Non tamen est ibi compositio ex genere et differentia, quia ens differentias habere non potest, cum nihil sit quod rationem entis subterfugere possit. Et sic patet quod materia et forma non componunt substantiam in communi accepta neque etiam genus et differentia, sed ut dictum est secundum nostrummodum intelligendi componitur ex actu et potentia seu ex quod est et quo est.”

Appendix 2

Cf. § 5.

Albertus Magnus, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. A. Borgnet (*Opera omnia*, vol. I), Parisiis 1890, 2b-4a:

Johannes Versor, *Questiones quinque predicabilium Porphyrii* (above, n. 34), q. 2, ff. 2vb-3ra:

“Caput II. Utrum *logica* sit *pars philosophiae*?”

Hanc autem scientiam qui modus est omnis philosophiae, quidam nullam partem esse philosophiae contendunt, dicentes *non nisi tres esse partes philosophiae, scilicet physicam, mathematicam* sive disciplinabilem, *et metaphysicam* sive divinam.

Cum enim *diffinitio* dicens quid et propter quid *medium sit in scientia*, et *diffinitio non possit variari nisi tripliciter*, scilicet quod aut concipiat *materiam sensibilem*, quae *cum motu* est et mutatione; aut concipiat *materiam intelligibilem*, cujus essentia non est cum motu et mutatione secundum rationem, quamvis secundum esse sit in materia quae est cum mutatione et motu, sicut est magnitudo et numerus; aut nec secundum essentiam, *nec secundum esse* concipiat *materiam sensibilem*: videtur quod philosophia non habeat nisi tres partes essentielles, sicut et Aristoteles dicere videtur. Propter quod nonnulli *logicam* scientiam sive rationalem, *nullam partem* dicunt *esse philosophiae*.

Addunt etiam ad suae assertionis confirmationem, quod *nullius rei modus, cum re cujus modus est, venit in generis sui divisionem*. Constat autem, quod *logica* generaliter dicta *modus philosophiae est*. *Non ergo venire* videtur *ad philosophiae divisionem*, nec videtur in aliqua parte hujus generis quod est philosophia contineri.

Hanc autem opinionem alii quidam impugnantes dicunt philosophiae generalis esse intentionem omnem, *omnium quocumque modo entium comprehendere* veritatem, *quantum homini possibile est comprehendere eam secundum rationem et intellectum*. Ea autem quae sunt, dicuntur esse aut ab opere nostro, sive a voluntate, sive etiam ab intellectu scientiam quae-rente: aut a natura generaliter dicta, quae ab opere nostro causari non potest. Et cum ea quae a natura sunt, nostrae sint causae scientiae, et non nos sumus causa ipsorum, non potest de illis esse scientia practica. Relinquitur ergo, quod de talibus apud nos non est nisi scientia contemplativa, quae lumine intelligentiae perficitur. Eorum autem quorum nos sumus causa per voluntatem, non potest esse apud nos scientia speculativa, sed tantum practica. Eadem enim sunt in

“Queritur secundo: Utrum *logica* debeat dici *pars philosophiae*?”

Arguitur quod non primo autoritate Philosophi sexto Metaphisice ponentis *tantum tres partes philosophiae, scilicet physicam, mathematicam et metaphysicam*, ergo et cetera.

Secundo arguitur: *Diffinitio est medium demonstrationis facientis scire*, ergo tot sunt partes philosophiae et non plures quot modis diffinitiones variantur. Sed *diffinitiones non variantur nisi tripliciter*, quia vel diffinitio rei concipit *motum* vel *materiam sensibilem* et est diffinitio physica, vel abstrahit a motu et materia sensibili, licet non a *materia intelligibili*, et sic est diffinitio mathematica, vel abstrahit penitus a motu et materia tam *sensibili* quam intelligibili, quia talis res *bene potest esse sine materia*, et sic est diffinitio metaphisica. Et non possunt pluribus modis rerum diffinitiones narrari, ergo *logica non est pars philosophiae*.

Tertio arguitur: *Nullius rei modus cum re cuius est modus venit in sui generis divisionem*. Sed *logica est modus philosophiae*, ergo non venit in *divisionem philosophiae* tanquam pars eius.

In oppositum arguitur primo quia philosophia secundum genus suum est *comprehensio omnium quorumcumque entium, secundum quod possibile est homini talia entia comprehendere secundum rationem et intellectum*. Sed *logica* est comprehensio alicuius entis, quia est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis; ergo est pars philosophiae.

quolibet scibili principia et causae et elementa cognoscendi, quae sunt principia essendi: quia aliter sequeretur, quod id quod scitur a nobis, non scitur secundum id quod est, sed potius sciretur secundum id quod non est. Et sic falso modo sciretur omne quod scitur, quod absurdum est. Relinquitur igitur quod de entibus a natura causatis, non potest esse scientia per ea quae sunt a nobis, sed potius scientia eorum habetur ex principiis causantibus essentiam et esse eorum in natura, quae non nisi per contemplationem sunt in omnibus. Eorum autem quae sunt a nobis, non potest esse scientia vera apud nos nisi per ea principia quae sunt in nobis, per quae nos sumus causa eorum, quae a nobis sunt: cuius finis non est verum, sed bonum, quod nobis bonum est. Similiter igitur alicujus philosophiae erit intentio comprehendere veritatem ejus quod rationis ductu via est in omnem cognitionem omnium eorum quorum cognitio fit in nobis per ea quae cognita sunt apud nos, ex quibus nos proficiscimur ad scientiam incognitorum. Erit igitur de intentione philosophiae etiam logica scientia quae est rationalis.

Adhuc autem hujus signum dicunt, quod *apud Peripateticos philosophia in tres partes prima divisione divisa est, in physicam scilicet generaliter dictam, et ethicam generaliter dictam, et rationalem similiter acceptam*. Dico autem *physicam generaliter dictam*, quae comprehendit et naturalem et disciplinalem et divinam. *Ethicam autem generalem*, quae in se continet et monasticam et oeconomicam et civilem. *Rationalem autem generalem* quae comprehendit omnem modum deveniendi de noto ad ignotum quocumque modo: quod per multa genera probationum fit, ut in sequenti ostendetur. Manifestum est igitur, quod *logica aliqua pars est philosophiae*.

Adhuc autem si aliquid est de intentione philosophiae: tunc hoc maxime de intentione philosophiae erit, sine quo nullus in philosophia in aliquam devenire potest cognitionem. Ignorans autem logicam nullus ignoti perfectam potest acquirere cognitionem, eo quod ignorat modum per quem devenire oportet de noto ad ignoti notitiam. Videtur ergo *logicam praecipue esse de intentione philosophiae*."

Secundo apud *philosophos scilicet peripateticos philosophia dividitur prima sui divisione in physicam generaliter dictam, ethicam generaliter dictam et rationalem sive sermocinalem generaliter dictam*. *Physica vero generaliter dicta secundum omnes peripateticos comprehendit naturalem philosophiam, mathematicam et metaphysicam*. *Ethica vero generaliter dicta continet sub se monasticam, yconomicam et politicam*. *Rationalis autem generaliter dicta comprehendit omnem modum deveniendi de noto ad ignoti noticiam, quod per multa genera propositionum fit*. Ergo philosophi peripatetici dixerunt *logicam esse partem philosophiae*.

Tertio arguitur: Illud necessario est de intentione philosophiae, sine quo nullus potest devenire in cognitionem alicuius. Sed nullus ignorans logicam alicuius ignoti perfectam potest acquirere cognitionem, ergo *logica est de intentione philosophiae et pars eius*."

Appendix 3

Cf. § 5.

Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Periyermenias*, lib. 1, lect. 3, ed. Leonina, Editio altera retractata, vol. I*1, Roma-Paris 1989, 14.39-16.138:

“Vbi oportet intelligere quod una duarum operationum intellectus est indiuisibilium intelligencia, in quantum scilicet intellectus intelligit absolute cuiuscunque rei quidditatem siue essenciam per se ipsam, puta quid est homo uel quid album uel aliud huiusmodi; alia uero operatio intellectus est secundum quod huiusmodi simplicia concepta simul componit et diuidit. Dicit ergo quod in hac secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et diuidentis, inuenitur ueritas et falsitas, relinquens quod in prima operatione non inuenitur, ut etiam traditur in III De anima.

... Ad huius igitur euidentiam considerandum est quod ueritas in aliquo inuenitur dupliciter: uno modo sicut in eo quod est uerum; alio modo sicut in dicente uel cognoscente uerum; inuenitur autem ueritas sicut in eo quod est uerum tam in simplicibus quam in compositis, set sicut in dicente uel cognoscente uerum, non inuenitur nisi secundum compositionem et diuisionem.

Quod quidem sic patet. Verum enim, ut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethicorum, est bonum intellectus, unde, de quocunque dicatur uerum, oportet quod sit per respectum ad intellectum. Comparantur autem ad intellectum uoces quidem sicut signa, res autem sicut ea quorum intellectus sunt similitudines.

Johannes Versor, *Questiones primi libri Perihermeniarum Aristotelis* (above, n. 34), q. 3, ff. 61va-b:

“Sciendum secundo quod, ut prius dicebatur, duplex est operatio intellectus. Una est simplicium intelligentia, quando scilicet intellectus absolute intelligit cuiuscunque rei quidditatem siue essentiam per seipsam, ut puta quid est homo uel quid est album; et in hac operatione, ut habet textus, non est ueritas vel falsitas. Alia est operatio intellectus que est compositio et diuisio, que fit cum intellectus simplicia simul componit et diuidit; et in hac operatione intellectus sic diuidentis et componentis est ueritas vel falsitas.

... Sciendum tercio quod ueritas reperitur in aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo sicut in eo quod est uerum seu sicut in re que est uera; et hoc modo reperitur ueritas tam in simplicibus quam in compositis. Alio modo inuenitur in aliquo tamquam in cognoscente et dicente uerum; et sic <non> inuenitur nisi in compositione et diuisione intellectus; et hoc modo intelligitur Philosophus cum dicit: circa compositionem et diuisionem intellectus est ueritas falsitasque, sicut in dicente et cognoscente uerum vel falsum.

Pro cuius declaratione est sciendum quarto quod, ut dicitur sexto Metaphisice, uerum est bonum intellectus. Habetur tamen ibi quod uerum et falsum sunt in mente, id est in intellectu; bonum autem et malum sunt in rebus. Ex quo sequitur quod de quocunque dicitur uerum necesse est quod sit per respectum ad intellectum, cuius intellectus uerum et bonum est perfectio. Ad intellectum comparantur uoces sicut signa conceptuum eius; et ita uoces dicuntur uere quia sunt signa ueri quod est in conceptione intellectus. Res autem ad intellectum comparantur sicut ea quorum conceptiones intellectus sunt similitudines et ita res non potest dici uera nisi per respectum ad intellectum. Sed si quereretur aliquis utrum res eodem modo dicatur uera secundum quod ad diversos intellectus comparatur, responderetur quod non.

Considerandum autem quod *aliqua res comparatur ad intellectum dupliciter*. Vno modo sicut mensura ad mensuratum, et sic comparantur res naturales ad intellectum speculativum humanum. Et ideo intellectus dicitur uerus secundum quod conformatur rei, falsus autem secundum quod discordat a re. Res autem naturalis non dicitur esse uera per comparisonem ad intellectum nostrum, sicut posuerunt quidam antiqui Naturales, estimantes rerum ueritatem esse solum in hoc quod est uideri: secundum hoc enim sequeretur quod contradictoria essent simul uera, quia contradictoria cadunt sub diuersorum opinionibus. Dicitur tamen aliqua res uera uel falsa *per comparisonem ad intellectum nostrum, non essentialiter uel formaliter, set effectiue, in quantum scilicet nata est facere de se ueram uel falsam estimationem*; et secundum hoc dicitur aurum uerum uel falsum. *Alio uero modo res comparantur ad intellectum sicut mensuratum ad mensuram, ut patet in intellectu practico, qui est causa rerum*. Vnde opus artificis dicitur esse uerum in quantum attingit ad rationem artis, falsum uero in quantum deficit a ratione artis."

Pro cuius solutione sciendum quinto quod *quelibet res naturalis constituta est inter duos intellectus*, scilicet inter intellectum diuinum ad quem comparatur res sicut artificata ad artem et effectus ad causam sive mensuratum ad mensuram; et proportionabiliter diceretur de artificiali ad intellectum nostrum practicum. Ideo res naturalis per comparisonem ad ipsum dicitur essentialiter uera pro quanto per formam suam imitatur artem diuinam seu illud quod de re ipsa producendo preconceptum erat in intellectu diuino; et sic omnino comparatur ad ipsam *sicut mensuratum ad mensuram*. Et proportionabiliter, ut dictum est, diceretur *de re artificiali in ordine ad intellectum nostrum practicum* que uera esse dicitur in quantum attingit rationem artis que est in intellectu practico artificis, *falsa uerum in quantum deficit a ratione artis*. Si ergo res naturalis constituitur inter intellectum diuinum, ad quem comparatur ut effectus ad causam, et inter intellectum nostrum speculativum, ad quem comparatur sicut mensura ad mensuratum, tunc per respectum ad ipsum non dicitur uera essentialiter uel formaliter sed effectiue, in quantum scilicet nata est apud intellectum nostrum de se facere ueram estimationem, cuius oppositum dixerunt aliqui antiqui constituentes rerum ueritatem consistere solum in hoc quod est uideri nobis apparere. Ex quo errore sequeretur quod duo contradictoria essent simul uera. Et sic patet qualiter ueritas in aliquo inuenitur, qualiter etiam res naturales diuersimode ad diversos intellectus comparate dicuntur uere."

*Theology, Philosophy, and Immortality of the Soul in the
Late Via Moderna of Erfurt*

PEKKA KÄRKKÄINEN

ABSTRACT

In 1513 the Fifth Lateran Council determined that the immortality of the rational soul is not true only in theology, but also in philosophy. The determination can be related also to the actual teaching of philosophy. In the university of Erfurt, Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen and Jodocus Trutfetter wrote expositions on natural philosophy at that time. Usingen's and Trutfetter's expositions of *De anima* represent a position, which faithfully follows in methodology and aspirations the tradition of the *via moderna*. Furthermore, they give an interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and theology, which Trutfetter considered consonant with the intentions and the formulations of the Fifth Lateran Council; and finally, Trutfetter even presents a practical application of the Council's recommendations.

In the early 16th century the question of immortality vs. mortality of the human soul became a crucial point in understanding the relationship between theology and philosophy of nature. As one culmination point of this development, the Fifth Lateran Council of 1513 determined on the point that the immortality of the rational soul is not only true in theology, but also in philosophy, against some of the so-called secular aristotelian critics.¹

This determination can also be related to the actual teaching of philosophy, as seen in the case of the University of Erfurt, where two notable figures of the late German *via moderna*, Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen (d. 1532) and Jodocus Trutfetter (d. 1519), wrote expositions on natural philosophy at that time. These two men, later known as teachers of the young Martin Luther, included a section on psychology in several of their works on natural philosophy. Also in their careers they were borderline figures between philosophy and theology. Whereas both were originally

¹ On the preceding discussion on immortality of the soul see Eckhardt Keßler, *The Intellectual Soul*, in: Charles B. Schmitt (ed.), *Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Cambridge 1988, 485-534. The text of the determination is cited here according to Norman P. Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Volume 1: Nicaea I to Lateran V*, London 1990, 605-6.

teachers of philosophy in the artistic faculty, Usingen later became an Augustinian friar and a fierce adversary of the Reformation, while Trutfetter moved from the artistic faculty to the theological faculty, first to Wittenberg in 1506. In 1510 he came back to Erfurt, to the theological faculty, but in 1515 he was commissioned as a lecturer on Aristotle in the artistic faculty, which was quite exceptional for doctors of theology.²

To illustrate the theme, I shall treat some relevant passages from Usingen's and Trutfetter's works on natural philosophy, where they discuss the problems of psychology. The earliest of them is Usingen's *Parvulus philosophie naturalis* from 1499. Next follows, chronologically, his collection of questions called *Exercitium de anima*, published in 1507, several years before the Council. Finally comes Trutfetter's only publication in natural philosophy, *Summa in totam physicen*, which came out in 1514, in the year following the determination.³

I shall not, however, begin by analyzing the discussion of the immortality of the soul by Usingen and Trutfetter immediately, but I shall first make some remarks on their nominalist method in general and then on their psychology in particular. Only thereafter will I proceed with their views on immortality vs. mortality of the soul, particularly on the central question of the origin of human souls, focusing on how it relates to the question of the relationship between theology and natural philosophy. The question of the origin of the soul, whether there are causes other than material beings in its generation is, in the medieval discussion, tied to the question of the mortality of the soul, and the answer to the question determines, whether the soul is conceived in a materialistic way as mortal with the body, or whether it is seen as being immortal, existing in some form after the bodily death.⁴

² Erich Kleineidam, *Universitas studii erffordiensis II*, Leipzig 1992, 205-7. On Usingen's and Trutfetter's lives, see Kleineidam 1992, 290-1; 298-9.

³ Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen, *Parvulus philosophie naturalis*, Leipzig 1499; *Exercitium de anima*, Erfurt 1507; Jodocus Trutfetter, *Summa in totam physicen: hoc est philosophiam naturalem conformiter siquidem vere sophie: que est Theologia per D. Judocum Isenmachensis in gymnasio Erphordensis elucrabata et edita*, Erfurt 1514. I shall not discuss here the further developments in the later editions of Usingen's and Trutfetter's works, which could be interesting for the sake of increasing humanist influence, especially in Usingen's writings.

⁴ Apart from this particular question there are several themes, where the interplay between theology and philosophy is realized. See, for example, the question on the plurality of forms, where the notion of the soul separated from the body plays an important role in the argumentation. See Usingen, *Parvulus*, ff. 86^{r-v}.

1. *Philosophical Method of the Erfurtian Via Moderna*

The University of Erfurt was one of the most famous among the *via moderna* of the late Middle Ages. If we pass the difficult question of what, in general, distinguished between the *via antiqua* and *via moderna* at the time, I shall refer to the witness of the Erfurtians themselves, which considers their philosophical method as a characteristic of their position. This is to be found in Trutfetter's *Summule totius logice*, where the author cites the conclusions of the influential quodlibetal dispute in 1497, which became a starting point of the ockhamistic reform of studies in Erfurt.⁵

According to Trutfetter's witness the position of *via moderna* ("terminist" as he calls it) is based on a careful analysis of the signification of the terms, thereby avoiding overly hasty conclusions about the ontological structure of the world, according to the principle of economy. The error of the rival ("realist") position, which presupposes many unnecessary ontological entities, is based on ignorance of the art of dialectic, particularly concerning the connotations of the terms.⁶ This is seen as an integral part of the semantic analysis, which has been commonly considered as necessary preliminary work for the other sciences, e.g. in physics or metaphysics.⁷ Trutfetter notes that early theologians and philosophers were

⁵ Jodocus Trutfetter, *Summule totius logice*, Erfurt 1500, ff. M1^v-M2^v.

⁶ Trutfetter, *Summule*, ff. M1^{r-v}: "Nec oportet illis effingere entitates proprias ab aliis distinctas pro qualitate modorum significandi. Hinc in his a multis incaute ac propriam seductionem requiritur metaphysica, ubi perfacile consuleret dialecticus. Accidit enim error iste ex sola artis dialecticæ et connotationis terminorum nescientia. Id quod anno a natali Christiano 1497 in universali disputatione, quam quodlibetum vocant, in hæc verba conclusimus."; *Summule*, f. M1^v: "Errant igitur nonnulli in propriam seductionem incaute metaphysicam requirantes, ubi dialecticus facile consuleret, quorum, ut veritati sic et Aristoteli nostro, adversa est universalium confictio, atque rerum signorum numero multiplicatio."

⁷ Trutfetter, *Summule*, f. M1^v: "Sed acclamant alii, quod de entibus rationis nihil curant. Vadamus, inquiunt, ad res, vitem habentes terministam, irridentes quod omnia referat ad signa. Nos, inquiunt, rem perquirimus, ad rem imus, quid ad nos de terminis, quasi de rebus sine terminis possit esse sermo, quasi dialectica penitus supervacua. Sic fuit et est in pluribus, qui se gratis involvunt cura et erroribus inextricabilibus, quos sola scit et potest dialectica resolvere definiendo, dividendo, terminorum denique connotationes cum modis significandi vivaciter exponendo, nec non sophismatum paralogisationes fantasticas detegendo. Nec ob id dico sufficere dialecticam pro cognitione metaphysicæ et theologie, ita quod plurimorum perscrutatione haud opus sit, quom dialectica non dat cognitionem illarum scientiarum sed certis modis iter expedit, quo ad illas venit." As Urban notes, the passage is paraphrased from Jean Gerson's *Collectorium super Magnificat*, Tract. 2. See Wolfgang Urban, *Die 'via moderna' an der Universität Erfurt am Vorabend der Reformation*, in: Heiko A. Oberman (ed.), *Gregor von Rimini, Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation*, Berlin 1981, 311-30, esp. 327, n. 54.

already aware of different figurative modes of speech, and interpreting them presupposes careful attention to those figures. Moreover, all the realists do observe the possible equivocations of terms, in which they do not differ from terminists.⁸

One could illustrate the difference by saying that, as in the case of relational terms, it does not imply that these terms signify some kind of relational entity which is really distinct from singular beings, but rather that the relational term merely signifies all beings of its scope and additionally connotes their standing in relation to other entities. In a similar way, the existence of several other entities as being really distinct from substances and absolute qualities was denied.⁹

In addition to this general semantic orientation, the frequently used authorities are also found among the representants of the *via moderna*. Here it should be noted that Erfurtian teaching followed traditionally along the lines of Jean Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen rather than that of Ockham, the *Venerabilis inceptor*, although Ockham, together with Pierre d'Ailly and Gregory of Rimini, was strongly favored, especially by Usingen and Trutfetter.¹⁰ An example of the continuing importance of Buridan is seen, however, in Usingen's *Exercitium de anima*, published in 1507. The

⁸ Trutfetter, *Summule* f. M2: "Hanc veritatem omnes antiqui doctores, philosophi et sancti non ignorarunt. . . . Et quia non semper animadverterunt vel advertere cogitarunt ad sermonis proprietatem, sed aliquando improprie, figurate et tropice sunt locuti, reverenter sunt interpretandi et illorum dicta non in sensu quem verba faciunt, sed potius quem ipsi pre se ferunt accipienda, et ita eorum improprietates ad proprietatem sunt reducendae nequaquam ampliandae. Alioquin quid mirum si augetur deceptio. In hac veritate omnes realistae, qui saltem non aberrant a terministis, minime dissident, licet sepius nominis aequivocatio incomponibilem litem inter eos constituat."

⁹ Cf. Trutfetter, *Summule*, M1: "In tam numerosa rerum varietate, duobus praedicamentis, substantia et qualitate, intrinsece, reliquis octo extrinsecis habitudinis abunde significata. Simpliciter nulla est entitas universalis, respectiva, indivisibilis, privativa, aut successiva, nullum complexe significabile, forma totius, aut totalitas, a quolibet singulari, absoluto, ac permanenti sequestrata." I will not give a detailed account here of how the relation between signification and ontology was understood by Trutfetter and other nominalists.

¹⁰ See Kleineidam 1992 (above, n. 2), 141. Kleineidam notes (*ibid.*, 142), commenting upon the quodlibetal dispute in 1497, that Usingen strongly favoured Ockham, Pierre d'Ailly, and Gregory of Rimini, even against old authorities like Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen. This does not say very much concerning the general stand of these authorities, because on this particular question Buridan and Marsilius represented the opinion shared by *via antiqua* against the contrary position of Ockham and d'Ailly (see Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 125^v). Concerning the authority of Ockham, which was not absolute for Usingen, see Urban 1981, 325 and 329; but also the much-favored Gregory of Rimini was disregarded on the question of *complexe significabilia*, as we shall see.

disposition of this collection of questions resembles a similar collection by John Buridan, which was available in Erfurt libraries in manuscript form.¹¹

2. *Usingen on the Science of Psychology*

Soul as the proper subject of this science is discussed in the first question of *Exercitium de anima*. The nominalistic approach described above also dominates Usingen's definition of the object of psychology. According to him, the object of demonstrated knowledge (*scientia adhaesiva*) is threefold: firstly, the conclusion of a demonstration as a necessarily true proposition; secondly, the subject term of the conclusion; and thirdly, the entity as it is signified by a true proposition and its subject term.¹² The division is attributed by Usingen to the "common way of speaking among the *via moderna*,"¹³ and at the beginning of the *Exercitium physicorum*, more specifically to Marsilius of Inghen and Ockham,¹⁴ but a parallel is to be found in the corresponding passage of Buridan's *Questiones de anima*.¹⁵

¹¹ On the Buridanian tradition of *questiones de anima* see Peter Marshall, *Parisian Psychology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century*, in: Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 50 (1984), 101-193. See also Erfurtian manuscripts of Buridan's *Questiones de anima* mentioned in Benoit Patar, *Le traité de l'âme de Jean Buridan*, Louvain 1991, 34* and 48*-9*.

¹² Usingen, *Ex. an.*, f. A2^r: "Scibile propinquum est cui propinque, id est primo et immediate, assentitur, ut est conclusio demonstrata vel demonstrabilis, quia illa est verum propositionale quod immediate et primarie terminat actum adhaesivum intellectus, quemadmodum ens terminat actum apprehensivum, qualis autem habitudinis esse debeat conclusio scibilis docet Philosophus primo Posteriorum dicens scientiam esse verorum notitiorum perpetuorum et impossibiliter aliter se habentium, quia propositiones contingentes et singulares non sunt per artem demonstrativam terminabiles cum non sint mansive demonstrabiles. Remotum est cui remote, id est mediate, assentitur tanquam parti totius veri, ut est terminus conclusionis puta subiectum, quare scibile remotum dicitur scibile partiale, assentiens enim toti assentit parti eius ex qua totum est constitutum. Remotissimum est cui remotissime, id est mediatissime, assentitur tanqu[a]m obiecto et rei significatae per verum propositionale et subiectum eius."

¹³ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, f. A2^r: "Notandum est scientiae adhaesivae triplex esse scibile iuxta communem usum loquendi viae modernae scilicet propinquum, remotum et remotissimum."

¹⁴ Usingen, *Exercitium physicorum*, Erfurt 1507, f. A2^r: "Ut habet Ockham et Marsilius circa primum Sententiarum." The division between a threefold object of science resembles, for the most part, Marsilius' division between immediate, remote and the most remote object of science (see Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum*, I, 2, ed. Manuel S. Noya, Leiden 2000, 78, 23-79, 7). Marsilius also refers to Ockham in this context.

¹⁵ Jean Buridan, *Questiones de anima*, I, 1, ed. Patar in Patar 1991, 168, 80-7. Buridan did not, however, in this context argue against the doctrine of complexly significables, as Marsilius did in his *Sentences* commentary; he also does not use the terms immediate, remote and the most remote, but Usingen seems to have taken the contents of Buridan's threefold

Psychology, according to Usingen, properly consists of knowledge in the latter two meanings, namely as concerning the 'soul' as the subject term of a demonstrated conclusion and as an entity of which such a conclusion claims some state of affairs.¹⁶

For him it is enough to say that since a proposition is assented through a previous demonstration, through it the truth of some state of affairs is also assented concerning the subject term and the entity it signifies. This is due to Usingen's denial of the existence of so-called *complexe significabilia*. This means that the conclusion itself does not signify anything that its individual terms do not signify. So there is again no need for such additional entities as *significatum totale*, as the thing signified by the whole proposition was called by Gregory of Rimini and other adherents of *complexe significabilia* doctrine. As a matter of fact, the existence of *complexe significabilia* was one of the things already denied in the programmatic quodlibetal dispute of 1497. Because there is only one entity, the soul, which the conclusion and its subject term signify, there is also no need for diverse acts of assent, which form the psychological knowledge in question. It is the very same act, whereby the conclusion, its subject term, and the thing signified are assented, which is called knowledge. So here also the semantic analysis of signification tends towards simplifying the view of the ontological structure of being.¹⁷

division of the object of science to combine it with the terminology of Marsilius. The authenticity of the edited text of the first redaction of Buridan's *Quaestiones* has been questioned. See J.M.M.H Thijssen, *Late-Medieval Natural Philosophy: Some Recent Trends in Scholarship*, in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales*, 67 (2000), 158-190, at 179-80. However, since there are no other editions of the questions at hand available, I have relied on Patar's edition.

¹⁶ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, f. A3^v: "Quibus premissis respondetur ad questionem per duas conclusiones. Prima conclusio. De anima est scientia tanquam de scibili remoto et remotissimo. Haec conclusio habet duas partes, quarum prima vult de illo termino anima esse scientiam tanquam de scibili remoto, quia ille potest ingredi conclusionem demonstrabilem, ergo potest remote sciri. Secunda vult de re significata per illum terminum anima esse scientiam tanquam de scibili remotissimo, quia illa potest significari per conclusionem demonstrabilem et subiectum eius, ut patet in illa demonstratione vel consimili, ut quidquid inhaeret corpori est actus corporis, et anima inhaeret corpori, igitur anima est actus corporis."

¹⁷ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, ff. A2^{r-v}: "Idem enim significant cum complexe significabilia non sint ponenda quae posuit Gregorius Ariminensis et Henricus de Hassia ut patet circa 1. Physicorum, ista enim inquantum talis nec est propositio nec pars eius, quare remotissime terminat actum adhaesivum intellectus, quorum exemplaris declaratio patet in hac demonstratione vel consimili, ut omne animal est risibile, et omnis homo est animal rationale,

Similarly there were other doctrines connected to these themes, where there was a notable disagreement among the adherents of the *via moderna*. For example, Usingen argues against the position, that there would be knowledge of the thing itself primary to the propositional conclusion concerning it. This passage is found in Usingen's earlier work, *Parvulus philosophie naturalis* (1499), where he notes that this opinion is "obscure," "not internally consistent," because knowledge of an extramental entity includes, properly speaking, the knowledge of concepts they signify, and so the contrary opinion is easier to understand and compatible with the common presuppositions of the *via moderna*. The issue was also considered as being a sharply divisive question within the *via moderna*, as it was argued from the common presuppositions of that school. In the same way Gregory of Rimini, whom Usingen mentions as an adherent of the *complexe significabilia* doctrine, was in many ways a respected authority of the *via moderna* in Erfurt. Usingen's positions reaffirm the importance of the semantic analysis as the first step in the philosophical method, as it was vehemently confessed by the Erfurtians in 1497.¹⁸

The procedure of semantic analysis also precedes the definition of the term 'soul' as an object of knowledge in psychology, differentiating it from the understanding of the term without reference to its operations in the body, contrary to metaphysics. One must note here that Usingen conceived the soul as the substantial form of the body, and denied, together with the common tradition of the *via moderna* Ockham's idea of the plurality of substantial forms in man.¹⁹ Calling soul a substantial form does not contradict it being a substance, when it informs the body, because essential parts of substances are also called substances.²⁰ Furthermore, the human soul is immaterial and independent of the body, so that after its separation from the body it can exist as a substance in the meaning "*res per se subsistens*."²¹

igitur omnis homo est risibilis. Sciuntur autem ista tria scibilia una scientia, quae est assensus conclusionis, quia assentiendo conclusioni propinque tanquam totali veritati simul assentitur subiecto eius remote, id est partialiter, et rei significatae per eam tanquam obiecto eius remotissime."

¹⁸ Usingen, *Parvulus*, ff. 8^v-9^r.

¹⁹ Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 87^r, according to which the defense relies on Gregory of Rimini's arguments against Scotus and Ockham. See also *Ex. an.* ff. D2^v-E1^v.

²⁰ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, ff. C5^r-C6^r.

²¹ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, ff. L3^r-L4^r; M4^r-N1^r.

Soul is considered by Usingen as the most general term in psychology, which then confers upon it the reason for the unity of this science and for its distinction from other sciences. Soul is, however, understood here in a qualified sense, namely connotatively, connoting its operations in the body.²² The operations of soul are not, strictly speaking, the object of psychological knowledge, nor is the soul in itself, apart from these operations. This is defined by describing the semantic character of the term soul in this context. In psychology 'soul' is namely a connotative concept, since it connotes certain operations in the body. It is defined as a substantial form, which is called 'soul' by virtue of its vivifying status as a form of a body. Solely metaphysics considers the soul in an absolute manner, without any concern whether this substantial form actually informs a body or not, because metaphysics considers the things "from the viewpoint of their absolute formative principles" (*secundum rationes earum absolutas*).²³ Therefore the notion of a soul separate from the body, or a soul as mover of celestial bodies, is excluded from the psychological concept of soul.²⁴

3. Usingen on Theology and Psychology

This definition leaves room for certain theological considerations, as is the case later in *Exercitium*, where Usingen treats the question whether or not the soul is a form of body both on the basis of Catholic teaching

²² Usingen, *Ex. an.*, f. A3^v: "Secunda conclusio. Ille terminus anima connotative captus est subiectum attributionis scientiae de anima, quia huic convenit diffinitio subiecti et causae assignationis eiusdem." Ibid. f. A2^v: "Quarto notandum est subiectum attributionis esse terminum communissimum in aliqua scientia totali a quo sumit unitatem extrinsicam et ab aliis scientiis arguitivam distinctionem."

²³ Usingen, *Ex. an.* f. A2^v: "Tertio notandum est circa partem quaesiti, animam dupliciter considerari, nam primo absolute, ut est quaedam forma substantialis, non curando an ab informando vel foris manendo dicta, qualiter anima separata a corpore etiam dicitur anima, et ita non debet capi in praesenti, quia sola metaphysica considerat res secundum rationes earum absolutas. Secundo connotative, ut est quaedam forma substantialis ab informando dicta animans, id est vivificans corpus, in quo est principium operationum vitalium, qualiter diffinit eam Philosophus secundo huius dicens eam esse actum corporis, quod facit vitaliter operari et ita debet capi in praesenti." See also *ibid.*, f. A3^v. In *Parvulus* (f. 81^r) Usingen makes no such distinction between absolute and connotative uses of 'soul,' but notes, e.g., the concept of 'body' such that it can be understood "absolutely, as in the category of substance" and "in the category of quality, as it is an abstract term." Cf. a similar distinction concerning God in theology and in metaphysics in Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones*, I, 2, ed. Noya, 129, 17-23.

²⁴ Similarly already in 1499, see Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 81^r.

and as a philosophical question.²⁵ Moreover, the following questions on the unity of the intellectual soul and on immortality of the rational soul are explicitly treated because of the heresies related to them.²⁶ Here it should be noted, that the seminal quodlibetal dispute of 1497 already addressed the question of the origin of the human soul, among other topics, reaffirming the Catholic doctrine of the creation and immortality of individual souls.²⁷

The question concerning the intellection of a soul separated from the body is a special case, which Usingen does not deal with in *Exercitium*, in accordance with the definition that this theme is not treated in psychology. In *Parvulus philosophie naturalis* (1499) Usingen has indeed addressed such a question, but also there he noted that Aristotle does not deal with this theme in *De anima*.²⁸

In *Parvulus* Usingen tends to make a difference between pure philosophical analysis and the philosophical analysis from the viewpoint of Christian theology. There he notes, commenting on the text concerning habits of the soul, that the author treats the subject not as "a pure philosopher, but as a theologian, that is, as a Catholic philosopher." The distinction made there is the one between acquired and infused habits, which according to Usingen cannot be done by a pure philosopher, who does not need the concept of infused habits.²⁹

As we shall see, a similar distinction is seen in Usingen's treatment of the origin of the rational soul in *Parvulus*, which he sees as a central question determining the nature of the intellectual soul, because many heathen philosophers differ here from the Catholic Christian doctrine. His aim is to consider, not only if the Catholic and heathen views differ from each other, but also in which respect they differ.³⁰ In the index of questions found at the end of the work, the question was entitled as "whether

²⁵ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, ff. L4^v-M2^v, questions "Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma substantialis corporis humani" and "Utrum, circumscripta fide catholica, ratio naturalis dictaret intellectum humanum esse formam corporis humani."

²⁶ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, ff. M3^r-N1^r.

²⁷ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. P4^r.

²⁸ Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 124^r.

²⁹ Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 112^v: "Et talis secundum autorem duplex est, scilicet acquisitus per operationes, et infusus, id est acquisitus sine praevis operationibus, ubi autor loquitur, non tanquam purus philosophus, sed tanquam theologus, qui est philosophus catholicus, quia puri philosophi nihil noverunt de habitibus infusis."

³⁰ Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 111^r: "Pro solutione multarum questionum quae possent hic fieri de potentia rationali et intellectu humano, notandum est quid philosophi ethnici et gentiles

human intellect is derived from the potencies of matter," although this title does not appear in the text. The main question can be formulated, so that it asks whether the generation of a human soul happens by virtue of natural agents, that is, without any supernatural influence.³¹ The question was important from the viewpoint of creationistic theory concerning the origin of the soul, which Usingen shared, according to which human souls are created individually, together with the formation of the body, to which they are then infused, which was considered as the Catholic Christian view on the matter.³²

In this question, Usingen presents not only the three commonly known positions of Alexander Aphrodisias, Averroës, and Aristotle as in the average Buridanian tradition, but he also presents Plato as a fourth position. Concerning Alexander's materialistic position, he says that it is shared by many gentile philosophers, while it is difficult to falsify it merely on the basis of natural reason (*secundum purum lumen naturae*).³³ He also maintains that many people of his own time share Alexander's position, but his target here is hard to identify.³⁴ In the 14th century, Blasius of Parma had represented the Alexandrist position, but the contemporary philosophers favored mainly the Averroistic view.³⁵

Usingen's point reflects, in some sense, the position of the *via moderna*, in which Alexander's position appears to be the most convenient for the natural reason. He does not, however, share Buridan's (and Ockham's) view that its falseness cannot be demonstrated by arguments of natural reason alone, but thinks only that it is "difficult to falsify effectively." This formulation differs significantly also from Pierre d'Ailly's formulation in his *Tractatus de anima*, that Alexander's position is for the natural reason

senserunt de anima rationali, ut simul videatur in quo cum veritate catholica concordent et in quo discordent."

³¹ Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 140v: "Utrum intellectus humanus sit eductus de potentia materiae."

³² Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 112v. A creationistic view is articulated also by Johannes Dorsten, who was an influential theologian in Erfurt in the late 15th century. Dorsten could also explain the transmission of original sin despite this view, basing his argumentation on Giles of Rome's views. See Adolar Zumkeller, *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters*, Würzburg 1984, 324.

³³ Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 111v: "Haec opinio fuit quondam multorum gentilium philosophorum, quoniam secundum purum lumen naturae difficulter potest reprobari efficaciter."

³⁴ Ibid., f. 111v: "Et timeo hodie eam esse multorum insensatorum hominum, qui non credunt corde divinis eloquiis et scripturae sanctae testimoniis."

³⁵ Keßler 1988, 487 (above, n. 1); Olaf Pluta, *Kritiker der Unsterblichkeitsdoktrin in Mittelalter und Renaissance*, Amsterdam 1986, 51. Such contemporary philosophers included Pietro Pomponazzi, who later became famous for defending the philosophical validity of Alexander's position.

the most probable.³⁶ There are some terminological similarities to be observed in Lawrence of Lindores' *Quaestiones de anima*, which maintains that according to the natural light of reason (*stando in lumine naturali*) it cannot be conceded as proved that the human intellect is either immortal or corruptible. "Philosophically speaking" (*pure philosophice loquendo*), the opinion of Alexander appears to be more probable than the Averroistic position.³⁷ A distrust of the probability of Alexander's view, even in a philosophical analysis, allows Usingen such extreme expressions as of those who defend the Alexandrist position, who "do not believe in their hearts in the divine sayings and the testimonies of the sacred Scriptures," and who think of the Christian faith as a mere fabulation.³⁸

Against the solution of Averroës, which presupposes one common intellect, Usingen notes that it is condemned by the Church. There he supposedly has in mind the statutes of the Council of Vienna in 1312, where this doctrine of Averroës was first condemned, although the importance of Averroës in psychology persisted until the late 15th century.³⁹ Usingen brings no arguments against this position, but refers to the authority of Augustine and further to that of Gregory of Rimini, whose proofs that this is not a correct reading of Aristotle—as Averroës thinks—he takes for granted.⁴⁰

³⁶ On Buridan, see Pluta 1986 (above, n. 35), 41; on Pierre d'Ailly, see his *Tractatus de anima*, 6, 1, ed. Olaf Pluta, *Die philosophische Psychologie des Peter von Ailly*, Amsterdam 1987, 35, and on his later views, Pluta 1986, 42.

³⁷ Lawrence of Lindores, *Quaestiones de anima*, III, 4, cited in Pluta 1986, 107.

³⁸ Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 111v: "Et timeo hodie eam esse multorum insensatorum hominum, qui non credunt corde divinis eloquiis et scripturae sanctae testimoniis, sed innitentes suis capitibus dicunt ea, quae fides catholica docet, esse composita. In quorum persona loquitur sapiens: Ex nihilo nati sumus et postea erimus tanquam non fuerimus. Item Ecclesiastes: Unus est interitus hominum et iumentorum et aeque utriusque conditio, et nihil habet homo iumento amplius etc. Haec opinio per catholicam doctrinam dudum explosa est, quare non sit cure catholico philosopho."

³⁹ Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 111v: "Sed haec opinio damnata est ab ecclesia, quia fide credimus quemlibet hominem suum habere intellectum numeraliter distinctum ab intellectu alterius." See Kießler 1988 (above, n. 1), 486.

⁴⁰ Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 111v: "Et hoc dicit Augustinus in secundo De libero arbitrio: Manifestum est rationales mentes singulos quosque nostrum singulas habere. Et hanc positionem probat Gregorius Ariminensis circa secundum Sententiarum non fuisse de intentione Aristotelis, sed Commentatorem deridendum esse, quia ascribit eam intentioni Aristoteli, ubi videas si placet." See Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, II, d. 16 et 17, q. 1, art. 2, ed. A. Damasus Trapp OSA, Berlin 1979, Tomus 5, 330, 36-331, 5. The argument against the Averroistic position, which Usingen brings out is discussed by Gregory *ibid.*, art. 2, ed. Trapp, 326, 14-9; 327, 2-329, 37. The same text of

Plato is passed over by Usingen with no discussion concerning whether or not his ideas contradict the Catholic doctrine, in contrast to what he does with the other three philosophers. Usingen only briefly describes Plato's doctrines of the pre-existence of souls and anamnesis-theory and his notion of the soul after death.⁴¹

Aristotle is again discussed in detail, and particularly his relation to Catholic doctrine is examined. In evaluating Aristotle's doctrine from the viewpoint of Christian theology he detects one point, where Aristotle clearly deviates from it. This is the question of whether the human soul is generated from the potencies of matter, where Usingen thinks that Aristotle also understands the generation here taking place by virtue of natural agents which does not consider any supernatural influence. For this reason Usingen thinks that Aristotle also understood the generation of the soul as being derived from the potencies of matter (*sentit animam rationalem educi de potentiis materiae*), where it does not differ from the generation of animal souls. Usingen understands that Aristotle could not have known any other manner of generation, being a pure philosopher; but for the Christian theologian, such an understanding of generation is insufficient. The Christian notion of creation, which is not the same as the purely philosophical concept of generation, presupposes, according to Usingen, a predisposed subject, where the soul will be created, but does not take place by virtue of natural agents, but rather as the divine act of creation instead. Concerning the generation of the soul, Usingen seems to imply here that there were no lines of argumentation that Aristotle could have established, based upon his natural reason. This comes close, by the way, to Buridan's view that Alexander's position, which in this matter is shared by Aristotle, cannot be falsified by natural reason alone.⁴²

Augustine from *De libere arbitrio* 2, 7, 15 is also cited by Gregory here (ed. Trapp, 326, 33-4).

⁴¹ Usingen, *Parvulus*, ff. 111^v-112^r.

⁴² Usingen, *Parvulus*, ff. 112^{r-v}: "Sed quando quaeritur, an haec positio Aristotelica in omnibus concordet cum veritate catholica, respondetur, quod sic, praeter unam particulam, qua sentit animam rationalem generari, quia non generatur illo modo quo Aristoteles loquitur de generatione, quia secundum Aristotelem generari est procedere de non esse ad esse in materia praedisposita virtute agentium naturalium, quod non est aliud quam educi de potentiis materiae. Et sic Aristoteles sensit animam rationalem educi de potentiis materiae sicut brutalem, quia secundum eum octavo Physicorum non est alius modus emanandi effectus a sua causa, quam per generationem, quae est processus formae de non esse ad esse virtute agentium naturalium, quoniam actio specialis Dei vel supernaturalis puro philosopho non fuit cognita sicut est creatio vel annihilatio. . . . Et illa creatio animae rationalis est quasi actio media inter creationem extra subiectum et educationem de potentiis

On the immortality of the soul after death Aristotle thinks otherwise, according to Usingen, agreeing for the most part with the Catholic view which understands the human soul as being immortal. Although, Usingen himself shares the view expressed by Pierre d'Ailly and Gregory of Rimini⁴³ that Aristotle speaks on these matters ambiguously, and he refuses to harmonize the contradictory statements found in Aristotle's writings. In his opinion, Aristotle is more likely to hold the opinion of the perpetuity of the human soul, and therefore conceding to Christian doctrine. It is evident, nevertheless, that Usingen understands this as a mere opinion of Aristotle, which is again grounded upon no conclusive philosophical proofs.⁴⁴

A similar solution is evident later in 1507, when Usingen discussed several related questions in his *Exercitium de anima*. The central question of whether or not the intellectual soul is derived from the potencies of matter is not discussed there, but Usingen notes that Aristotle is holding the affirmative view on the question against the Catholic doctrine of creation.⁴⁵ On the immortality of the soul after bodily death, whereby Usingen is persuaded of its existence, is conceded as truth in the philosophy because it does not contradict the natural reason, but is proved on the contrary by dialectical arguments—although not by logically valid proofs. Additionally,

materiae, quia praesupponit subiectum dispositum et tamen non producit virtute agentium naturalium, quare a theologis quandoque vocatur creatio, quandoque vocatur generatio, sed non ad sensum pure philosophicum."

⁴³ Petrus Alliaco, *Tractatus de anima*, 6, 1, ed. Pluta, 35; Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, II, d. 16 et 17, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Trapp, 330, 37-331, 5.

⁴⁴ Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 112r: "Et dixit eum amplius esse perpetuum. Et quamvis Aristoteles videtur talia sensisse tamen non adducit efficaces probationes, quia, ut Cameracensis de eo testatur, quando Aristoteles loquebatur de his, quae in discrimen religionum sonabant et pertinebant paucis transivit iam hoc potius aliud persequendo. Quare repetitur in plerisque locis de eadem re contrarie scripsisse, quia in primo De anima dicit: Non reminiscimur post mortem, in secundo vero dicit: Separetur hoc ab hoc tanquam perpetuum a corruptibili, quae duo manifeste impugnant se, ut patet clare. Nec est opus exponere et concordare, ac si in nullo errasset nec in aliquo sibi contradixisset, quod potius divinum est quam humanum. . . . Quia autem Aristoteles magis inclinatus fuerit huic positioni quam oppositae, signanter de perpetuitate animae, claret ex hoc, quod eius scripta magis sonant pro illo."

⁴⁵ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, f. L3v: "Tertio notandum est omnem formam substantialem materialem generabilem et corruptibilem de potentiis materiae esse eductam generando et rursum retransire in potentias materiae corrumpendo, quia secundum Philosophum primo Physicorum materia est primum subiectum talis formae. Et quid corrumpitur in hoc abibit ultimum, sed anima rationalis iuxta veritatem catholicam non sic educitur, sed immediate a Deo creatur in corpore. Nec retransit in morte hominis in potentias materiae, sed separatur a corpore acquirens esse per se subsistentiae."

Aristotle is reckoned among the adherents of immortality, in spite of some contrary arguments, which Usingen discusses, among others.⁴⁶

On the question whether the human soul is the substantial form of the body, Usingen defines his view of the relation between theology and philosophy. After discussing the question on the basis of the Catholic Christian position as a part of his argumentation,⁴⁷ he asks in a separate question, if the position can be defended from the standpoint of the arguments of pure natural reason (*utrum circumscripta fide catholica ratio naturalis dictaret intellectum humanum esse formam corporis humani*).⁴⁸ His final answer is contrasted with Ockham's position in his *Quodlibeta*, where the latter holds the view that the natural reason cannot demonstrate or prove as evidently probable that the intellectual soul is the form of the body. According to Usingen this is naturally believable (*naturaliter persuasibile*) and dialectically provable (*dialectice conclusibile*), which is enough for him to answer his main question affirmatively, namely that according to the natural reason this position is to be considered true.⁴⁹ A similar view is expressed in Usingen's *Exercitium physicorum* concerning the question whether it is to be conceded, according to the philosophy of nature, that the First mover is omnipresent, which he answers affirmatively. The answer is grounded on reasoning that this truth, which is known to be true from revelation, does not contradict the principles of natural science because of the coherence of all truths, and this is a sufficient condition for its being true also in natural science. So in theory, Usingen includes such articles of faith, which do not contradict the principles of natural science as a part of the natural sciences themselves. He also finds it important to note here, however, that this truth can be deduced from the principles of natural science as a probable, although not evident, truth.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, ff. M4^v; N1^r.

⁴⁷ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, ff. L4^v-M1^v.

⁴⁸ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, ff. M1^v-M2^v.

⁴⁹ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, f. M2^v: "Ad tertium dicitur secundum Guilhelum Ockham non esse ratione naturali evidenter probabile vel demonstrabile intellectum humanum esse formam corporis humani, ut docet in Quodlibeto; est enim naturaliter persuasibile et dialectice conclusibile, seclusa et circumscripta fide catholica, quod sufficit ad veritatem responsionis. An autem articuli fidei et in conciliis per ecclesiam determinata sint demonstrabilia nec ne, habet videri in theologia." Usingen uses the expressions *lumen naturae* and *ratio naturalis* interchangeably, and he differs clearly from Lawrence of Lindores' use of the concept *lumen naturae*, which included only evident or naturally demonstrated truths. See Usingen, *Ex. an.*, f. M1^r and *Ex. Phys.*, f. 51^v; Lawrence of Lindores, *Questiones de anima*, III, q. 4, cited in Pluta 1986 (above, n. 35), 107.

⁵⁰ Usingen, *Ex. phys.*, ff. 52^{r-v}: "Quibus praemissis respondetur ad questionem affirmative.

Following Marsilius of Inghen, Usingen explains that this does not contradict the idea that Christian faith does not depend on philosophical proofs. Only some articles of faith, like the ones concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation, are known only through revelation; there are several others that are known by natural reason also, but one's faith in them does not rely on their philosophical demonstrability, because they would be believed also, even when there were no philosophical proofs for them.⁵¹

So we can sketch the position in these controversial matters in Erfurt before the determination of the Fifth Lateran Council. In the questions discussed above, Usingen seems to think that in the controversial doctrines concerning the intellect there are no evident philosophical grounds that would necessarily contradict the Catholic doctrine. There are some doctrines, like the soul being derived from potencies of matter, where pure philosophers like Aristotle follow their erroneous views systematically, because they know nothing of Christian revelation, but Christian doctrine does not really contradict their views, but rather includes it since it is insufficient in itself. Notably, this doctrine was not among those condemned by the Fifth Lateran Council, but only the related question on the immortality of the soul after death.⁵²

Usingen does not see in this doctrine a necessary connection to the question of immortality, as Aristotle holds both of them. In this doctrine Aristotle, and most philosophers, even agreed with the Christian dogma, but their proofs were a type of dialectical demonstration, and not logically valid consequences. Discussing the question on the soul as a substantial form of the body, the dialectical proof was taken by Usingen as a philosophically plausible way of affirming truth in the natural sciences. It may seem that this view exceeds the limits of natural philosophy, which he set for himself in the initial question of *Exercitium de anima*. There he defined the knowledge of the soul to be founded on the demonstrated

Haec responsio probatur autoritate et ratione. . . . Ratione sic, quia non repugnat principiis naturalis rationis cum sit verum, ut testatur fides orthodoxa, sed omne verum vero consonat, principia autem naturalis rationis omnia sunt vera cum innitantur divine veritati, quae est metrum et mensura omnium verorum. Etiam potest probabiliter deduci ex principiis naturalis rationis, sed non evidenter, ut dicit Londorius, quia est quedam veritas conformis lumini naturalis rationis, ad quam possunt movere principia naturalia, sed non evidenter probare." Usingen refers here explicitly to Lawrence of Lindores (Londorius).

⁵¹ Usingen, *Ex. an.*, f. M2^v.

⁵² See *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Tanner, 605-7.

truths of the soul, although he did not discuss there whether the demonstration must be evident or not.⁵³

One should note here concerning the doctrines, which the Fifth Lateran Council later declared as orthodox, that Usingen thought they were also philosophically the most probable, although not to be demonstrated by logically valid proofs. He even strived to refute any arguments against them, as the Council also recommended and urged.⁵⁴

4. *Trutfetter and the Fifth Lateranum*

As one might expect, there are some new aspects in Trutfetter's *Summa in totam physicen*, which came out in 1514, the year after the decree of the Fifth Lateran Council. Trutfetter describes his work as an *epitome*, an introduction into natural philosophy, which mainly describes the position of the *via moderna* without going into a detailed discussion on individual topics.⁵⁵ Trutfetter's work can also be considered as a nominalist counterpart for a *via antiqua* compendium of philosophy: *Margarita philosophica* by Georg Reisch (1503), which was actually one of its sources.⁵⁶

The latter contains extensive discussions on theological matters in its book on psychology, which Trutfetter could make use of.⁵⁷ The theological interest in *Margarita* fit well within Trutfetter's concept, as he considered *Summa* according to its title "an exposition of natural philosophy in conformity with the true wisdom, which is theology." Despite this emphasis Trutfetter does not contain as much theological discussion in

⁵³ See above, n. 13.

⁵⁴ *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Tanner, 606, 7-10.

⁵⁵ Trutfetter, *Summa* A5^r: "Has siquidem omnes quum nec etiam in transitu, ut dici solet, et superficie commemorare compendii ratio sinat, collibeat saltem post habitis disceptationibus supervacaneis, speculationibus superioribus, probationibusque minus necessariis paucula quedam generaliora et necessaria (quae tantillae aetati, cui hoc Epitome dedicare constituimus, congruere et initiatorum animos oblectare simul ac ad altiora capescenda preinstruere valeant) simplici narratione ac stilo plano, eorum solum, quos nominales vocant, sententiam recitando cum annotationibus quibusdam in marginae profusorem ampliorem lectionem praelibare." The work is a compendium of natural philosophy in the manner of his own compendium of logic *Breviarium dialectice* (1500, later under the name *Epitome seu breviarium logice*). Humanist Christoph Scheurl calls Trutfetter's *Summa* "compendium seu potius enchiridion universam naturalem philosophiam," *Christoph Scheurls Briefbuch, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Reformation und ihre Zeit*, ed. F. F. von Soden and J. K. F. Knaake. Vol. 1, Potsdam 1867, 137. (Letter to Trutfetter 13 December 1514).

⁵⁶ I use here the 1508 edition of *Margarita philosophica*, Strasbourg 1508.

⁵⁷ See e.g. Trutfetter, *Summa*, ff. Y4^r and Z1^r, where Reisch is explicitly cited.

his exposition as Reisch, and focuses more along the lines of Usingen's *Parvulus*, presenting mainly an introduction to natural philosophy, with certain discussions on the relevant theological issues.⁵⁸

The beginning of Trutfetter's exposition of psychology in *Summa* resembles Reisch's *Margarita*, but rearranging the material from Augustine, which Reisch cites word-for-word. First he removes doubts that no such thing as the soul exists whatsoever. He does this by an early form of Cartesian "cogito" from Augustine's *De trinitate*. This states that no wise man would deny the existence of a soul, while the doubt itself indicates a living thing, the doubting indicates a memory and finally a doubting person understands himself doubting. So three basic elements of a soul, namely life, memory and understanding, are indicated by its reflective acts concerning the very doubt of its existence.⁵⁹

After that Trutfetter proceeds by introducing the variety of opinions concerning the essence and origin of the soul, with a special consideration of their erroneous nature. Some of them imply the mortality of the rational soul, since they see the soul as material or being some sort of bodily composition. He sees the error of the soul's material nature refuted (as Reisch does) already by Aristotle in the first book of *De anima* where the Philosopher treats some views of his predecessors.⁶⁰ Later on Trutfetter admits, as does Usingen, that Aristotle himself is not unambiguous on

⁵⁸ "Summa in totam physicen, hoc est philosophiam naturalem siquidem verae sophiae, quae est theologia, per D. Judocum Isennachensem in gymnasio Erphordensi elucrabata et edita". According to his friend Christoph Scheurl, Trutfetter's fame was so widespread in German universities that in autumn 1513 some adherents of the *via moderna* from the University of Freiburg in Breisgau fervently asked for Trutfetter's books, which Scheurl subsequently delivered to them. Especially expositions of physics and metaphysics were eagerly anticipated, but only textbooks on logic were available at that time. See *Christoph Scheurl's Briefbuch*, ed. von Soden (above, n. 55), 125. (Letter to Trutfetter, 25 August 1513.) About a year afterwards, Trutfetter had finished his *Summa* and there is again evidence from Scheurl that the writing of this first work on natural philosophy was no minor accomplishment for Trutfetter. See *Christoph Scheurl's Briefbuch*, ed. von Soden, 138. (Letter to Trutfetter, 13 December 1514): "Laborasti iam longo tempore et noctes [noctis ed.] dixisti insomnes, absolvisti novum opus cum magna laude, pervenisti ad dulcem metam: rogo te quiesce modo, obsecro te resume vires, dormi, ede, bibe, laetare, cura valetudinem; nam te valente valet Erphordia, valet Friburgum, valet studiosa iuventus, valet posteritas."

⁵⁹ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. X4^v: "Tale equidem aliquid esse nullus sapientum dubitavit. Quandoquidem (vt beatus Augustinus lib. 10 De trinitate c. 10 ait) enim si quis dubitat, vivit; si dubitat, unde dubitet, meminit; si dubitat, dubitare se intelligit."

⁶⁰ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. X4^v: "Et hi omnes animam mortalem esse senserint, quia sive corpus esset sive aliqua corporis compositio, non posset utique immortaliter permanere." See also *ibid.*, f. Y3^r.

the question of immortality of the rational soul, and cites here Pierre d'Ailly. He even suspects that immortality would not conform to Aristotle's ideas on the eternity of the world and the denial of an actual infinite.⁶¹

The interest on the question of immortality conforms to decisions made by the Lateran Council towards the end of the previous year (19 December 1513), which were transmitted to Trutfetter early in 1514.⁶² In fact, Trutfetter's exposition follows along the basic guidelines posed by the Council, which

strictly enjoin on each and every philosopher who teaches publicly in the universities or elsewhere, that when they explain or address to their audience the principles or conclusions of philosophers, where these are known to deviate from the true faith—as in the assertion of the soul's mortality or of there being only one soul or of eternity of the world and other topics of this kind—they are obliged to devote their every effort to clarify for their listeners the truth of the Christian religion, to teach it by convincing arguments, so far as this is possible, and to apply themselves to the full extent of their energies to refuting and disposing of the philosophers' opposing arguments, since all the solutions are available.⁶³

This kind of method is followed quite clearly in Trutfetter's exposition on *De anima*, culminating at the point where he presents a collection of certain sentences concerning the rational soul, which every Christian should agree upon for his salvation.⁶⁴

One must remember, in any case, that Trutfetter was writing his *Summa* as a teacher of the theological faculty, which would have given him par-

⁶¹ Trutfetter, *Summa* Y3: "Quid autem Aristoteles de hac re senserit, ex libris ipsius autenticis perspicue non habetur, quia de his quae tangunt sectas et religiones hominum communiter ambigue et obscure loquitur. Hoc tamen certum est, quod nonnulla sibi repugnantia ponit. Non video enim quod sibi consonant mundum fuisse ab aeterno, singulorum hominum singulas esse animas immortales et perpetuas et non esse multitudinem actu infinitam." See Petrus Aillyaco, *Tractatus de anima*, 6, 1, ed. Pluta, 35. Also Gregory of Rimini noted this argument which is directed against the idea of the immortality of individual souls, but according to him the eternity of the world and the actual existence of the infinite number of souls are possible in *potentia Dei absoluta*. See Gregorius Ariminensis, *Lectura*, II, d. 16 et 17, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Trapp, 331, 6-8. Alexander's and Averroës' positions are described shortly before that of Aristotle, following along the same lines as Usingen in his earlier works.

⁶² A letter from Christoph Scheurl to Trutfetter dated 23 March 1514 clearly indicates that Trutfetter was familiar with the councilar decision at that time. See Gerhard Ebeling, *Lutherstudien*, Vol. 2/2, Tübingen 1982, 76, n. 60. An explicit allegation to the decree is found in Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. Y4: "Quam quidem constitutionem modernus pontifex Leo decimus in concilio Lateranense novissimis his diebus innovavit."

⁶³ *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Tanner, 606.

⁶⁴ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. Y2^v.

ticular interest in theological matters here. Interestingly, the Council also takes a position on the length of the studies in natural philosophy, when immediately after the afore cited passage it is recommended that after five years of studies in natural philosophy, one should proceed in this area only together with theological studies, in order to avoid the embellishment of heresies among the secular philosophers.⁶⁵

On the other hand, Trutfetter himself underlines the importance of the study of psychology for theologians. After having discussed the distinction of the potencies of the soul, he emphasizes the importance of this study for theologians, alluding to the theological notion of the soul as an image of the Trinity. Although he leaves the detailed discussion on the theological implications to theological studies, he implies a connection between philosophical psychology and theology, the former being helpful in the clear exposition of this theological doctrine. It is not to be overseen, however, that the psychological analogy was widely used, for example, in the sermons on the Trinity.⁶⁶

In accordance with Usingen, Trutfetter notes that the 'soul' is here used as a soul connected with the body, excluding God or various movers of celestial bodies, etc.⁶⁷ He even explicates the science of psychology in a similar manner, noting that metaphysics explicates the soul in absolute terms, while psychology, as a part of natural philosophy, treats it with terms that connote movement and change. Of some interest is Trutfetter's notion that the absolute terms of metaphysics are of the kind that they are essentially predicated of a soul.⁶⁸ Otherwise he is satisfied to distinguish

⁶⁵ *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Tanner, 606.

⁶⁶ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. Z4^r: "Sed diceret quis: quid theologis cum tam studiosa disquisitione distinctionis potentiarum animae; videtur namque relinquenda philosophis. Is sciat eam non parum conferre theologis ad convenientem assignationem imaginis beatissimae Trinitatis in anima rationali, quam quidam consistere astruunt in his tribus potentiis, memoria scilicet intellectu et voluntate, alii iterum aliter, recentiores vero in essentia animae et duobus actibus nobilissimarum potentiarum, scilicet intellectus et voluntatis, ut patet plenius circa dist. 3. Magistri [libri] 1. [Sententiarum], quae missafacio ad specialem potentiarum tractatum properans." Contemporary examples of use of the psychological analogy can be found, e.g., in Martin Luther, *D. Martin Luthers Werke (Weimar Edition = WA)*, Weimar 1883-, 1, 85, 29-86, 7; 4, 599, 10-21.

⁶⁷ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. X5^r.

⁶⁸ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. X6^r: "Caeterum quia nunc de anima tractatum instituimus sciendum, non esse nostri propositi nunc tractare de anima per terminos absolutos et essentialiter praedicabiles de pronomine animam demonstrante (quod metaphysica de ea considerat), sed per terminos motum et mutationem connotantes (qui ad naturalem philosophiam spectant)."

psychology from the other sciences, such as physics, moral philosophy, rhetoric, botany, and zoology, with brief remarks.⁶⁹

Although a part of natural philosophy, Trutfetter considers the empirical or rational philosophical approach to psychology insufficient, if its conclusions would strive against certain basic theological truths which, as noted above, are to be believed by every Christian at the foundation of divine revelation in the Scriptures and in the testimony of the Catholic fathers. As such, neither of these truths contradict the teachings of many pagan philosophers, but are in fact also found in their writings, as several theologians in history have also noted.⁷⁰

In addition to its basic positive attitude, Trutfetter's exposition does reveal a consciously nominalist reading of the determination of the Fifth Lateran Council. First of all, he finds it necessary to emphasize, as Usingen did in his *Exercitium*, that he does not imply thoughts such that doctrinal truths were to be understood by natural reason alone. So, he alludes to several explanations as to why some theological truths are to be found in the writings of some pagan philosophers. Moreover, his emphasis upon these doctrinal sentences concerning the rational soul are to be believed in the case of contradicting the philosophical argumentation, which leads to similar thoughts.⁷¹

Thereafter Trutfetter mentions that Aquinas discusses the doctrines of the soul as a form of body and its immortality but, as Ockham has shown, his proofs are not conclusive. So Trutfetter denies, as does Usingen, the possibility of conclusive philosophical proofs for these doctrines, but relies instead on ockhamistic principle of non-demonstrability of the articles of faith. Trutfetter may have thought, like Usingen, that the immortality of

⁶⁹ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. X6^v.

⁷⁰ Trutfetter, *Summa*, ff. Y2^v-Y3^r: "Haec veritas satis abundeque firmata est sanctorum scripturarum catholicorum quoque doctorum testimoniis, quae cuique christiano longe amplius valere debent omni humana experientia, persuasione aut quantumcumque efficaci demonstratione. Hanc praeterea sacrae fidei veritatem (ut et omne divinae religionis archanum) particulatim diversis diversa inventientibus (ut Lactantius ait libri Divi. institut. 7. c. 7.) philosophi attigerunt, quamvis summam nullus comprehendere potuerit."

⁷¹ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. Y3^r: "Nec tamen suspiceris velim candide lector, me in eam delapsam stoliditatem, quo sentiam sacrae fidei nostrae inscrutabilia mysteria humana ratione comprehensa, sed ea in libris gentilium sparsa, vel ex paterna instructione, vel Mosis prophetarumque aviditate sciendi studiosa lectione, vel speciali divina aut diabolica revelatione, vel quia illa gentilium libris false ab haereticis (et Pelagianis potissimum) ascripta sint, quo fidei nostrae archana puris naturalibus et non gratiae ascribebant." See also the previous note.

the soul can, in some weaker sense, be proved by the philosophers, but belongs basically to the articles of faith.⁷²

Trutfetter's collection of sentences, which he required to be believed regarding the rational soul, is in itself an elucidating account of his views on the relationship between theology and philosophy. As noted above, the passage seems to be influenced by the newly issued decree concerning the immortality of the soul. For this reason Trutfetter also comes to note on the soul as being separated from the body, although he had just excluded it from the foregoing treatise.⁷³ The other important source seems to be the Sentences commentary of Gabriel Biel, which was used extensively in the *Summa*.

Trutfetter introduces some sentences concerning the origin of human souls. He states that rational souls are created individually after the formation of their respective bodies, and that they are infused into their bodies, viz., united to inform them as their essential forms.⁷⁴ The notion that human souls are created individually after the bodies is already clearly articulated in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (2 Sent. 17). Trutfetter cites Lombard word for word earlier in the *Summa*, dealing with the creation of man.⁷⁵ There he also notes that this theme was already discussed in the influential quodlibetal dispute of 1497, which preceded an extensive ockhamistic reform in the studies of the philosophical faculty of the University of Erfurt. Trutfetter points out the unanimity of the Catholic position formulated by Lombard and the main conclusion of the Erfurtians.⁷⁶

⁷² Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. Y3^r: "Nec prorsus me fugit doctorem sanctum l. q. 75 ar. 6 animae immortalitatem, item 76. ar. 1 animam intellectivam esse formam corporis (et ita alios alios quosdam dictae veritatis articulos) attentasse demonstrare, sed id minus efficaciter effectum probat doctor subtilis li. 4. dist. 43. q. 2. et post Guillelmum Ockam Gabriel ubi supra atque proinde homini sola fide credita."

⁷³ It must be admitted that in this respect there had been previous deviations, e.g. Usingen had treated the question of the intellection of the soul as being separate from the body already in 1499, although he mentions that this theme is not found in Aristotle. See Usingen, *Parvulus*, f. 124^r.

⁷⁴ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. Y2^r: "Cuique corpori iam formato ac sufficienter disposito propria peculiarisque anima a deo creatur, creandoque infunditur illi, quae [quod *ed.*], tanquam proprio perfectibili, per realem informationem, ut per se et essentialis forma, unitur, ut inibi Deo creatori suo famulans maiorem annonam mereatur."

⁷⁵ Trutfetter, *Summa*, ff. P3^v-4^r citing Petrus Lombardus, 2 *Sent.*, d. 17, c. 2.

⁷⁶ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. P4^r: "Hoc siquidem intellectu et sensu nec secus anno salutis nostre 1497 in disputatione de quolibet inter alia conclusimus. Praelarga conditoris clementia homini animantium prestabilissimo ac omnium facile optimo corpus non sine membrorum decora et commoda commensuratione donans capiti omnem coeli ornatum inscribendo, animam immortalem liberi arbitrii munere praeditam ad scientias virtutesque capescendas

Apart from the word 'infusion' used by Lombard, Biel adds the word 'union' saying hereto that rational souls are created by God, and the meaning of Gen. 2:7, whereby the soul is said to be insufflated into man, is to be understood as God making the individual spirit and "uniting" it with the man.⁷⁷ The Council and Peter Lombard talk only of the "infusion" of souls, so it is natural that Trutfetter combines these two formulations. The notion of the soul as an essential form is also found in the determination of the Council, which cites the decree of the Vienna Council of 1312, whereby the Averroistic view of one common rational soul, which merely governs the bodies without being their essential form, was rejected.⁷⁸

Furthermore, rational souls are immaterial and independent from the determining of a body and not to be located in any particular part of the body. Again, they are immutable, indivisible, and immortal, so that in death the soul leaves the body, but without transmigration in an animal or a plant. Their final destiny is to be led into eternal life in the blessed vision of God or into eternal punishment, both according to their individual merits, whereby they are reunited to their bodies which they had before their death.⁷⁹

semina habentem indidit naturalibus potentiis ac viribus modo coelestium sphaerarum distinctis eam insignando [insignendo *ed.*].” Cf. Usingen, *Ex. an.*, f. L3^v: “Sed anima rationalis iuxta veritatem catholicam non sic educitur, sed immediate a Deo creatur in corpore.”

⁷⁷ Gabriel Biel, *Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum*, II, 17, q. 1 G, 37-8, ed. W. Werbeck & U. Hoffmann, Tübingen 1973-92, 394: “Sexta opinio et catholica est, quod anima immediate a Deo creatur et non educitur de potentia materiae.” Ibid. II, 17, q. 1 D 2-3, ed. Werbeck, 391: “Ad primam dicendum quod ‘inspirare’ vel ‘insufflare’ secundum aliam translationem in praedicta auctoritate ‘idem est quod spiritum facere et’ eum corpori unire.” Biel cites here Bonaventure’s commentary on the same text. Cf. also Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. P3^v: “Quam nec Deus de sua essentia (ut quidam haeretici putaverunt), nec de aliqua materia formatam, sed <de> nihilo creatam univit.”

⁷⁸ *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Tanner, 605, 21-5: “Cum illa non solum per se et essentialiter humani corporis forma existat, sicut in canone felicitis recordationis Clementis papae V praedecessoris nostri in generali Viennensi concilio edito continetur, verum et immortalis, et pro corporum quibus infunditur multitudine singulariter multiplicabilis, et multiplicata, et multiplicanda sit.” The term ‘essential form’ in Trutfetter instead of ‘substantial form’ in Usingen’s works (see *Ex. an.*, f. A2^v and *Parvulus*, f. 81^v) alludes to the influence of the determination. See also Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. Y4^r: “Maledictus quoque ille Averrois eas non esse formas substantiales corporum, sed per assistentiam dumtaxat uniri corporibus proinde atque rectores navibus, quem errorem Ecclesia damnavit et haeticum declaravit, ut habetur in Clementina unica De summa trinitate et fide catholica, quam quidem constitutionem modernus pontifex Leo decimus in concilio Lateranense novissimis his diebus innovavit.”

⁷⁹ Trutfetter, *Summa*, f. Y2^r: “Immaterialis siquidem, nec ullam sibi corporis particulam determinans, sed omnibus proprii corporis particulis tota simul assistens. Non maior in

This latter part of the passage seems to be influenced by the Council regarding the immortality of the soul only in general terms, and it describes the different destinies of the rational soul in far more detailed a manner than the Council's Determination. In it Trutfetter gathers and refutes various philosophical opinions that would contradict the Catholic Christian doctrine. So if he were at first inspired by the Determination, he continues far beyond its actual contents. By doing this, he brings forth some results of a previous discussion on theological doctrines in psychology, to point out to his readers this problematic in the very introduction to psychology.

One cannot pass over the allusion to similar themes in the disputation by Trutfetter's pupil and a fellow colleague from a neighboring university some years later. In the philosophical theses of the Heidelberg Disputation in 1518, Martin Luther also discussed the immortality of the soul as one of the themes. Luther's main point was to show that Aristotle systematically teaches the mortality of the soul, in which Luther clearly differed from his teachers. His main argument was linking the question to the doctrine of the eternity of the world, which was also noted by Trutfetter as a questionable point against Aristotle. In addition to this, he also extensively discussed largely the textual evidence from Aristotle on immortality, but considered it in support of his own interpretation.⁸⁰

5. *Concluding Remarks*

Concerning the relationship between theology and philosophy in the early 16th century, Usingen's and Trutfetter's expositions of *De anima* are noteworthy, mainly in two respects. Firstly, they represent a position, which faithfully follows, in methodology and aspirations, the tradition of the late medieval *via moderna*. Secondly, from that starting point they give an interpretation on the relationship between philosophy and theology, which

maioribus, nec minor in minoribus, sed indivisibilis inpartibilisque, nec ad membri sectionem divisionem patiens, nec retrocedens, sed membrum dissectum vivificare desinens, non moriens in corpore nec post interitura. Non in caelestia, bestiarum, plantarumque corpora aut demonum naturas transmigrans, sed immortalis perseverans, corpore exuta pro meritorum suorum qualitate (nisi debitum aliquod satisfaciendi adhuc pro peccatis venialibus aut mortalibus, quo ad culpam hic dimissis, retardaverit) vel limpidissimam divinitatis beatificam visionem, vel aeternae damnationis poenam mox consequitur. Tandem in adventu districti iudicis ipso eodem corpore, quod hic per mortem deposuerat, iterum supervestienda in illo quoque, aut pro iustitia premio, aut pro sceleribus poena, aeternaliter afficienda."

⁸⁰ Luther, *WA*, 59, 410, 15-420, 3.

Trutfetter considered consonant with the formulations of the Fifth Lateran Council of 1513 on the same matter, even showing similar intentions as the Council in its expressions; and finally, Trutfetter also provides a practical application of the Council's recommendations.

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Reviews

The Winged Chariot. Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk, eds. M. Kardaun and J. Spruyt. Brill, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2000, xxvi & 331 p. ISBN 90 04 11480 7

Introduction

It is not too late to review a good book, that not only offers a complete bibliography of prof. L.M. de Rijk and a detailed picture of his lively interest in and of his deep knowledge of ancient and medieval philosophy, but gives also an idea of how his school follows his path without just accepting the Word of the Teacher (or better, of the *auriga*, as the title suggests), but discussing his interpretations and sometimes correcting them.

The volume presents itself as a sort of monography, divided into ten chapters, each dealing with one or more authors or topics, following a chronological order. The choice of the themes and their distribution through the centuries, from Antiquity to the Late Middle Ages, reflects somehow de Rijk's scientific production: five over ten chapters are devoted to Antiquity (Plato, of course, but not only); four of them deal with the Middle Ages; and only one is dedicated to a Neoplatonic author (John Philoponus).

In what follows, we will present and discuss these chapters, dealing with the first part as a whole, then with those about XIIth-century authors, and finally with the remnants.

1. *The third way of the logos*

In introducing this collection of essays, the editors remark that "the core of Plato's work is formed by the semantics and logic of the Being" (p. XII). Undoubtedly, by this claim they intend highlighting here, as in many other passages, the debt their studies owe to de Rijk's approach to Platonic issues, especially as argued in his Commentary on the *Sophist*. However, they specify that this thematic domain is developed only by one of the essays expressly devoted to Platonic texts. The editors refer to D. O'Brien's article (chapter two), where the author compares Parmenides' and Plato's positions about 'what is not'. On the contrary, we think that this preliminary assertion might reveal a fruitful perspective in order to give an account of the first part of the book as a whole.

Let us start, then, from the end of this first part, i.e. from the conclusions that M. Kardaun draws in her essay about the Platonic conception of art. According to her, this conception results neither completely negative towards nor different from the theory of art held by Aristotle in his *Poetics*. Reading Platonic art theory in this new and more complex way is made possible by a preliminary reconsideration of the pivotal term *mimēsis*, which Kardaun chooses to translate by 'representation' rather than by the usual 'imitation'. She prefers to use the second word only for signifying the worse kind of mimetic art, the one implied in the production of mere *phantasmata* and, consequently, the one which Plato refuses to admit in the ideal city of the *Republic*. Nonetheless, it is possible to find a higher level of artistic production which is not condemned, since it is based upon the representation of something of the World of Ideal Forms.

Kardaun affirms that Aristotle inherited from Plato the consideration of artistic literature as a mimetic medium, in the sense that it “represents its object in a picturelike, immediate, non-discursive way” (p. 161). To support her thesis, the scholar quotes a passage from Aristotle’s *Poetics* (1460b), where the poet as a *mimētēs* is compared to a painter (*zōgraphos*) or to any other image-maker (*eikonopoios*) (p. 139, note 27). But are we sure that a literary text is mimetic “notwithstanding its use of words”, as claimed by Kardaun?

A Platonic dialogue, in particular, discusses the problem of the two kinds of *mimēsis*: the *Sophist*, that is exactly the dialogue analysed by O’Brien from an ontological point of view. In his (very) long and fascinating overview, the scholar inquires into a third ontological way proposed by Plato, a way that is able to go beyond the Parmenidean dichotomy between ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’, the latter resulting unthinkable and unsayable. That third way, entailing being and not-being without any contradiction, is the way of otherness, as O’Brien remarks (p. 55ff.). Let us quote some other passages of the dialogue preceding and following those on which O’Brien’s essay is focused. The two main characters of the *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus, need to tackle the questions concerning otherness, because their problem, first of all, is to define what an image is. Theaetetus claims that an *eidōlon*, the term chosen in the dialogue to mean ‘image’ in general, is nothing but a *heteron toiouton* (an other such) in its being similar to (*aphomoiōmenon*) what is true (240a). However, as soon as image features are fixed that way, the characters of the dialogue can no longer speak about *eidōlon*, viz. *mimēma*, but only and expressly about image *qua* icon (*eikōn*: 240b), that is about one of the two kinds of image presented in the dialogue.

The diaeresis between *eikōn* and *phantasma*, considered respectively as the better and the worse kind of *mimēma*, derives, in its turn, from the need for grasping the sophist’s essence by a clear formula. The aptest definition of his nature had been found in his being a controversialist (*antilogikos*: 225b, 232b) able to deny any argumentation and, consequently, in his being an image-maker (*eidōla poiein*: 234b—also quoted by Kardaun at p. 139). In fact, in denying everything, the sophist seems to possess a real knowledge about all (233b-d), even though claiming it can not forcibly be anything but an illusory joke (234a). Also the art of creating images, however, is a joke founded on the creation of false appearances which, in the case of the sophist, are “said images” (*eidōla legomena*: 234c). From this it derives that images’ way of being, i.e. their otherness, can not be dissociated from the semantics of the *logos* in any way, although the diaeresis concerning images deals essentially, in the *Sophist* (235d-236c), with visual artistic *mimēmata*. Thereby, what kind of images are sophistic discourses concerned with? The conclusive definition of the sophist depicts him as a *phantasmata* maker and connects him to a *mimētikē technē* only able to create a knowledge founded on the opinion (*doxa*). The *mimēsis* practiced with *epistēmē*—viz. the higher level of *mimēsis*—is considered instead as only related to *sophos*’ linguistic representations (266d-268d). It remains now to understand what kind of images the higher *mimēsis* should be concerned with.

Let us leave for the moment the question unanswered and continue reading the *Mélanges de Rijk*. The opposition *epistēmē-doxa* comes back in J.M. van Ophuijsen’s essay, which is focused on Plato’s concept of *pistis* (trust), considered from the perspective of its possible influence on the following religious notion of faith. Van Ophuijsen’s claims are negative about the legacy at issue, unless one intends *pistis* in the sense “of allowing oneself to be guided by, of relying upon, another; a reliance that is in this case correct (*orthon*) because the guide is the person who knows (has *epistēmē*)” (p. 124). In the *Republic*, *pistis* is associated to a hierarchical ladder of knowledge, in which it is collocated at the second rung from the bottom, dealing with *doxastikē* cognition and opposed to the two higher degrees of knowledge, that are, from the top, *epistēmē* and *dianoia*. The same opposition is also present in Plato’s *Gorgias* (not by chance, the name of a sophist), where, according to van Ophuijsen, “there are two types of persuasion: one that furnishes belief-upon-trust with-

out knowing, and one that does furnish knowledge (*epistēmē*)” and is consequently “an instructing teaching type” (see p. 125, for the quotations from *Gorgias* too). Whereas rhetoric, that is sophistic art, belongs clearly to the first type, on the contrary the didactical type of persuasion will pertain to the philosopher’s (or *sophos*’) way of speaking about things. The paideutic purpose of philosopher’s *logos* leads us back exactly to the *Republic*’s questions concerning education (*paideia*) of future citizens in virtue of the higher kind of *mimēsis*, in the very way in which they are discussed by Kardaun (pp. 143-4). The problem is really the same, since the semantic creations of the *logos*, as we have already seen, are images.

Following O’Brien’s right interpretation of Platonic “moves” in the *Sophist* (p. 55ff.), the third ontological way of otherness is in the middle between the two ways presented by Parmenides, because it is not a way of not-being in any way at all (*mēdamōs*: *Soph.* 237b, 240e), but a way of not-being (and contemporaneously being) in some respect (*pōs, kata ti*: 241d). Being ‘other than’ means not-being *qua* ‘being different from’. Hence, we would like to add to O’Brien’s analysis, any image shares in the not-being of otherness insofar as it is, at the same time, different from and in relation to what it represents (its model: *paradeigma*, 235d) (cf. *Soph.* 255d). In other terms, Plato is here talking about the semiotic nature of every image, its weaving (*symplokē*) of ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ (240c) in its being something which stands for something else. *Qua* other, all images, also those belonging to the linguistic domain, share in falsehood in relation to their paradigms which only are true inasmuch as really (*ontōs*: 240b-c) being. But at this point, how can the content of a discourse, necessarily false in virtue of its semantic nature, be paideutic and able to offer knowledge in any way?

There is another Platonic relevant passage that is not referred to in this volume, but that is strictly linked to these issues, since it talks about the semantics of *eikones* and proposes, once more, a parallelism between language and visual arts. In *Cratylus* 432b-d, both an *onoma*, i.e. a significant word, and a picture (*zōgraphēma*) are firstly described as *mimēmata* (430b-d), then specified as *eikones* of what they represent, because they do not have to be similar (*homoia*) to it in all respects (*pantachē*). Otherwise they in fact would be a double, not a sign of the model. In parallel: their relation of similarity to the model involves a semantic selection of its features. Just this semantic selection is the reason for describing images as *hetera*, different from their model, in the *Sophist*. But, on the basis of the same selection, *eikones* may be also defined as ‘such’, naturally in some respects, since, though false *qua* other, they are able to preserve something of what is represented. This ‘something’, which in the *Cratylus* (432e) is called *typos* (trace), in the *Sophist* corresponds to that true proportion (*alēthinē symmetria*: 235e) whose presence in an image allows to distinguish *eikones* from the complete semantic falsehood of *phantasmata*.

The passages from the *Sophist* and the *Cratylus* show that Kardaun is right in her underlining the need for distinguishing at least two Platonic conceptions of *mimēsis*. However, we do not agree with her claims about the non-discursive character of the higher kind of *mimēsis*, that is the iconic one, at least according to the terminology used in the *Sophist* (to which we shall refer in the following lines too). It is difficult to admit that the semantics of a text is mimetic “notwithstanding its use of words”, after reading in the *Cratylus* that a single word is considered by Plato as a *mimēma*. The iconic semantic model seems in fact extended from the meaning of words to that of texts. Besides, in the *Sophist*, at the level of propositional *logoi*, Plato uses only one term, *symplokē* (weaving), in order to define both their iconic content and their discursive, that is syntactical, composition. The *symplokē* of an *onoma* and a *rhēma* is in fact the least condition to create a *logos* (262c) and, consequently, its semantic images, in their turn involving a weaving of being and not-being. Not only: *logos* belongs to the Beings (*ta onta*) which derive from the *symplokē* of Forms and share the image nature (259e). So, the path we have followed so far in reading the first part of the *Mélanges* seems to coincide with one of the many senses in which Plato’s ontology

might be read from a semantic and logical perspective, such as the editors hint in their introduction.

The third way of otherness, in the middle between 'what is' and 'what is not', is the semantic way of linguistic images. Whenever these are iconic, they are twice in the middle, as far as their similarity is a third way between truth and falsehood, between identity and complete otherness. We think that it is just in virtue of this third iconic way that Plato may still place his trust in *logos*, to such a point to claim in the *Sophist* that without *logos* any form of philosophy would not exist either (260a). Even if expressed in other terms, this might be considered the thematic core of the two essays not quoted yet: the one by J. Mansfeld, concerning the Platonic dialectical way of proceeding in cosmological debates in the *Phaedo*, and the one by D.T. Runia, focused on the *Timaeus*. Trust in *logos* lets Plato use it and especially test its most complex mechanisms in order to tackle the highest issues of his philosophy, such as the cosmological ones. So, beginning from the "dialectical method" of discussion (Mansfeld, p. 13ff.) up to the categorial syllogism which Runia sees in the *Timaeus* (cf. p. 107ff.), in Plato's works a *logica utens*, according to the two scholars, would have already been hinted at, even if it had to expect Aristotle to be explicitly theorized.

In conclusion, it is clear that linguistic *mimēsis* is not able to offer *epistēmē* immediately. In the *Sophist* (263d, 264a-b), in fact, the *logos* does not result disjoined from the creation of *doxai*; however, these may be correct or true and make room for an inquiry into Being. Naturally, this is not the case of the opinions *tout court*, those false and linked to the *phantasmata* of sophistic discourses. On the contrary, the iconic way of the language seems to be the way followed by the philosopher in his search for truth by traces and in his trying to communicate some knowledge about it.

2. Medieval Platonism (almost) without Plato: the High Middle Ages

If, as we will see, in the late middle ages (Aristotelian) realism didn't go hand by hand with Platonism, in the previous centuries things went differently. In IXth century, for instance, an authentic neoplatonic author, the ps. Dionysius Areopagita, started being very influential, at least on theology and metaphysics. It is only in XIIth century, however, that Plato himself acquired a prominent position as authority, at least for some writers such as William of Conches, thanks to the Latin translation of his *Timaeus*. The contribution of W. Otten, devoted to the integration of Christian and Platonic cosmology by William, makes clear how deep was the influence of Plato's model both in stimulating speculations about the universe formation, and in shaping a methodology. As far as the first point is concerned, William of Conches took Plato's *Timaeus* as the opportunity to get an insight into invisible realities (such as the basic elements that constitute every physical object); but he saw in it also a literary model worth to be continued, through the application of *integumentum*, that is myth or allegoric narrative, to give a rational account of nature. As W. Otten says concluding his chapter, "in another decade or so Plato would succumb to Aristotle in a scholastic change of authorities that would revolutionise philosophical and theological speculation". This explains why the two following chapters of this volume (70 pages, nearly a third of the whole book) are dedicated to one the most important XIIth-century theologians, whose semantic theories have been studied by de Rijk in various articles, Gilbert de la Porrée. As we will see, Plato does not appear among his sources, his influence being mediated by the (derived) neoplatonism of Boethius.

The two chapters deal with very different topics. The first one, written by J. Spruyt, is about the distinction between different uses of language in Gilbert's theories of the meaning of terms dealing with the transcendent domain and the natural one; the second chapter, by C.H. Kneepkens, proposes a very interesting comparison between Peter Helias and

Gilbert on some grammatical and semantical problems. The two chapters share some points, but offer two different approaches to the study of Gilbert's linguistic and semantic thought that integrate and complete each other in a very fruitful way.

As its author says at the beginning, chapter eight tries "to explore Gilbert's ideas as to how the significates of terms are influenced when transportation from one domain [i.e. the Transcendent] to the other [the sublunary one] takes place" (p. 205). The exposition of Gilbert's thought is very detailed; it discusses and corrects previous interpretations, giving not only long quotations from Gilbert's works, but also (a difficult task indeed!) the English translations of all of them, which help and guide the reader through the intricacies of a not always perspicuous Latin text. As said above, Gilbert's Platonism doesn't derive from Plato, but from the latin assimilation of Neoplatonism made by Boethius. Notions such as *participatio* or *denominatio*, the distinction between *id quod est* and *id quo est*, that are central in Gilbert's and his followers' semantics, stem back to Boethius' theological treatises. Spruyt's efforts are completely devoted to the reconstruction of Gilbert's theories from his commentaries on Boethius' theological tracts and they offer a convincing picture of them, especially when dealing with the notion of *persona* that, in spite of its central role in trinitarian theology and contrarily to other words pertaining to the Transcendent domain, has its proper use for natural things and it is transferred to the other domain only *ex proportione*, so that "only part of the significative content of *persona* applies to Divine persons" (p. 234). Gilbert works out his theory mainly as theologian, and sometimes refers to other philosophers, as at p. 209. Some of them—he says—hold that, whatever object they speak about, "by the same cause as they are (*esse*), they are a something (*esse aliquid*). Therefore they say that the verb 'is' is said of all things equivocally"; some others, on the contrary, maintain that "entities that subsist are (*esse*) owing to their *subsistentiae* and are a something (*esse aliquid*) owing to the things that accompany the latter", that is quantities and qualities (owing to all other categories, subsistent things neither *are* nor *are a something*). The author of this chapter, being coherently and exclusively dedicated to the interpretation of Gilbert's texts (which is not an easy task), leaves however the reader with some questions open about the identity of these philosophers and the position taken by Gilbert on the subject. Fortunately, the following chapter gives the reader these answers.

The approach adopted by Kneepkens in this chapter is the opposite: Gilbert's and his followers' theories are considered in relation, and in opposition, to those of the Chartrians, and among them especially to those of Peter Helias, the most influential commentator on Priscian's *Institutiones grammaticae*. He does not try to describe the whole theories of the two authors, but prefers to analyse the respective positions about the semantics of the verb *esse* (the substantive verb) as a relevant example, in order to show their differences. The opposition between the two theories is centered around the different conception of substance as special meaning or *res verbi* of the verb *esse* they adopt. According to Peter Helias, it signifies *substantia* as it derives from *substare*, which corresponds to the Greek term *hypostasis* and is to be identified with the bearer of forms that unites them to itself and to each other, but regardless of what forms they are. This is the reason why the verb *esse* is predicated properly of substances (as instances of the Aristotelian category), and only improperly or *transumptive* of accidents. This does not mean that *esse* signifies everything in an equivocal way (*significare omnia ut equivocum*), but only that it is said equivocally of everything (*dici equivoco de omnibus*) (pp. 252-55). This point is made, as Kneepkens shows, very clearly in the older version of Helias' commentary on Priscianus minor, that is not taken into account by the editor of Helias' *Summa*. It must also be said that this point of doctrine is very subtle, but it is crucial for the understanding of both theories. When he comes to Gilbert's and his followers' theory, it is clear that Peter Helias is one of the possible representatives of the first group of philosophers above mentioned, and also that

Gilbert is “a partisan of the group of philosophers who make a distinction between the causes of *esse* and *esse aliquid*”, that is substance, on one side, and quality and quantity, on the other, leaving apart the other seven *accidentia* (p. 260). In the last part of this chapter, Kneepkens shows how Gilbert’s positions were adopted by the Porretani, such as Peter of Poitiers and the author of the *Grammatica Porretana* (edited in CIMAGL 57, 1988, by Fredborg and Kneepkens—we regret that this reference is missing in the bibliography), both in theology and in grammar (with some relevant implications for syntax). In conclusion, both chapters shed light on each other and help us getting a better understanding of the semantical debate around the mid-XIIth century. Only one point remains obscure, according to us: the role of *impositio* for the creation of those terms, such as *esse* and *bonum*, that, in Gilbert’s view, have as their primary meaning the divine Form, while all other things can be said to be or good only by partaking this Form. Given the importance of *impositio* for grammarians and logicians, one wonders whether and in which texts an opposition between a theological perspective and a philosophical one would emerge on this topic, too.

3. Late Antiquity and late Middle Ages: is it possible to conciliate Plato and Aristotle?

Going some steps backwards, chapter five, by M. Kardaun, is followed by a very interesting contribution on Philoponus’ attempt to reconcile Plato’s theory of learning as recollection and Aristotle’s theory of human intellect’s potentiality, conceived of as that of a writing tablet with no sign on it. The author of this contribution, Frans A.J. de Haas, seems to focus on this theme mainly for declaring his gratitude to prof. de Rijk than for its connection to one of the contributions of his teacher: as a matter of fact, he stresses the role of the teacher’s intellect as the active intellect that removes the material impediments towards the knowledge of truth (and that’s why “we always owe thanks to him”, p. 183).

The reference to the Neoplatonic account of how men get to the knowledge of universals, however, represents also a link between this themes and some developments of thirteenth-century metaphysics, that found in Scotus’ writings and Scotism a kind of apex. To the way in which one of Scotus’ followers, Petrus Thomae, distinguished the Aristotelian categories from one another, is devoted the last chapter of this volume, by E.P. Bos. As the author makes clear at the end of his introductory remarks, Petrus Thomae “can be labelled a Platonist”, only “if one takes this label in broad sense” (p. 278). As a matter of fact, even the most realist philosopher at the end of thirteenth century would have rejected this label, as Scotus himself implicitly did in his first questions on the *Peri hermeneias* (q. 1). In XIIIth century, all philosophers wanted (or pretended) to be Aristotelian, and they did not accepted separate Platonic Ideas. It is then more appropriate to talk about Realism rather than of Platonism, for this period, and this is what Bos ends up doing (p. 285: “he [i.e. Petrus Thomae] interprets the different categories as principles of things. His conception is realist.”). Considering for instance an author, such as Robert Grosseteste, in spite of his direct connections to Neoplatonism, and in particular to Philoponus’ commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, would have led to the same conclusion: XIIIth-century realist philosopher, even when he accepted the existence of Platonic Ideas in God’s mind, always tried to reject what was conceived of as the core Platonism, that is the statement about a separate existence of Ideas (cfr. Grosseteste, *In Post. An.*, I.15, where these Ideas are defined as monsters, *prodigia*, formed by the intellect when it fails to understand). Petrus Thomae’s tract is however another very interesting example, together with the *Logica contra Ockham* by the ps.-Richard of Campsall, of how the theoretical tools worked out by Scotus, mainly in his theological writings (such as *distinctio formalis*, *ultima abstractio*, his theory of predi-

cation *in divinis*) were systematically applied to the discussion of logico-metaphysical problems, such as the ontological status of the categories.

Bologna

STEFANIA BONFIGLIOLI (§ 1) and COSTANTINO MARMO (§§ 2-3)

Frans de Haas and Jaap Mansfeld (eds), *Aristotle: 'On Generation and Corruption,' Book I*. Symposium Aristotelicum. Clarendon Press, Oxford 2004 347 p. ISBN 0 19 924292 5

This volume is a collection of papers from the 15th Symposium Aristotelicum held at Deurne, the Netherlands, in 1999. It is organized in keeping with the format of the symposium, with each of the main participants giving a close reading of a pre-assigned portion of the text, focusing on the structure of Aristotle's arguments and their relation to other texts within the Aristotelian corpus as well as to other figures, especially those Aristotle took to be his opponents. The volume features ten essays corresponding to the ten chapters of *De Generatione et Corruptione* I (hereafter *GC* I), plus an introductory and concluding essay. The rationale behind the choice of *GC* I as the topic for the 15th Symposium (the 14th, published by Oxford in 2000, applied the same, chapter-by-chapter analysis to *Metaphysics* XII) is its centrality in the development of Aristotle's physical theory, especially its articulation of the concepts not only of generation/corruption but also of alteration and growth/decay, all of which are essential for understanding the account in *GC* II and *Meteorology* IV of the constitution of homoeomerous matter (flesh, blood, and bone) from the four elements. In this way, *GC* I may be seen as a text of applied physics that is preparatory for the life sciences. Through it, we learn how the general account of motion in the *Physics* applies to the sublunary realm, which in turn provides the rudiments for understanding the motion of living things in the *De Anima* and the *Parva Naturalia*. There is also the fact that *GC* I has been an especially difficult text for both ancient and modern readers, so that, as one of the editors remarks, "there is room for improvement on existing scholarship" (1).

The volume more than meets these aims. Each essay provides a carefully reasoned exegesis of its portion of the text as well as an interpretation of its significance within the broader program of Aristotelian natural philosophy. Of course, where there is interpretation there is also controversy, but the contributors are at least forthright about their disagreements—several of which have been carried over from discussion at the Symposium—and the notes are generous enough to allow non-specialists to see precisely what is at stake. The contributors are also literate about the commentary tradition on *GC* from Simplicius to C. J. F. Williams, so that for those interested in its impact on scientific posterity, the fortunes of a particular interpretation (or, more to the point, misinterpretation) can be reliably tracked. Of course, *GC* was one of the 'books of Aristotle' on the arts curriculum of medieval universities; the masters charged with lecturing on it were influenced in what they said by the commentaries of earlier figures, especially by Averroes (via Michael Scot's thirteenth-century Latin translation of his Middle Commentary on *GC*), Avicenna (through various intermediaries and eventually in a late thirteenth-century translation of his *Kūtāb al-Shifā*), and Philoponus (via Averroes).

One of the strengths of the volume is the way each essay descends to the relevant particulars, and this on two fronts. On the one hand, the authors are single-minded about trying to recover the dialectical context of Aristotle's arguments, especially in connection with his reply to the atomists, his most formidable opponents where the theory of matter is concerned. On the other, they are determined to follow some of the practical implications of Aristotelian natural science given the principles of material change sketched in *GC*

cation *in divinis*) were systematically applied to the discussion of logico-metaphysical problems, such as the ontological status of the categories.

Bologna

STEFANIA BONFIGLIOLI (§ 1) and COSTANTINO MARMO (§§ 2-3)

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I. The results are not always consistent with what we find in other works, but the volume leaves the impression of an Aristotle struggling valiantly to fit the pieces together—and struggle he must if he is to bridge the gap between relatively inert, elementary matter of the cosmos and the homoeomerous matter of living things, a stuff much richer in possibilities.

From a scholarly point of view, there is not a weak link in the entire collection. Medievalists, however, will be especially interested in three topics. First, there is the question of the place of *GC* vis-à-vis the other *libri naturales* in the Aristotelian corpus. In the introductory essay, Myles Burnyeat contends that *GC* must have been written for an audience already familiar with the *Physics*, and that structurally, “as the physics of the bottom, *GC* is twin to *de Caelo* . . . we might think of *de Caelo* I and *GC* I as a pincer movement, one starting from the very top and moving down to the elements, the other starting from the very bottom and moving up to homoeomerous mixtures,” creating “the habitat for the living things to which Aristotle will devote his most scrupulous attention” (14–15). This ought to suggest a research program for the history of natural philosophy: How did medieval readers of *GC* and *de Caelo* understand these texts in relation to the *Physics*? With a few notable exceptions—I will mention here only the fine volume edited by Hans Thijssen and Henk Braakhuis, *The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's 'De generatione et corruptione'* (Brepols, Turnhout 1999)—recent scholars have tended to ignore commentaries on subsidiary texts like *GC* when they wanted to find out about the theory and practice of natural science in the Middle Ages. The only problem with this is that medieval philosophers did not ignore them, suggesting that our picture of the period will remain incomplete until we can understand what they thought they were doing in their commentaries on those texts.

There is also the much-vexed issue of prime matter, discussed in three essays in the volume. Does Aristotle have a doctrine of prime matter, and if so, what form does it take in *GC*? Keimpe Algra shows why, although prime matter plays no role in the text of *GC* I.3 and modern commentators find the notion “basically un-Aristotelian, or even intrinsically incoherent,” many older commentators, including both Philoponus and Thomas Aquinas, found it necessary to ascribe it to Aristotle in order to make sense of the notion of ‘non-being *simpliciter*’ as the *terminus a quo* of substantial change (92). Sarah Broadie follows with an essay arguing that for Aristotle, prime matter “is a principle of *change* only, not of *being*,” requiring for its realization “not stuffing but potentiality” (138). She then gives an elegant rereading of the account of elemental change in *GC* I.4 whereby each simple transition from element to element occurs as part of a four-stage process driven by the singular agency of the sun; change is then understood as proper to the entire cycle of transformations, with elementary bodies left, appropriately enough, to do “the donkey-work of the sublunary world” (141n58). David Charles provides a slightly different interpretation inspired by the concept of a logical object in Kit Fine’s *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects* (Oxford 1985). Like the concept of the ‘now’ in Aristotle’s *Physics*, ‘prime matter’ is the immaterial (and hence imperceptible) substratum or logical ‘underlier’ that persists through elemental change even though no material substance does. Thus, the concept of prime matter traditionally ascribed to Aristotle, i.e., as material or quasi-material substratum, can be avoided ontologically, following Charles’ suggestion, or physically, in terms of Broadie’s cycles of elemental change.

Finally, there is the topic of mixtures treated in *GC* I.10, which was taken up with renewed interest in the fourteenth century following the appearance of Avicenna’s *Liber tertius naturalium de generatione et corruptione*. Dorothea Frede explores some of the reasons for the seemingly undue attention Aristotle gives to mixtures: “*mixis* is not easily classified as a kind of change within one of the ten categories,” she points out, and, unlike proper *pathê*, mixed ingredients retain but do not display their original qualities, since they remain potentially separable (290–92). Of course, medieval Aristotelians were also worried about extra-categorical phenomena, or at least about those that did not appear to be of divine

origin. Frede also sheds light on Aristotle's larger project with an interesting comparison of the treatments of mixture and homogenous matter in *GC* I.10 and homoeomerous tissues of living things in *Meteorologica* IV.8-12. What this shows is that while the Aristotelian natural scientist has an economical account of the material universe in terms of the four elements and their basic properties, this same economy produces "a desperate shortage of differentiae at a higher level of complexity," i.e., when it comes to explaining the non-homogenous parts of organisms, for here "nature needs different and more sophisticated means of production" (312-13). The volume closes with a brief essay by John Cooper contending that commentators since Philoponus have been quick to read Aristotle's theory of mixture as involving the total interfusion of ingredients (despite evidence in *GC* I.10 to the contrary) because they were "surreptitiously" influenced by the Stoic doctrine of Chrysippus, according to whom "a mixture contains within itself in fully actualized form all of its ingredients" (325). Again, the later history of this Stoic reading of Aristotle should be of great interest to scholars as they uncover more of the commentary tradition on *GC*.

In short, one could not hope for a better philosophical introduction to Aristotle's *GC*. In its pages, one can appreciate why *GC* was of central importance to philosophers from late antiquity until the early modern period, though nowadays we tend to think that the *Physics* tells us all we need to know about the way Aristotelians conceived of the workings of the natural world.

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Irène Rosier-Catach, *La parole efficace: signe, rituel, sacré*. Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2004, 780 p. ISBN 2 02 062805 8

In her *La parole comme acte* (1994), Irène Rosier-Catach gave us a foretaste of this book with a section on scholastic discussions of the sacraments as signs. But where that short discussion was essentially synchronic, here she traces the development of sacramental speculative theology from the spectacular intervention of Berengarius of Tours (ca 1010-1088) to the uncompromisingly philosophical approach of Duns Scotus (ca 1265-1308).

The book opens with a forward by Alain de Libera which discusses two distinctions crucial to Rosier's case, those between public and private signs, and between sign and symbol. The need for these distinctions was amply illustrated by the furious debates surrounding the law of 10 February 2004 forbidding the wearing of religious symbols in schools: they played fast and loose with the distinction between signs and symbols, and lacked a theological dimension, even though much of the reasoning implicit in these debates and in the law itself derives from the catholicism of pre-revolutionary France. In his view the remedy to the woolly thinking evident in that controversy lies in books like this one, which investigates the archeology of the religious sign and relates its findings to modern work on language acts.

Rosier-Catach's own introduction places the sacraments themselves in the context of a society permeated with religious and secular ritual, and their theology within its extraordinarily rich discourse on language. Her aim is to "reconstitute the theoretical coherence" of medieval thought on the sacraments by examining how they used the language theory of their times, an approach medieval theologians would have understood: Albert the Great cites its etymology to show that theology was discourse about God. However she does not aim to clarify issues of medieval theology, but theologians' ideas on language. This demands she focus on the contextualisation of language through its communicative functions, which were investigated in some depth by Roger Bacon in particular, and trace the theologian's adaptation of the current linguistic and semiotic ideas to their own purposes.

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The book examines the articulation between the nature of the sacramental sign, the causality which governs the operation of the sacraments, the sacramental formulas, the intentions of minister and receiver of the sacrament. The chapters setting out how these issues developed are followed by a massive chapter on the arguments over the words of consecration at Mass. Each of these chapters is supported by an annexe containing extended extracts from her authorities excellently translated into French, with the Latin originals and some other important documents. She concludes her book with a carefully crafted conclusion, a huge series of endnotes, a comprehensive bibliography, and subject and person indexes.

The first chapter opens with an account of the controversial claim by Berengarius of Tours (ca 1010-1080) that the substance of bread remained after the words of consecration had made it into a sign of Christ. He supported his case against the solid defence of the traditional doctrine of transsubstantiation by Lanfranc (1005-1089) with a massive dossier from Augustine, centring it on a dialectician's exegesis of Augustine's definition of the sign:

Signum est enim res praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire. [A sign is a thing which, quite apart from the outward appearance it presents to the senses, makes something else come into the mind.] (*De doctrina christiana* 2.1.1)

Berengarius reads this definition very literally. As a sign is by nature perceptible to the senses, and presents something different from itself (*aliquid aliud*) to the mind, he draws the conclusion that the image the Eucharist brings to the mind is in a relation of similitude to Christ, not in one of identity. This semiotic argument he reinforces by dialectical principles drawn from *Categories* 14 and Porphyry's *Isagoge*, and by the principle that accidents can only be supported by an appropriate substance: a human body can not support the accidents of bread and wine.

These arguments, as Rosier-Catach points out, set out the terms for later developments in sacramental theology. It would seem their most long-lasting result was replacing the vague description of a sacrament as "a sign of a sacred thing" (*signum rei sacrae*) by the definition, "an outward sign of inward grace instituted by Jesus Christ", which is still found in modern catechisms. The immediate issue, however, was defusing Berengarius's interpretation of Augustine's sign theory, and developing a rational basis for traditional doctrine by more flexible use of his methods. To this end theologians worked independently of the Faculty of Arts to build interpretation into their model of perception. Their examination of the notion of visibility set off rigorous redefinition of Augustine's terms: Petrus Cantor for instance, distinguishes between the "direct visibility" of something immediately obvious to the senses, and the "indirect visibility" of something hidden, like a hand inside a glove. Rosier-Catach credits this sort of thinking with blurring Augustine's clear distinction between signifier and signified: for instance, Richard Fishacre (d. 1248), one of the pioneers of Aristotelian philosophy at Oxford, observes that both the *sensibile* and the *intelligibile* can be signs and significates. His corollary was that the word, *sacramentum*, meant three things: a material sign, its significate (*res sacramenti*), and the permanent effect of the sacramental rite.

Berengarius's chief sticking-point, that the Eucharist was a cause as well as a sign of grace, was dealt with by skilled recourse to dialectic. Even though sacraments were *signa data* by reason of their institution, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure invoked the potency-and-act model which is frequent in grammar: like words sacraments have a natural aptitude or potency to signify, which passes to act when their signification is realised in a context. The contradiction between signification by nature and signification by institution was resolved by the assertion, which seems to be due to Roger Bacon, that a natural sign could be designated to signify relations, so that it could be in both a relation of simili-

tude and a causal relation with its significate. Baptism, for instance, was a natural sign signifying by similitude with water and its power of cleansing, but Christ gave it the tasks of imparting grace and cleansing Original Sin by institution.

Similitude between Christ and his presence to the mind and the lack of it between him and the bread had been one of Berengarius's arguments against transubstantiation. Rosier-Catach traces how the thirteenth century met this argument by developing the concept of proportional similitude. This was in part function: for example, bread and wine are temporal foods, the Eucharist spiritual. But she shows that there developed a distinction between relation of sign to thing by similitude, which was natural, and by institution which was voluntary. While grammarians cite the barrel-hoop hanging before a tavern as a conventional sign of wine without further comment, Fishacre is among the first to cite it as a sign which requires interpretation because its meaning depended on a similitude not immediately obvious. It is a sign of wine to drink, because it was a part of the barrel the wine was shipped in. Likewise, even if sacraments did not have a physical similitude, they have a conventional similitude to their significate through function.

This chapter also traces developments independent of Berengarius, like the scholastic typology of demonstrative, prognostic and commemorative signs. It is through the social repercussions of these various types of signs that sacraments play an important part in teaching religious truths and in the cohesion of the Christian community. There is also a short account, which Rosier-Catach later returns to, of how discussions centred on Anselm's concept of the truth of a sign (*rectitudo*). As a sign must be "true" in both institution and use, the administration of a sacrament was intimately linked with its institution. The rest of this chapter outlines the medieval elaboration of Augustine's matter and form model of the sacraments. Twelfth century discussion of the matter was somewhat haphazard, but the thirteenth century formalised it on Aristotle's hylomorphic model. The matter of a sacrament was a thing or an act, or both together, and its form was the spoken words. The form of the spoken formula was its signification, which defines the purpose and intent, and from which its efficacy is derived. The prime mover of this development according to Rosier-Catach was Hugh of St Cher (1190-1263).

The two rival hypotheses about the efficacy of the sacraments, "physical causality" and *causalité-pacte* (causality by binding agreement) discussed in the next chapter, illustrate how theologians developed the principle of sign as cause from analogies with the world at large. Physical causality was first mooted by Stephen Langton (ca 1150-1228), who compared sacraments to medicines. It was further developed by Hugh of Saint-Cher among others, who appealed to Avicenna's model of the reception of form by matter. Avicenna postulated two parallel causes: one which prepared the matter to receive the form, the second which attributed the form to the matter. Hugh ascribed medicines and sacraments two efficient causes: apothecaries prepared medicines for a specific purpose and God instituted the sacraments, while a doctor administered medicine and a minister the sacraments. Secondly the hypothesis that sacraments acted through some *virtus* inherent in its matter either created by God or placed in the matter through institution or a special intervention had its counterpart in the common belief, which has biblical backing (cf. Ecclesiasticus 38.4) that God had given medicinal properties to certain substances at the time of creation and occasionally infused them into things already in existence.

In that intellectual climate the analogies with popular beliefs on which physical causality was based were inevitably subjected to searching scientific testing. The author states bluntly that the objections thus raised played an important part in the development of *causalité-pacte*. To my mind they recall the three meanings Fishacre gave the word, *sacramentum*. Unlike the *virtus creata* of medicines, the nature and mode of action ascribed to sacraments could not be described in physical terms, there was no way of knowing whether the *virtus* of a sacrament was conferred at the time of institution of administration, and there was

no sense of how long the efficacy of a sacrament lasted. Further, the assumption that the *virtus* of a sacrament was an internal accident ran counter to the principle that sacraments are in relation to the grace they bring. Consequently the virtue of a sacrament adds nothing to its essence, nor can it be a basis for its action (cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* V.2.225.b11).

Rosier-Catach gives Fishacre a pivotal role in the establishment of *causalité-pacte*: in his view God was the only proper cause of the sacraments. Consequently the causality in the sacraments resulted from a contract between God and Man. Man fulfilled his contractual obligations by faith in the conventions God imposed. This principle theologians illustrated by Augustine's example of money: its value is not an accident rising from the essence of the coins, but a relation between it and its value maintained by agreed conventions. They also compared sacraments to insignia of office and rings like a wedding ring or a bishop's ring. When publicly conferred, these act as signs giving the recipient a particular status and imposing responsibilities. She refers briefly to how *causalité-pacte* impinged on the almost universal belief in magic during the Middle Ages. She begins with Augustine's distinction between superstitious practices and true religion, and goes on to a brief discussion of how medieval theologians used Augustine's ruling to distinguish between the sacraments, which were supernatural interventions in human affairs legitimated by a pact with God, and magic, which was also intervention by supernatural forces, but these interventions were invited by pacts with Satan.

From the tenor of Rosier-Catach's discussion, it is clear that *causalité-pacte* was no less controversial than physical causality. Running through her account of mid-thirteenth-century discussions is the implication that the arguments against physical causality do not always apply, and that several theologians, including Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, who do not use the term, *signum efficiens*, to denote a sign which produces an effect on the observer, saw physical causality as an instrument of *causalité-pacte*. She passes on to the fourteenth century by showing how the concept of efficacy displaced Anselm's *rectitudo* as a measure of the validity of a sacrament. The Franciscan, Peter Olivi, postulated that the administration of a sacrament could only actuate its signification and efficacy if the intentions of minister and recipient were consonant with the divine intention governing its institution. This Duns Scotus developed into a definitive version of *causalité-pacte*, in order to refute Aquinas's view of the matter. As a *signum efficiens* a sacrament is in relation as relative to correlative to both its significate and the element that that significate is founded on, a relation in which intention plays a pivotal role. The chapter finishes with a comment on discussions about meaning in the Faculty of Arts. Rosier-Catach draws attention to two opposing tendencies which run parallel to the theologians' *causalité-pacte* and physical causality respectively: the Augustinian idea that word-meaning was purely conventional, and the Aristotelian view adopted by the *modistae* in particular, that meaning depended in part on features of the significate. She leaves the question of whether there was some cross-influence between the two faculties hanging in the air. I would think there was.

Quite deliberately the author implies that supporters of both hypotheses about the efficacy of the sacraments were dealing with an assembly of intractable variables that even the most eminent, like Aquinas, Bonaventure and Scotus, could not manage. The reader is left with the sense that the issue of causality was never resolved, or perhaps it could not be resolved.

The most important element in the subtext of Rosier-Catach's chapter on sacramental formulas is the role of authoritative tradition in building doctrine in the face of an almost complete lack of Scriptural authority. The medievals claimed that the sacramental formulas had been authored by the Church in a manner consonant with the spirit of what Biblical accounts there were. For example, the baptismal formula "N., ego te baptizo in nomine Patris, et Filii et Spiritus Sancti" [N., I baptise you in the name of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.], is based on Christ's mandate to the apostles, "Euntes

ergo docete omnes gentes: baptizantes eos in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus sancti." [Go forth, therefore, and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.] (Matthew 28.19), which theologians argued was a command to the Apostles, even if Christ had couched it in terms of a description of their responsibilities.

The second issue is the adequacy of the formulas, whose importance rose out of the twin issues of their institution and their function as forms of the sacraments. The author remarks the unconscious assumption in the Latin Church that Latin was the language in which these formulas had originally been drafted. Her accounts of minute discussions of the force of each word in the Latin baptismal formula show the theologians' deep concern with the forensic effect of words. For it is not only the meaning that is at issue: it is the social function of each word in the formula, such as the priest's assumption of responsibility through the redundant pronoun, *ego*, the precise designation of the act by the verb, *baptizo*, and the precise designation of the recipient by *te*. Her interesting section on the almost unknown proposals that sacramental formulas should be translated into the vernaculars for pastoral reasons recall the arguments justifying the introduction of vernacular liturgies during the twentieth century. Again she demonstrates that theological issues were resolved by secular means: the efficacy of the formulas could be preserved depended on the principle that grammar was the same in all languages and on Aristotle's arguments for the identity of the passions across languages. This guaranteed the universality of significates, or to put it more technically, the *unitas nominis* (unity of the word), which could not be impugned by language differences because they were by nature accidental: for example, *homo* and ἄνθρωπος were considered the "same" word because they share the same definition, and *pater* and *peire* were identical because they are related by etymology.

The last substantive issue, on which theologians did not always see eye to eye, was the integrity of the formulas when pronounced, a worry because of the uncertain Latinity of many of the medieval parish clergy, and, one suspects, the stylistic pretensions of the better educated. The tone of Rosier-Catach's account shows that theology was becoming much more formalist in its outlook. Twelfth-century theologians like Bernard of Clairvaux argued that if a minister had the proper intention, mangling the formula did not damage the meaning, as the *virtus* of a formula resided in its intention. On the other hand, most thirteenth-century scholastics saw *virtus* as a feature of the sign itself, and argued that the formulas had to be word-perfect as they were not efficacious unless both *significatum* and *modus significandi* remained intact. They distinguished modifications harmful to the efficacy of a sacrament from harmless by grammatical and rhetorical analysis. For example *Genitor*, a title focussing on the act of begetting, could not be substituted for *Pater*, which denoted the Father as a person.

The chapter on intention revolves around the obligations imposed on minister and recipient by the divine institution of the sacraments and their acceptance by the Church. Rosier-Catach's brief look at the relations posed between institution and intention would indicate that theologians saw institution as akin to the imposition of a word. Where a properly qualified impositor imposed a meaning on a word, Christ as the properly qualified "impositor" had given a specific meaning to the matter of a sacrament and unified the disparate elements of the sacramental sign. Consequently the minister acts as Christ's deputy and takes on the obligation of fulfilling the conditions laid down by the institution of the sacrament in question. The chapter then gives an account of the lively debates about the validity of sacraments administered by heretics and priests in the state of sin, their intentions at the time of administration, and the minister's obligation to respect the prescribed rituals. Concern that following the ritual laid down by the Church made it difficult to judge the sincerity of the minister's intention, produced some discussion over the primacy of word or intention in a liturgical ritual.

Theologians expected the production and reception of sacramental formulas to be subject to a "symmetry of intention" between minister and recipient of a sacrament and also to harmony "between mouth and heart". Even if the grammarian (like the modern linguist, it must be said) concentrated on the production of an utterance, the theologian was equally interested its reception, whose efficacy depended on the intentions, knowledge and intellectual capacity of the recipient, and his assent to the proceedings. The author details the uncomfortable discussions about forced baptisms and marriages provoked by the need for assent. The role of assent often depended on what sort of causality the theologian concerned postulated for these sacraments.

The section on oaths, lies and perjury draws the reader's attention to the keen medieval sense of the responsibility of a speaker to express his meaning and the responsibility of the hearer to reciprocate by interpreting him within the sense and intent of his utterance. This sense of responsibility underlies the importance placed by theological debates on the moral and social repercussions of utterances and their bearing on the validity of the sacraments. An oath was a public utterance calling God to witness the truth of a statement or the sincerity of a promise. Deliberate lies were sins on the part of a person and also acts with social repercussions. An utterance is true if the modes of understanding and the modes of signifying match. A lie therefore harms the social fabric by frustrating the expressive and communicative purpose of language. Oaths and lies come together in perjury, which calls God to witness the truth of a false statement, or the validity of a promise one does not intend to keep. Hence, though lies and deception negate the validity of other sacraments, they are crucially harmful in matrimony whose essence is the public exchange of consent between bride and groom.

Underlying the whole thrust of this chapter is the moral principle, enunciated as early as Hilary of Poitiers, that the significance of a statement should be judged not only on its meaning, but also on its intention. This principle, which was part of the law of contract Rosier-Catach footnotes to Gratian, she could also have mentioned that it had its source in Roman Law.

The problems posed theologians by the Eucharist result in the longest and most complex chapter in the book. The Eucharist is the only sacrament which brings about complete transformation of its matter (the bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ), and whose sacramental formula is its sole efficient cause. Moreover the words of consecration are the only sacramental formula to have something close to verbatim scriptural authority: they are a conflation of the words attributed to Christ in the three synoptic gospels and in St Paul, 1 Corinthians 11.23-24. Once again, theologians based all their argumentation on the Latin text.

The chapter opens with a return to Berengarius, and his claim that *Hoc est enim corpus meum* denoted impanation because it was logically inadequate to denote the complete transformation postulated by transsubstantiation. Rosier-Catach shows how theologians countered him with sophisticated use of his own weapons. She gives a long list of thirteenth-century paraphrases whose purpose was exegesis of this formula and elimination of heresy by couching the doctrine of transsubstantiation in terms of a movement between a *terminus a quo*, and a *terminus ad quem*. Paraphrases like *panis transit in (fit) corpus Christi* were acceptable; *de pane fit corpus Christi*, for instance, was not acceptable because it implied a causal relationship between the bread and the presence of Christ. She sums up the whole argument in an informative table which matches the extant paraphrases, legitimate and illegitimate, with model sentences from handbooks of dialectic and the principles they exemplify.

Her discussion of the formulas themselves focusses on how theologians used arguments drawn from grammar and the *Physics* to clarify the balance between meaning and performative function. As it denotes substance and not person, the neuter demonstrative pronoun, *hoc*, states that both the substance of bread and the substance of Christ are present

on the altar. There was never complete agreement over when the bread ceased to be present and Christ become present, and over the nature of presence to the mind. Theologians had more success with the substantive verb, *est* (is), which denotes existence rather than change, and its relation to the conversion of the elements. They were, of course, bound by the Gospel text. Suggestions that it would have been better if Christ had used *fit* (becomes) or a jussive subjunctive (*sit* or *fiat*) were dismissed on the grounds that *est* is a performative by function because a sacramental formula must signify the outcome of its sacrament, which can only be done by the present indicative. The third difficulty was the *suppositio* of *meum*: it did not seem logical that it should refer to both the person who said it and to Christ who was being reported. Finally, consecrating the bread separately from the wine raised the insoluble question of whether Christ was entirely present under both forms.

Unlike Berengarius who had applied the laws of dialectic without taking context into account, theologians took it for granted that the words of consecration could only function within their liturgical context. They are the climax of a short narrative of the Last Supper. Rosier-Catach's account of the lively discussions of the priest's role illustrates how the theologians mollified unease with the direct quotes in the liturgical narrative by slightly twisting the norms of dialectic. There was agreement that priest begins by speaking *recitative*, that is as narrator. But when he recites the words of consecration, he is taking on the persona of Christ, which raised the issue of whether he is still speaking as narrator, or *significative*, as Christ had. The majority answer to this conundrum was that the priest was speaking both *recitative* and *significative*, a solution demanding *meum* have double supposition. The development of the theory of *demonstratio* in the late 1240s was crucial in solving the pragmatics of the Eucharistic formulas. Rosier-Catach succinctly traces its development by grammarians and logicians as a preface to an account of the theologians' rejection of *demonstratio concepta* (concept of demonstration) as the operative factor in favour of *demonstratio exercita ad intellectum* (demonstration brought about to the intellect). She takes Aquinas and Bonaventure as the pivotal theorists, building on ideas from many others, including Robert Kilwardby. However, she gives Duns Scotus the final word. For he took the argument about the validity of the Eucharistic formula beyond Anselm's ideas of *rectitudo* and settled on the efficacy of the formula as a gauge of its validity. For Scotus the mechanism of transsubstantiation was substitution of another being rather than conversion of what had been there, and his seems to be the last word on the subject.

The conclusion sums up the three major lessons of the book. It emphasises that the interaction between theology and the language sciences rose out of sources in common, like Donatus, Priscian and the Aristotelian corpus, but that they used them differently because of the differences in attitudes to language between arts and theology. This is as one would expect, because grammar, logic and theology have different objects, which inevitably result in different expectations of data. The second issue is the relation between the efficacious sign of the title and modern theories of language acts. The author makes easy connections between the work of Grice on implicature, Austin and Searle's "language acts", and Thomas Reid's "social acts" and the *actus exercitatus* (act brought about) or the *signum efficiens* of her medieval theologians. This she strengthens by sidelong glances at Augustine and others who analysed language as a tool of teaching. Her third point takes up an issue made explicit by de Libera's foreword, the difference between a sign and a symbol. She makes a particularly striking remark that sacramental theology is one immense gloss on Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*, drawing the reader's attention to overriding importance of the theologians' exegesis of Augustine's definition of the sign. They emphasised the two relations it enters into: as a sign properly so-called, it is in relation to reality to its significate, but as a symbol it is in relation to the person who receives it and interprets it. This then develops into a short discussion of the double value of the sign, as something with a meaning and as something that has an effect on its receiver.

The most important constant in this book is the explicit ranking of faith as an intellectual power, which brings to mind St Anselm's definition of theology as *fides quaerens intellectum* (faith in search of understanding), an aphorism which set out the relationship between the servant sciences and theology. They are there to explain belief, not to overturn it. As versatile handmaids of theology, grammar and dialectic suffer the indignity of being overruled or retrained when they begin to push beyond the bounds of sanctioned belief. Yet the fate and continuing unacknowledged presence of Berengarius are ample testimony to the power theology vested in the sciences of the Trivium.

The second important element in this book is the author's careful analysis of the difference between the theologians' approach to language and that of the grammarians. This is only to be expected as the two sciences have completely different objects as far as language is concerned. She shows that, even if they exemplify again and again the principle that God is not subject to grammar, their relatively orthodox analysis of utterances is coupled with a keen sense of language in context, whether it be social or liturgical. Whether this is due solely to developments within the language sciences, I doubt if Rosier-Catach is in a position to determine. My own feeling is that theology itself with its moral concerns and medieval society which valued the spoken language over the written, had much to do with developing the strong sense of language functions highlighted in this book.

The third issue is the skill with which theologians adapted Berengarius's weapons to deal with the spectres he raised. Berengarius's problems rose from his violently context-free dealings with Augustine's definition, which was countered, unconsciously Rosier-Catach implies, by the realisation that Augustine had constructed his definition around three terms, sign, signifier and interpreting mind. The moral and social developments of this principle through techniques general to the medieval sciences constitute one of the most important threads running through the book. Their other achievement, whose importance to the sacraments the author sets out in some detail, is their rereading of Augustine's watertight distinction between sign and thing signified. This, of course, has relevance elsewhere: it turns up in the relation between *res* and *ratio intelligendi*, which were considered to be in a relationship of thing to sign, and this relationship was replicated in the relation between *ratio intelligendi* and *ratio significandi*.

Since I first read Rosier-Catach's *La parole comme acte* I have at times found myself wondering whether Roger Bacon's functionalist view of grammar would have had the influence it did if he had not been a skilled theologian. But functionalist views were not the property of Bacon alone, and I wonder if they were developed in discussions with his friend, Bonaventure. She gives an excellent picture of the vigour of theological discussion and of its freedom and ferocity and originality within the bounds of received doctrine. She cites a whole galaxy of theologians, giving credit for significant innovation where credit is due. The importance she accords the Franciscan, Bonaventure, and the Dominican, Thomas Aquinas, is no surprise, for their analysis of the sacraments (with refinements from Duns Scotus), was still the received version in twentieth-century theological manuals. What is telling, however, is the attention given lesser known figures from the early thirteenth century, like Richard Fishacre, Richard Middleton, and William of Meliton. By reason of their pioneering contributions they stand out among the huge number of theologians between Abelard and William of Hales who contributed significantly to the building of the theoretical coherence Rosier set out to find.

The last virtue of this book is the author's sober account of the development of the theory of the *signum efficiens* and its kinship with modern ideas on language acts, which lies at the centre of her enterprise. She is right in showing how slow was the development of *demonstratio* into a prototype of the theory of the *signum efficiens*, even if topics essential to language acts, like intention, truth and signification, permeate the book. Her comparison of the point reached by Duns Scotus with the modern work of Searle and Austin is a

very telling comment on the human propensity to ignore what goes on under one's nose. One might have expected that highly ritualised society to have drawn the conclusion that acts or utterances could generate their own significates and have a major effect on the their recipients somewhat more expeditiously.

As Rosier-Catach says in her introduction, she is not primarily concerned with sacramental theology. Her book, however, gives a well-documented, perceptive account of how theologians developed analytical tools from the language sciences, and is, in effect, de Libera's "archeology of the religious sign". By the nature of its subject it is an extremely complex book which demands careful reading, at least a rudimentary grasp of sacramental doctrine and, I would think, familiarity with the philosophical context. Even though those who expect medieval casuistry to reach firm conclusions about the sacraments will certainly be disappointed, Rosier-Catach conclusively shows that argument and discussion among theologians attained coherence of principle and method while allowing for the disagreements over major points which survived the shrewd analyses by Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure.

I would hope that historians of theology and medievalists in general would benefit from this book as much as I have. Once again Rosier-Catach has made a major contribution to our knowledge of the language scholarship of the Middle Ages.

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L.G. KELLY

Claude Panaccio, *Ockham on Concepts* (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy). Ashgate, Aldershot 2004, xi + 197 p. ISBN 0 7546 3228 8

Ockham's theory of concepts has been subject to heated debates for the last twenty years. A number of distinguished commentators carefully analyzed the significance and function of this theory in philosophy of language, ontology and epistemology. Yet, despite the sustained effort to shed light on this influential doctrine, many questions remained unanswered. Is Ockham a reductionist in his account of the basic stock of concepts? Is he committed to the position that concepts are somehow "similitudes" of things in the world? Does he provide an explanation for the origin of logical concepts? These and many more problems gave rise to controversial interpretations. In his highly innovative and stimulating book, Claude Panaccio presents a solution to all of them, thus providing a comprehensive interpretation and defense of Ockham's theory of concepts. He does not confine himself to adding some details to an ongoing debate, but intends to demonstrate "that most of the current interpretative disagreements about his [Ockham's] theory of concepts can be settled [...] on the basis of what he actually wrote." (p. 2) No doubt, this is a bold claim. But Panaccio successfully shows that a number of disagreements can indeed be settled and that the theory Ockham defends is not only coherent and well argued for, but also astonishingly similar to contemporary theories, especially to those that appeal to semantic atomism and representationalism.

In his reconstruction and interpretation of Ockham's theory, Panaccio combines a careful examination of key texts with a critical assessment of recent secondary literature. This is certainly the right method to choose. Given the vast amount of recent publications, it is not necessary to start from scratch when approaching Ockham's theory. Nor should one simply summarize the main theses in a descriptive way. What is needed is a discussion of the problems and alleged inconsistencies pointed out by recent commentators—a discussion that is based upon a detailed analysis of the relevant primary sources. It is precisely to this need that Panaccio responds. He tackles the crucial problems that M. McCord Adams, P. V. Spade, C. Normore, C. Michon, J. Biard, E. Karger and others emphasized

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and tries to show either that Ockham has the theoretical resources to resolve them, or that they disappear if one combines all the pieces of his theory. Let me focus on three problems that have been at the center of scholarly debates.

The first problem concerns the status of connotative terms. It is well known that Ockham takes concepts to be parts of a mental language that includes both absolute and connotative terms. But how is the relation between these two types of terms to be understood? P. V. Spade argued that, ideally, all the simple connotative terms are reducible to absolute ones. Yet this would have fatal consequences. For if the ideal mental language is “purged” of simple connotative terms, there are no simple relational concepts. That is, it has no concepts such as ‘father’ or ‘taller’. But how can there be a language without these concepts, given that they cannot be constructed exclusively from non-relational ones? It seems that Ockham’s reductionist approach is doomed to failure: it ignores the simple fact that relational concepts are non-reducible and non-eliminable.

Panaccio convincingly shows that this problem originates from a false understanding of mental language. Ockham does not take this language to be some sort of ideal construct. Nor does he choose a reductionist approach when explaining the various types of mental terms. In his view, connotative terms are not dispensable and cannot be completely eliminated in nominal definitions. For instance, the definition of ‘father’ would be something like ‘male animal having a child’, ‘child’ being another connotative term. In addition, Panaccio points out that in many cases the connotative term is not synonymous with its nominal definition. The definition simply indicates “the ontological import” (p. 90) of a term, i.e., it makes clear what objects in the world are signified by that term. But these objects can be signified in many different ways. That is why the connotative term cannot simply be replaced by the nominal definition. And in fact, quite often it is not replaced by the speaker—to have a concept is not the same as to spell out its nominal definition.

This rejection of Spade’s interpretation is far more than a correction of a small detail. It elucidates the basic idea that led Ockham to introduce the theory of mental language. His aim was not to construct a “pure” language in which all connotative terms are eliminated, but to explain what kind of mental terms a speaker acquires when he or she is in natural contact with objects in the world. Since these objects are always ordered in a certain way, the set of mental terms inevitably includes connotative terms that signify the various orderings. It is therefore an ontological thesis that lurks in the background: orderings in the world require terms that do not simply signify isolated things, but the way they are related to each other.

Another controversial point is Ockham’s thesis that concepts are “similitudes” of things in the world. This thesis makes sense in the light of his early *factum*-theory, for *ficta* (i.e., special entities with “objective being”) can indeed be taken to be intellectual pictures of external things. But how can the thesis be understood within the framework of the later act-theory? How can a mental act be a similitude of an external thing? Some commentators thought that Ockham failed to provide a satisfying answer to this crucial question. Others argued that he gave up the idea of similitude in favor of a causal explanation of concepts. Panaccio strictly rejects both interpretations. Referring to crucial passages in Ockham’s later works, he shows that the idea of similitude plays a prominent role in the act-theory. And he contends that this idea can be given a clear sense if one compares intellectual acts to physical acts such as catching a ball. When I grasp a ball, my hands have a certain position that fits this ball and all other balls that have the same shape. Likewise, when I intellectually grasp an object, my intellect takes a certain “posture” that fits this object and all other objects that are relevantly like it. The important point is that it fits many objects and thereby becomes a general concept: “What transforms the grasping act into

a general representation is that it fits the shape of the grasped object, thus resembling it to some extent . . ." (p. 124).

No doubt, this is an elegant explanation that has at least two advantages. First, it takes Ockham's talk about similitude seriously without turning it into a naive picture-theory. Second, it makes clear why similitude is required in addition to causality. For causality relates an act to a single object only, whereas similitude relates it to many objects and therefore enables the act to be a general concept. Despite its elegance, Panaccio's explanation leaves a crucial question open. In the case of the ball, it is understandable why the position of the hands can fit the ball: the material shape of one thing (hands) can fit the material shape of another thing (ball). In the case of the object that is intellectually grasped, the similitude is not so easily understandable. How can the *immaterial* "posture" of the intellect fit the *material* shape of an object? Panaccio frequently uses the expression "posture", unfortunately without giving it a precise meaning in the immaterial realm. What exactly does it mean that my intellect takes a certain posture when it grasps, say, a tree? Does it acquire something like an immaterial shape of the tree, distinguishable from the immaterial shape of a ball or a house? And is there a one-to-one relation between immaterial and material shapes? It seems to me that the comparison with a "manual concept" (p. 124) is informative only if these questions are fully answered—questions that inevitably arise within an ontological framework that distinguishes between immaterial and material entities.

A third issue that has been eagerly debated by recent commentators concerns the origin of logical concepts. Ockham clearly includes these concepts in mental language when he claims that there are mental syncategorematic terms. But on what basis are they formed? Categorematic terms are normally formed on the basis of an immediate perceptual relation with things in the world; my seeing of a tree enables me to come up with the term 'tree'. But there is no thing such as "an if" that would trigger the formation of the term 'if'. So how can I come up with this syncategorematic term? Panaccio is well aware of this problem. This term cannot simply be formed on the basis of a spoken or written term. Otherwise a significant part of mental language would become derivative of conventional language. That is why Panaccio thinks that Ockham subscribes to innatism: "... these logical acts correspond to *innate capacities of the mind*." (p. 154) This is a convincing explanatory strategy, even if the texts are not very explicit, as Panaccio concedes. It provides an elegant answer to the questions of (a) why all human beings are able to acquire the same stock of logical concepts, regardless of the objects they are in touch with, and (b) why the formation of these concepts does not depend on the mastering of a specific conventional language. In addition, this explanatory strategy nicely illustrates the striking similarity between Ockham's and Fodor's approach to mental language. Yet one should not overlook an important consequence this explanation has: it makes Ockham to some extent a rationalist, i.e., a philosopher who does not exclusively appeal to "conceptual empiricism",¹ but who claims that a significant part of the conceptual apparatus is *not* acquired through sensory experience.

Panaccio's careful interpretation shows that most (perhaps not all) exegetical puzzles can be resolved. And the comparison he draws between Ockham's and Fodor's (to some extent also Putnam's) theory of concepts makes clear that there is "no fatal incommensurability" (p. 181) between medieval and modern doctrines. It is in fact the commensurability that allows him to present Ockham as a philosopher who elaborates a theory of concepts

¹ This is how M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 1987, 495, characterizes Ockham's project.

that is appealing not just to medievalists, but also to analytic philosophers who defend a representationalist, externalist, and nominalist conception of concepts. What emerges from his book is a *Guilelmus resurrectus* who can easily engage in discussions with contemporary thinkers.

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DOMINIK PERLER

Richard Billingham, *'De consequentiis' mit Toledo-Kommentar*. Kritisch herausgegeben, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Stephanie Weber. B.R. Grüner, Amsterdam/Philadelphia 2003. (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, Band 38). xxviii + 335 S., ISBN 90 6032 367 X

In der Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Logik ist der Engländer Richard Billingham (*floruit* um 1350) zweifelsohne bekannt wegen seines Traktates *Speculum Puerorum sive Terminus est in quem*. Diese Arbeit ist eine empiristisch orientierte Logik, d.h. in diesem Fall, eine Logik die besonders individuelle Gegenstände, Eigenschaftsgraden (d.h. die Untersuchung von Sätzen mit 'mehr oder weniger', zum Beispiel 'Sortes ist grösser als Plato') und physische Gegebenheiten ('Anfang', 'Ende' usw.) berücksichtigt. Diese Logik ist, glaube ich, auf diese Weise eine rivalisierende Theorie zu der Suppositionslehre des Summulisten Petrus Hispanus.

Richard Billingham hat aber mehr geschrieben, unter anderen ein Traktat *De consequentiis*. Dr. Stephanie Weber hat in dem hier zu besprechenden Buch auf vorzügliche Weise dieses Traktat kritisch herausgegeben und erklärt.

Sie hat nicht nur das Traktat Billinghams in drei Versionen und einen Kommentar zu Billinghams Text der sich in Toledo befindet, *Catedral, Cab.* 94-27, ff. 75r-90v, in einer kritischen Edition vorgelegt und historisch situiert, jedoch diesen auch kritisch kommentiert. Sie gibt weiter einige Bemerkungen über Billinghams Leben und Werke.

Zum Ersten die Edition selbst. Dr. Weber präsentiert die Handschriften, nicht nur diejenigen die zur Ausgabe Billingham's Arbeit verwendet werden, jedoch auch die zur Edition des Toledo-Kommentars zum Billinghams Traktat. Diese letzte findet man in drei Versionen (Salamanca, *Bibl. Universitaria* 1882, ff. 120r-123v; Oxford, *Bodleian Lib.*, *Lat. misc.* E 100, ff. 56r-62r; Roma, *Bibl. Casanatense* 5445, ff. 108 Ar-119v). Es gibt eine vierte Version (Barcelona, *ACA, Ripoll*, 166, ff. 1r-5r), jedoch, wie Dr. Weber sagt, ist der Handschrift zu stark beschädigt, so dass eine Edition nicht sinnvoll wäre.

Die Versionen unterscheiden sich zu sehr um einen einheitlichen Text abzufertigen: der *apparatus criticus* würde unübersichtbar sein. In den Editionen des *Speculum Puerorum*, die von A. Maierü in 1970 und, auf neue Weise, von L.M. de Rijk in 1975 hergestellt sind, lässt sich auch diese Schwierigkeit sehen. Fast jedes Manuskript das einen Text des *Speculum* enthält, gibt eine eigene fast selbständige Version.

Im Interpretationsteil bespricht Dr. Weber zum Ersten den Folgerungsbegriff im Traktat Billinghams. Weiter kommentiert der Verfasser die materielle Folgerung (§ I.2), und die Definition der gültigen und ungültigen Folgerung im Toledo-Kommentar (§ I.3). In diesem Interpretationsteil bespricht sie weiter die speziellen und generellen Regeln, die sich in Billinghams Traktat vorfinden. Eine Bibliographie und Indexe (Eigennamen und lateinische—nicht deutsche—Begriffe) schliessen das Buch ab.

Dr. Weber behandelt ein wichtiges Thema: die Folgerungslehre. Wie sie auseinander setzt, ist diese Lehre ein neues Element in der mittelalterlichen Logik. Die Logik des Aristoteles war syllogistisch, und orientiert auf Termini; die Folgerungslehre dagegen auf Sätze, was mehr prinzipiell ist. Die mittelalterliche Lehre ist nicht auf die der Stoa basiert, aber besonders im 14. Jahrhundert, neu entwickelt. Im 12. Jahrhundert gab es auch Neueentwicklungen, aber die Meister des 14. Jahrhundert haben diese nicht gekannt, wie sie mit Recht sagt.

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DOMINIK PERLER

Richard Billingham, *'De consequentiis' mit Toledo-Kommentar*. Kritisch herausgegeben, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Stephanie Weber. B.R. Grüner, Amsterdam/Philadelphia 2003. (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, Band 38). xxviii + 335 S., ISBN 90 6032 367 X

In der Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Logik ist der Engländer Richard Billingham (*floruit* um 1350) zweifelsohne bekannt wegen seines Traktates *Speculum Puerorum sive Terminus est in quem*. Diese Arbeit ist eine empiristisch orientierte Logik, d.h. in diesem Fall, eine Logik die besonders individuelle Gegenstände, Eigenschaftsgraden (d.h. die Untersuchung von Sätzen mit 'mehr oder weniger', zum Beispiel 'Sortes ist grösser als Plato') und physische Gegebenheiten ('Anfang', 'Ende' usw.) berücksichtigt. Diese Logik ist, glaube ich, auf diese Weise eine rivalisierende Theorie zu der Suppositionslehre des Summulisten Petrus Hispanus.

Richard Billingham hat aber mehr geschrieben, unter anderen ein Traktat *De consequentiis*. Dr. Stephanie Weber hat in dem hier zu besprechenden Buch auf vorzügliche Weise dieses Traktat kritisch herausgegeben und erklärt.

Sie hat nicht nur das Traktat Billinghams in drei Versionen und einen Kommentar zu Billinghams Text der sich in Toledo befindet, *Catedral, Cab.* 94-27, ff. 75r-90v, in einer kritischen Edition vorgelegt und historisch situiert, jedoch diesen auch kritisch kommentiert. Sie gibt weiter einige Bemerkungen über Billinghams Leben und Werke.

Zum Ersten die Edition selbst. Dr. Weber präsentiert die Handschriften, nicht nur diejenigen die zur Ausgabe Billingham's Arbeit verwendet werden, jedoch auch die zur Edition des Toledo-Kommentars zum Billinghams Traktat. Diese letzte findet man in drei Versionen (Salamanca, *Bibl. Universitaria* 1882, ff. 120r-123v; Oxford, *Bodleian Lib.*, *Lat. misc.* E 100, ff. 56r-62r; Roma, *Bibl. Casanatense* 5445, ff. 108 Ar-119v). Es gibt eine vierte Version (Barcelona, *ACA, Ripoll*, 166, ff. 1r-5r), jedoch, wie Dr. Weber sagt, ist der Handschrift zu stark beschädigt, so dass eine Edition nicht sinnvoll wäre.

Die Versionen unterscheiden sich zu sehr um einen einheitlichen Text abzufertigen: der apparatus criticus würde unübersichtbar sein. In den Editionen des *Speculum Puerorum*, die von A. Maierü in 1970 und, auf neue Weise, von L.M. de Rijk in 1975 hergestellt sind, lässt sich auch diese Schwierigkeit sehen. Fast jedes Manuskript das einen Text des *Speculum* enthält, gibt eine eigene fast selbständige Version.

Im Interpretationsteil bespricht Dr. Weber zum Ersten den Folgerungsbegriff im Traktat Billinghams. Weiter kommentiert der Verfasser die materielle Folgerung (§ I.2), und die Definition der gültigen und ungültigen Folgerung im Toledo-Kommentar (§ I.3). In diesem Interpretationsteil bespricht sie weiter die speziellen und generellen Regeln, die sich in Billinghams Traktat vorfinden. Eine Bibliographie und Indexe (Eigennamen und lateinische—nicht deutsche—Begriffe) schliessen das Buch ab.

Dr. Weber behandelt ein wichtiges Thema: die Folgerungslehre. Wie sie auseinander setzt, ist diese Lehre ein neues Element in der mittelalterlichen Logik. Die Logik des Aristoteles war syllogistisch, und orientiert auf Termini; die Folgerungslehre dagegen auf Sätze, was mehr prinzipiell ist. Die mittelalterliche Lehre ist nicht auf die der Stoa basiert, aber besonders im 14. Jahrhundert, neu entwickelt. Im 12. Jahrhundert gab es auch Neueentwicklungen, aber die Meister des 14. Jahrhundert haben diese nicht gekannt, wie sie mit Recht sagt.

Dr. Weber präsentiert nicht nur Billingshams Theorie, aber setzt diese in den historischen Kontext. Billingshams Text ist vielleicht nicht der wichtigste der mittelalterlichen Logik. Zum Beispiel die des Ockhams, Buridans und Burleys sind umfangreicher und wichtiger. Dr. Weber bezieht sich auch auf diese in ihrem Buch. Billingshams Traktat ist eher eine Kompilation. Man findet hier nicht immer Klarheit der Gedanken, die man braucht. Dann und wann bezieht sie auch Teile des *Speculum Puerorum* des Billingshams dabei, und das macht ihr Buch hilfreich für dieses Traktat (S. 167).

Billingham definiert die Folgerung mit Hilfe des Konzepts *intelligitur in*: *eine formelle Folgerung ist diejenige wenn der Konsequent verstanden wird im Antezedent*. Wie der Autor sagt, soll dies mit ‚wird verstanden‘ übersetzt werden, nicht mit etwa ‚es ist verstanden‘, weil es ihnen um eine Tätigkeit geht, nicht um ein objektives Erkenntnis, wie man es in der neuzeitlichen Logik meistens versteht. Der Kontext der Folgerungslehre im Mittelalter ist eine *aktuell* geführte Disputation, oft im Rahmen der *Obligationes*. Billingham gehört zu der englischen Tradition, nach welcher man *consequentia* einteilt in *materialis* und *formalis*, und mit *intelligitur in* definiert.

Wie gesagt gibt Dr. Weber auch eine Edition eines Kommentars zu Billingham. Dies ist auch darum interessant, weil man von diesen Kommentaren noch nicht viel weiss. Dieser Kommentar übertrifft besonders was die speziellen Regeln der Folgerungslehre betrifft, die Theorie des Billingshams.

Der Autor geht von der historischen Auseinandersetzung über zu einem systematischen. Dies macht dieses Buch besonders interessant. Sie weist darauf hin, dass die mittelalterlichen Logiker *Consequentia* nicht immer strikt interpretieren, jedoch in einem erweiterten Sinn. Das Kriterium *intelligitur in* wird nicht bei materiellen Folgerungen erfüllt, die Lehre beschränkt sich nicht auf die logischen Regeln (S. 161).

Das vorliegende Buch ist sorgfältig und klar geschrieben, und gut dokumentiert. Die Bibliographie scheint vollständig und aktuell. Man findet auch Korrekturen der *Summa Logice* des Ockhams (zum Beispiel: der Teil über *Obligationes* ist nicht unumstritten Ockhams (S. 150, Fussnote 64); an S. 153, Fussnote 73 sagt sie mit Recht, einen Korrekturvorschlag F. Schupps folgend, dass *non* in Ockham, *Summa logice* III-3.1 (ed. 1970, S. 589, L. 55) gestrichen werden soll).

Die Edition ist gut hergestellt. Nur selten hätte ich andere Lesungen gewünscht. Ich gebe einige Beispiele aus die *Consequentiae* des Billingshams

S. 30, l. 5 von unten: ich schlage vor etwas wie: ‚sed aliqui dicunt <quod> isti sequuntur‘;

S. 45, l. 5 von unten: ‚quot‘ statt ‚quod‘;

S. 45, l. 3 von unten: ‚ultimo‘ oder ‚ulterius‘ statt ‚ultimum‘;

S. 45, l. 2 von unten: ‚quando‘ statt ‚quod‘;

S. 46, letzte Zeile: nach ‚sic patet‘: ‚et cetera‘ soll man besser streichen; ‚etcetera‘ ergänzt die Regel im Manuskript, und hat keine logische Bedeutung;

S. 81, l. 9 von unten: ‚singularis‘ soll wahrscheinlich sein: ‚significans‘;

S. 82, l. 2 von oben: ‚logicali‘ et ‚naturali‘ sind gewöhnlich die Formen des Ablativus;

S. 83, l. 12 von unten: ‚tria‘: wohin verweist der Text? Drei Bemerkungen findet man nicht im Text.

S. 92, l. 4 von oben: ‚quinque‘ soll vielleicht sein: ‚sex‘?

S. 94, l. 12 von Unten: ‚regulas‘ soll man lesen statt ‚regule‘; weiter: ‚dubita‘ (Imperativ) verstehe ich nicht;

S. 98, letzte Zeile, ein Verb fehlt nach ‚quod‘;

S. 100, l. 4 von oben: soll man hier nicht lesen wie etwa: ‚terminum stare immobiliter <est> quando‘?

In der Edition des Toledo-Kommentars hat Dr. Weber einige Fragezeichen in den Text eingeführt, wo sie das Manuskript nicht lesen konnte. Ich habe diese Textprobleme kontrolliert mit der Handschrift, aber kann die korrekten Lesungen auch nicht geben.

Noch eine Korrektur: Unter den Arbeiten Billingham's erwähnt Dr. Weber eine *Logica* (S. xxiii, Nr. 13). Auf S. 321 gibt Sie weitere Details. Das von ihr erwähnte Manuskript, München, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, Clm 4385, ff. 107v-112r, enthält nicht eine Arbeit des Billingham's, auch nicht ein Traktat wo Billingham's Themen aus dem Traktat *Speculum puerorum* behandelt werden, wie Dr. Weber sagt, sondern ein Kommentar zu dem *Speculum puerorum*.¹

Zusammen gefasst: Dr. Weber hat ein sehr empfehlenswertes Buch verfasst.

Universität Leiden

E.P. Bos

¹ *Das Incipit*: CIRCA MATERIAM LIBRI BILIGAM

Circa materiam presentis libri primo videtur queri quid sit subiectum huius et propria passio; secundo quid sit auctor huius libri; tertio quid sit utilitas huius libri, scilicet quare studetur; quarto quid sit tytilus; quinto et <ultimo> quid sunt cause scientie huius libri.

Ad primum respondetur: hoc complexum 'propositio probabilis respectu termini immediati in ea positi', et propria passio eius est 'verum vel falsum probabile'. Et licet in libro *Topicorum* etiam habetur, tamen non ratione primi termini mediati

Das Explicit: Et si *diceretur*: si ista est concedenda 'homo tantum currit', tunc ista etiam est concedenda 'hoc tantum currit', *respondetur*: verum est, et quando *diceretur*: tamen illa 'hoc tantum currit' infert (Mmg) istum 'tantum homo currit', quia non refert preponere, *respondetur* quod non refert preponere licet quoad terminum singularem tamen refert quoad alium terminum, quia ibi 'hoc tantum currit', ly 'currit' non distribuitur, sed ibi 'tantum hoc currit', ibi ly 'currit' distribuitur, et ergo refert preponere.

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
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
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